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This thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy,
based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis
consists of two parts. 
In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based
on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as
intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that
identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as
patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor
guide to moral reality.
In the second part,  I  identify and explore of  a number of  themes and tendencies  from
feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw
out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I
examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually
use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and
a different type of,  abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance,  in the
context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I
argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary
methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral
philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential
part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position
for the methodology of moral philosophy.
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INTRODUCTION
Moral philosophy is typically researched, written and taught as though it can, by and large, be
kept  separate  from  political  concerns,  as  though  we  can  make  judgements  about  theft  and
euthanasia, and choose between theories like utilitarianism and deontology, without worrying too
much about the social world where these judgements and theories have been developed, and are
to be applied. As my experiences both within and outside of philosophy made me more aware of
the  ubiquity  of  political  concerns,  I  became increasingly  suspicious  of,  and frustrated  by  this
attitude within philosophy, and this thesis is largely a product of that suspicion and frustration.
The goal of this thesis is quite diffuse; I do not just aim to stake any particular position
within a recognised philosophical debate, or defend a single philosophical view. Rather, the project
is to identify and explore some themes and tendencies that I have encountered within feminist,
and more generally anti-oppressive, research and practice, and to apply those insights I uncover to
the methodology of moral philosophy. In doing so, I develop a number of feminist critiques of the
methodology of moral philosophy, as it is currently practised, without meaning to ever present a
complete picture of how moral philosophy should be done, a singular right methodology. That said,
a  number  of  recurring  themes  come  together  to  present  a  coherent  view  of  how  of  moral
philosophy may be better practised, with greater epistemic humility, a greater diversity of methods
and interests, and much more weight placed on the experiences and judgements of those who
suffer from injustice.
Naturally, I deal with many more political concerns and debates than most works of moral
philosophy. Nonetheless, though this thesis may go some way towards problematising any sharp
distinction between moral and political philosophy, I do identify this thesis as a work in moral
philosophy,  addressed to those who work in  moral  philosophy.  I  am specifically  arguing that
moral philosophy needs to be more political, to deal more directly with the political, not just in
order to be relevant, but also to be good and accurate.
Structurally,  I  see  this  thesis  as  separable  into  two  unequal  sections.  The  first  three,
relatively short chapters begin in what I take to be something like the mainstream of academic
moral philosophy, at least in the analytic, anglophone tradition that I have largely been educated
in.  I  aim  to  present  a  rough  picture  of  how  moral  philosophy  is  typically  practised,  before
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examining a few possible critiques of that practice, eventually arguing in favour of a fairly radical
political critique rooted in the critical social theories, such as feminism and critical race theory. The
last three chapters, which make up the bulk of the thesis, have fewer points of connection with
mainstream  moral  philosophy,  as  I  develop  this  radical  political  critique  through  direct
engagement with those critical social theories, exploring themes and employing theories in order
to  challenge  particular  arguments,  debates,  and  methodologies  that  I  take  to  be  typical  of
mainstream moral philosophy. My direct interest in those arguments and debates, particular the
abortion debate which I discuss a number of times, is, in this thesis, secondary to my interest in
using them to illustrate something about philosophical methodology.
Given this structure, I could hope that the thesis would be well suited to lead an audience
situated in the mainstream of  moral  philosophy towards feminist  insights  and understanding.
However, for reasons that I discuss in the final chapter, I am not particularly confident that this
thesis could reliably accomplish such a thing, and I would not consider it a failure if it fails to do
so. Rather I  suspect that some sympathy towards,  if not familiarity with,  the political claims I
explore might be necessary to entirely follow and be convinced by my arguments. That is to say,
ultimately I imagine my audience to be those who are already somewhat inclined to engage with
feminist  and anti-oppressive  theories;  perhaps  even  those,  like  myself  upon  commencing  my
postgraduate studies, entirely educated in mainstream moral philosophy but sympathetic to, even
desperate for, feminist theory.
The shape of the thesis mirrors my own philosophical development. When I began to work
on it, my interest and much of my moral philosophical knowledge was in Henry Sigdwick and
contemporary Utilitarian ethics. I began work on a thesis aimed at defending normative hedonism
as a theory of well-being. Though very little of this work remains, considereing intuition-based
arguments against hedonism,set me down the methodological path that I have followed to a quite
distant philosophical destination. Of course, this history has shaped the final thesis, particularly
due to the depth of knowledge it gave me about mainstream analytic ethics, and the relative lack
of knowledge I started with around feminist ethics and methodologies. 
The thesis has also been significantly shaped by my own position and experiences as a
trans woman. For example, my early interest in critiquing the use of intuition in moral philosophy
was guided by these experiences, particularly by my gradual realisation that my own non-explicit
moral intuitions and attitudes were not just unfounded and contingent, but actually made my own
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life unliveable. To uncover such attitudes, in both myself and others, and to reject their validity
was not just a theoretical, but also a practical necessity.1 Similarly, upon coming to feminist theory,
many of my interests and attitudes were shaped by my particular experiences as a trans woman,
and by the work of other transfeminists; most obviously my deep suspicion of essentialism in
feminism, and my interest in the epistemic power of transformative experience. 
Relatedly,  my background has also given me a complicated relationship to the work of
many of  the cisgender feminists  I  discuss,  which has often been produced in the context  of  a
deeply transphobic, trans-exclusionary feminist movement. As Katherine Cross has put it, “to be a
trans woman who proposes to become an academic feminist is to consciously walk across shards
of glass — bits of the canon hither and thither written by people, mostly white cis women, who
could not see you as anything other than a ghostly abstraction made up of their nightmares. And I
have to learn from them.“2
Due to the influence of this background, though I only occasionally discuss topics relating
specifically to trans folk, I consider this thesis to be a work of transfeminism, a contribution to and
continuation of that relatively young intellectual and political tradition. In particular, I would like
to acknowledge my immense intellectual, philosophical, and personal debt to other transfeminists,
trans theorists, and trans woman writers, from whom I have learned so much.
Of course, this thesis is also influenced by the other social positions I occupy, perhaps most
notably as white and middle-class. The social privileges afforded to me by these positions have
shaped, and usually restricted, my worldview. I have been protected from many of the most overt
forms  of  oppression,  such  as  violence,  homelessness  and  incarceration,  which  are
disproportionately inflicted upon trans women of colour. I have been educated into racist, white
supremacist ways of thinking, and my social position has given me less personal motivation to
overcome these ideologies. Though I now try to learn from and engage with the work of feminists
of  colour,  and  other  anti-racist  theorists,  the  task  of  combating  my  own  epistemologies  of
ignorance  is  ongoing.3 My  tendency  in  this  thesis  to  focus  on  feminist  issues,  thinkers,  and
theories,  in preference to other  anti-oppressive theories,  is  a  particularly  obvious result  of  my
position as a white woman.
1 Though I have not explored this theme in the depth that it deserves, there are hints of it in chapters 2 and 6.
2 Cross (2014a), “May We Have This Dance? On Learning and Writing as a Trans Woman of Color,” Feministing, 
December 11th, 2014, http://feministing.com/2014/12/11/may-we-have-this-dance-on-learning-and-writing-as-a-
trans-woman-of-color/ 
3 I will discuss this issue of social position, and particularly epistemologies of ignorance, in chapter 5.
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Many of the issues raised in this thesis – of abstraction, objectivity, identity, social ontology,
and so forth – are extremely philosophically deep, and discussed in a huge body of literature both
within and outside of feminist philosophy. As such, it often necessary for me to quite brutally
contain the scope of my thesis. My primary interest is in questions of methodology and moral
philosophy, and my interest in many of the important,  related topics that arise is secondary; I
discuss them as they are relevant to moral methodology, but not for their own sake. As such, I
frequently pull the focus of my writing back to whenever it threatens to wander. This means that I
often put aside issues that others may find more interesting, or philosophically essential.
Most notably, due to the extreme depth and complexity of the issue, I have tried to avoid
the debates over realism and anti-realism in ethics, and often use terms like “true” or “accurate,”
while hoping that nothing I say hangs on a commitment to any particularly strong position on these
issues.4 That said, throughout this thesis I draw upon a range of theories advocated by a mix of
pragmatists, moral realists, and a few postmodernists, while hoping the insights I take from them
would not be entirely and fatally invalidated by a difference of meta-ethics. Most obviously, the
standpoint theory which I draw upon through much of chapters five and six stands in a complex
and sometimes unclear relation to all three of these meta-ethical positions.5 I ultimately believe the
theory survives these tensions, for the reasons discussed by its advocates, but I have not devoted
much work towards a dedicated examination of this issue. However, at a minimum I take myself
to be  committed, along with Charles Mills, to a kind of minimal realism, where “truth, falsity, facts,
reality, and so forth are not enclosed with ironic scare-quotes.”6
Another concept which I never directly address, though it appears throughout a great deal
of this thesis, is liberalism. Due to my background in, and focus on moral philosophy, I did not
initially identify liberalism as a target of my critiques. However, liberalism emerged as a theme in
the  thesis  as  I  noticed  that  many  of  the  philosophical  works  I  draw  upon  were  targeting,
sometimes primarily, various aspects of liberalism – liberal abstraction, liberal epistemology, even
liberal  feminism.  Conversely,  some  of  the  philosophers  I  draw  upon  a  great  deal  describe
4 I discuss the danger of focusing too heavily on such 'foundational' issues in chapter 2, in the section "Further 
Differences in the Three Approaches."
5 See Hekman (1997), "Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited," Signs 22:2, pp. 341-365, which 
takes a postmodern position in order to critique standpoint theories on this issue. See also the relies from Hartsock, 
Collins, Harding and Smith, following in the same journal, and further Kukla & Ruetsche (2002), "Contingent 
Natures and Virtuous Knowers: Could Epistemology be Gendered?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32:3, pp. 389-
418.
6 Mills (2007), "White Ignorance," in Sullivan and Tuana (2007), p. 15.
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themselves as liberals; most notably Charles Mills, who advocates "black radical liberalism."7 The
task of relating the specific methodological tendencies I discuss to some possible role within liberal
discourse or institutions is  not one that I  engage in,  through it  is  sometimes discussed by the
philosophers whose work I draw upon.8
It is notable that many of the wider themes and issues I touch upon throughout the thesis
are also of particular interest to liberal political theory. For example, a major theme in the later
chapters of this thesis is, roughly, the idea that reasoning which proceeds from some particular
perspective  or  standpoint  may be  inaccessible  (in  some sense)  to  those  who occupy different
standpoints. This may be seen to echo Rawls' particular interest, in Political Liberalism, in the fact
that "Different conceptions of the world can reasonably be elaborated from different standpoints
and diversity arises in part from our distinct perspectives."9 This fact underlies Rawls' position
regarding the priority of the right over the good, a central elements in his version of political
liberalism. However, despite the apparent similarity, the kind of perspective and standpoints I am
interested in seem quite importantly different to those that interest Rawls. Rawls is concerned with
"opposing and conflicting philosophical doctrines,”10 but the very way that I and other feminists
conceive of the opposing interests we are concerned with seems to pre-emptively block the liberal
solution  that  Rawls  wants  to  promote.  The  opposition  between  a  feminist  standpoint  and  a
patriarchal standpoint is deep and fundamental; the feminist standpoint is specifically oriented
around challenging and rejecting a patriarchal standpoint. Insofar as some political arrangement
was devised to allow these doctrines to coexist, the feminist must consider this – the continued
existence and influence of a patriarchal standpoint – to constitute a kind of failure of feminist
politics. Relatedly, as I will discuss in chapter 4, because the feminist conceives of the patriarchal
perspective  as  politically  dominant  and  powerful,  any  solution  to  the  problem  of  conflicting
standpoints based on liberal neutrality must be seen as implicitly favouring the patriarchal status
quo.  For these reasons,  I  see both my understanding and treatment of  the issue of  conflicting
political standpoints as somewhat more radical than that of liberal philosophers such as Rawls.
7 Mills (2015), "Black Radical Liberalism," PEA Soup, February 23rd, 2015, 
http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2015/02/black-radical-liberalism-and-why-it-isnt-an-oxymoron.html
8 For example, in Schwartzman (2006), Challenging Liberalism: Feminism and Political Critique, (Pennsylvania 
State University Press: University Park, PA), and Jaggar (1983), Feminist Politics and Human Nature, (The 
Harvester Press: Sussex).
9 Rawls (1993), Political Liberalism, (Columbia University Press: New York), p. 58.
10 Rawls (1993), p. 9.
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CHAPTER PREVIEWS
In  the  first  chapter  I  aim  to  present  a  rough  picture  of  what  I  take  to  be  the  dominant
methodologies  in  moral  philosophy.  I  do  this  through  an  exploration  of  what  kind  of  role
philosophers  may  see  for  the  pre-existing  moral  attitudes  -  desires  and  aversions,  intuitions,
'common  sense,'  etc  -  they  bring to  their  practice  of  philosophy.  I  look  particularly  at  four
methodological roles philosophers may see their attitudes as playing: 1) A kind of data that moral
philosophy  seeks  to  capture  in  an  abstract  theory,  2)  The  starting  point  from  which  moral
philosophy proceeds through some techniques of refinement, 3) A particularly important source of
evidence for moral theories, and 4) As desiderata for a good moral theory. I do not intend these
four roles to be either mutually exclusive or exhaustive, but rather as illustrative of some of the
more usual ways for moral philosophers to treat their moral attitudes. Though the chapter I am
concerned  with  the  question  of  whether  those  approaches  to  moral  philosophy  which  are
methodologically conservative - in the sense of giving a positive, epistemically privileged role to
the  philosopher's  pre-existing  moral  attitudes  –  will  also  tend  to  be  morally  and  politically
conservative.  I  do not yet,  in  this  chapter,  mean to  show that  such methodological,  moral,  or
political conservatism must be a bad thing.
The second chapter looks at various ways of advancing what I've called the geneological
critique  against  the  use  of  pre-theoretical  moral  attitudes,  particularly  intuitions,  in  moral
philosophy.  By geneological  critique,  I  mean critique based on the  idea that  awareness  of  the
source of these attitudes must undermine our faith in their epistemological value. I look at three
particular approaches to making this critique: 1) The historical approach, which claims that we
only have our intuitions due to some contingent historical facts which give us no reason to believe
those intuitions may be accurate, true, or appropriate. 2) The evolutionary approach, which claims
that our moral intuitions and attitudes derive from the way our ancestors adapted to evolutionary
pressures, and are therefore disconnected from any normative truth, and unsuited for moral life in
the modern world, and 3) The social approach, which sees our moral attitudes are created and
maintained by continuing systematic social influences, which tends to be oppressive or unjust, and
so distort and pervert our moral judgement. Much of this chapter is devoted to developing the
third, social approach, and arguing that it is more powerful than the other approaches, and leads
more directly to improved moral methodologies. 
The third, relatively brief chapter aims to head off a specific objection to taking the social
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critique of intuition seriously: the objection that the relevance of ideology and oppressive social
attitudes will be limited to a small number of moral issues, such as abortion and euthanasia. I head
off this objection first by arguing that attitudes such as racism and sexism touch on a surprisingly
large number of issues, that, as Kristin Waters has put it, “In philosophy, common topics that are
often assumed not to be raced or gendered may reveal themselves to be so under closer scrutiny.” 11
Secondly, I argue that these issues of ideology and oppressive social attitudes will be more widely
relevant  to  the  methodology  of  moral  philosophy  insofar  as  they  influence  not  only  our
judgements about particular moral issues, but also the wider methodological decisions about what
moral issues to study.
The fourth chapter marks the start of the second section of  my thesis,  where I  explore
specific  themes  and  tendencies  from  feminist  research  and  politics  in  order  to  critique
methodologies in moral philosophy. In this chapter I focus on the discussion of abstraction and
idealisation that  appears in various  articles  by Onora O'Neill,  and some developments of  and
criticisms of that discussion in the work of Charles Mills and Lisa Schwartzman. I conclude this
chapter by looking at the issue of abstraction in terms of the concept of intersectionality, developed
from Black feminist thought, and finally illustrate the critique of abstraction that I have developed
through an exploration of a usually neglected moral issue - of particular interest to transfeminists –
misgendering.
The  fifth  chapter  explores  the  idea,  common in  feminist  though and practice,  that  the
judgements and perspectives of those who suffer from injustice should be epistemically valued
over that of those who perpetuate or benefit from it. I explore this idea by examining alternative
epistemologies which give us reason to trust the perspective of the marginalised, and distrust the
perspectives  of  the  privileged,  namely  standpoint  epistemologies,  and  epistemologies  of
ignorance. My goal is to undermine what I call universalistic first-personal methodologies in moral
philosophy, which present the philosopher as epistemically self-sufficient, able to get at the moral
truth through only their own judgements and understandings, without the need to listen to or
learn from others. To close off this chapter, I illustrate my methodological conclusions by applying
them to a specific moral philosophical method: thought experiments.
The final chapter turns to the role of personal experience in moral philosophy, particularly
of transformative experiences which radically alter an individual's  moral  worldview.  I  mainly
11 Waters (2014), “Past as Prologue: Intersectional Analysis from the Nineteenth Century to the Twenty-First,” in 
Goswami, O'Donovan & Yount (2014), p. 33.
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explore  this  idea  through  discussions  of  trans  awakening,  and  of  political  consciousness,
particularly feminist consciousness and the practice of consciousness raising. I argue that moral
philosophers need to take seriously the idea that undergoing morally transformative experiences
may be  an indispensible  part  of  the methodology of  moral  philosophy.  Finally,  I  conclude by
arguing that moral philosophers will need to radically expand their idea of what kinds of activities
constitutes doing moral philosophy, in particular to include political activity designed to improve
epistemic access to social and moral reality, both for themselves, and for all other philosophers and
people.
CHAPTER 1 - METHODOLOGICAL CONSERVATISM IN MORAL THEORY
In this chapter I am concerned with investigating the notion of conservatism, as it applies to moral
philosophy, to become clearer on what we might mean when we issue a charge of conservatism. In
doing  so,  I  hope  to  also  present  a  loose  overview  of  what  I  take  to  be  some  dominant
methodologies in moral philosophy as it is currently practised. As a rough starting point for this
discussion, I take conservatism in moral philosophy to be a tendency displayed by those moral
theories,  views,  or  methods  which  in  certain  ways  ways  privilege,  rely  upon,  or  are  deeply
concerned with the particular moral attitudes that we initially bring to moral philosophy, whether
in the  form of  pre-existing  moral  beliefs,  commonly  held moral  attitudes,  moral  intuitions  or
anything similar.
In  this  I  differ  strongly  from  Kai  Nielsen,  who  uses  the  phrase  'moral  conservatism'
synonymously with 'absolutism,'  to refer to moral  theories that do not give any moral role or
weight to the consequences of actions.1 Though, as I see it, consequentialist theories may have some
inclination against moral conservatism, as they must allow for the  possibility that even our most
deeply held and cherished moral beliefs about particular actions may be shown to be false, upon
empirical  investigation,  it  is  nonetheless  true  that  some  consequentialist  theories  may  be
1 See Nielsen (1972) "Against Moral Conservatism," Ethics 82:3
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importantly conservative.
For example, R. M. Hare thought it essential to demonstrate how his Utilitarianism was, on
some ordinary practical level, largely consistent with many of the everyday moral judgements we
intuitively make.2 We may also identify some methodological conservatism in Henry Sidgwick's
concern with showing that a form of Utilitarianism could be reached by applying philosophical
pressure  to  ordinary  intuitional  moral  beliefs,  that  “the  Morality  of  Common  Sense  is
unconsciously or implicitly Utilitarian.”3
We can easily imagine other kinds of deeply conservative consequentialist  theories.  For
example, a theory which was concerned with  maximising social obedience, or adherence with a
stringent set of sexual norms, may obviously be deeply conservative despite potentially licensing
morally counter-intuitive acts, insofar as it were based on simply assuming some particular, not
independently  justified,  conservative  moral  value  to  be  important.  Less  obviously,  we  may
imagine a consequentialist theory which avoids that problem, on the level of abstract moral values,
but  which recommends  deeply  conservative  decision  procedures,  or  methods  for  determining
consequences. For example, a Utilitarian theory which took pleasure as the only good could go on
to  recommend  that  agents  determine  what  is  pleasurable  by  introspecting,  and  determining
whether a particular experience is the kind of thing that they, the particular introspecting agent,
would go  in  for.  This  kind of  procedure  could,  used by  some particular  people,  discount  as
possibly pleasurable, say, masochistic sexual practices, or foreign culinary delicacies, which some
other  less  conservative  procedure  may  recognise  as  a  source  of  pleasure  in  the  appropriate
circumstances, for example, when sampled by a relevantly appropriate person. Furthermore, just
as not all consequentialist theories need be anti-conservative, so too not all non-consequentialist, or
absolutist theories need be conservative.
At this point, it's worth noting a certain ambiguity in the idea of conservatism I've been
using: it's not always clear whose moral beliefs we should see conservatism as relating to. For
example, while veganism is not at all a widespread belief or practice in our society, it may seem
deeply obvious and intuitive to someone raised as a vegan, or even to someone who was strongly
convinced of it, or powerfully converted to it, recently. Must we suppose that Utilitarianism was
more conservative  for  J.  S.  Mill,  because  he  was  raised by Utilitarians?  It  seems unhelpful  to
2 This is a simplification of Hare's thought, which I will discuss more later. See Hare (1971) Essays on Philosophical
Method (MacMillan Press: London), chap. 7, and Hare (1981) Moral Thinking (Oxford University Press: Oxford), 
chap. 1-3.
3 Raphael, (1974), "Sidgwick on Intuitionism," in The Monist 58:3, p. 411.
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suggest  that  the  degree  of  moral  conservatism of  a  view like  veganism may turn  just  on the
personal history of the person holding it.
Similarly, some putative moral values, such as chastity or honour, may be seen as deeply
conservative, even if few people in our society actually hold these to be valuable in the traditional
way.  This  may have something to do with the  history of  these  values,  their  influence on our
culture, or perhaps their being embedded in, and expressed by, our enduring institutions, as for
example the value of chastity is expressed in some of the customs and laws relating to marriage.
Though I  am not particularly interested in ironing out all  possible  vagueness from the
concept  of  conservativeness,  it  will  help  here  to  make  a  distinction  between  two  kinds  of
conservatism  we  may  encounter  in  ethics.  The  first  is  the  fairly  familiar  notion  of
moral/social/political conservatism, which involves some kind of belief in or allegiance to some set
of traditional or socially dominant moral beliefs or institutions. The second is a more technical
notion I'd like to introduce of methodological conservatism, which involves a moral thinker giving
some kind of privileged status to the moral beliefs, attitudes or values that they initially bring to
the process of their moral thinking. From here on, I am primarily interested in this latter concept,
though one  of  my interests  is  in  how methodological  conservatism may serve  to  promote  or
perpetuate morally conservative attitudes.
There are a few things to spell out in this idea of methodological conservatism. The first
regards what we mean by 'moral thinking.' By this, I include moral thought on a number of levels,
including abstract theorising about the nature and structure of morality, general thinking about
moral principles, and thinking about the morality of particular actions, the level of judgement. I
am open to the possibility that methodological conservatism could operate on any of these levels,
thought it most obviously applies to the levels of principles and judgement.
The more crucial detail to spell out is the notion of giving privileged status to our pre-
existing moral attitudes. By this, I mean granting some special epistemic or methodological role to
these attitudes. Though this idea needs to be a bit more specific, I intend it to cover a fairly wide
range of possible ways that a thinker may treat their pre-existing moral attitudes, which may be
carefully distinguished, but will tend to over-lap and co-occur. 
In what follows, I explore some of these ways, and consider how they may contribute to
moral  conservatism  in  the  resulting  philosophy.  In  doing  so,  I  am  mainly  focusing  on  the
methodologies of the kinds of moral philosophy I have been most familiar with, those that were
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most prominent in my own early education, and which I take to have some degree of dominance
in contemporary analytic moral philosophy more widely. These are particularly those approaches
in the Kantian and consequentialist  tradition, along with some more intuitional and some less
theoretical approaches. Politically, these approaches are most associated with liberalism, though
they have had some more radical or conservative practitioners. The most obvious absence here is
that I  am not particularly discussing or drawing upon approaches from the tradition of virtue
ethics. This is partly due to my own lack of deep knowledge of this tradition, but also because I
suspect virtue ethical approaches will often avoid much of the methodological critiques I make
throughout this thesis. Relatedly, I don't discuss, in this chapter, explicitly feminist approaches to
moral philosophy, such as the ethics of care. 
MORAL ATTITUDES AS DATA OR STARTING POINT
A moral philosopher may take their initial moral attitudes purely as a set of data to be explained,
systematised, or captured by a moral theory. This is perhaps the most conservative attitude one
could take towards the methodology of moral philosophy. It seems to lead to a purely descriptive
role for moral theorising. Though hardly common, this seems to be the attitude of Michael Ruse,
who  sees  moral  philosophy  as  the  business  of  charting  the  moral  tendencies  given  by  our
evolutionary history.4 There may also be elements of this attitude in the quietism of David Winch,
though  in  his  approach,  actually  building  a  moral  theory  may  be  superfluous;  rather,  just
observing our moral tendencies may be all we can do.5 However, this kind of approach is more
often raised in order to be pushed away; defenders of reflective equilibrium will (quite rightly)
assure us that this is not what their methodology amounts to, though they often thereby miss more
subtle ways their methodology may be quite conservative.
More commonly, a moral philosopher may take their initial moral attitudes as the “starting
point” of moral philosophy. This kind of claim is fairly common,6 but also can be rather vague,
perhaps intentionally so.  It  has an air  of platitude. It  may mean something as simple (though
important)  as  the  observation  that  we  all  come  to  moral  philosophy  with  pre-existing  moral
attitudes, and that these will inevitably guide our attention, our sense of what is important or
relevant, and our most immediate reactions to certain discussions or arguments. This is hardly
4 Ruse & Wilson (1986), “Moral Philosophy as Applied Science,” in Philosophy 61.
5 See Winch (1972), "Moral Integrity," in Ethics and Action (Routlege & Kegan Paul: London) p. 182.
6 For example, it appears in Bykvist (2010) Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed (Bloomsbury: London), p. 14, 
and perhaps in Jackson (2000) From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford University Press: Oxford), p. 135.
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objectionable, and is definitely worth keeping in mind, but it does not yet amount to granting any
special  privileged epistemic status to those attitudes.  For  example,  a  certain kind of  dogmatic
moral  system might  acknowledge that  the starting point  of  moral  thinking is  our pre-existing
attitudes, but then argue that these attitudes must be overcome, and replaced with a given set of
moral commandments. This may not constitute a conservative methodology in the sense I have
been concerned with (though, of course, it could lead to a conservative moral theory).
Before we can assess whether this Starting Point position on pre-existing moral attitudes
might lead to a conservative moral methodology we need to specify what we are supposed to do
with the attitudes which form our starting point. Perhaps one natural way to read this kind of
claim is as a lighter version of the previous suggestion: in moral philosophy, we start with our pre-
existing moral beliefs, and, as above, try to systematise them into a single coherent moral theory.
However, these attitudes are only the starting point, and not also the end point, because we may
find contradictions in our moral beliefs, and these will need to be resolved. This seems to be the
view of  Krister Bykvist,  who emphasises  the  goal  of  coherence,  and the likelihood of  finding
contradictions in our initial set of moral attitudes.7
This kind of project may not be purely descriptive because, insofar as it resulted in a single,
coherent moral theory without contradictions, it could thereby offer normative recommendations
and guidance to someone whose pre-existing moral attitudes suggest some mutually incompatible
courses of action. On the other hand, it could remain purely descriptive by suggesting that the
resolution to the contradictions found were somehow implicit in the original set of attitudes, or by
offering no more guidance in the case of contradictions than 'a choice will have to be made here,
and moral thinking can not help determine which choice, if any, is correct.' Regardless, it still looks
like a very conservative methodological position, as it only allows for any change of moral attitude
in these limited cases of contradiction, and then presumably only in ways necessary to resolve the
contradictions. It does not seem able to licence, or to provide the resources for any particularly
bold shifts in moral understanding. 
Another philosopher who talks of  our pre-existing moral  beliefs  as  a starting point  for
moral philosophy is Frank Jackson, who claimed that, in doing moral philosophy, “we must start
from somewhere in current folk morality, otherwise we start from somewhere unintuitive, and that
can hardly be a good place to start from.”8 However, Jackson is not suggesting that we take our
7 Bykvist (2010), p. 14.
8 Jackson (2000), p. 135. 
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entire set of moral beliefs as a starting point, as he also claims that when we build our moral
theories “it is to be expected that we should start with a fragment that particularly appeals to us
and  seek  to  reconstruct  the  rest,  near  enough,  from  that  fragment.”9 When  he  speaks  of
“reconstruct[ing]  the  rest,”  he  does  not  necessarily  mean  reconstructing  just  our  current  folk
morality, and ending where we started. Jackson draws a distinction between current folk morality,
and mature folk morality. The former is “the network of moral opinions, intuitions, principles and
concepts whose mastery is part and parcel of having a sense of what is right and wrong, and of
being able to engage in meaningful debate about what ought to be done.”10 The latter is what our
folk morality would become when fully exposed to debate and critical reflection. 
However, Jackson tells us very little about how we should go about building a moral theory
from an intuitive  fragment.  Again,  we are  left  unclear  what  we are  supposed to  do with our
starting point. However, when we look at Jackson's discussion of the practice of moral philosophy
as a whole, rather than what an individual theory builder might do, the view does not look too
dissimilar  to  the  kind  of  coherence-building  method  I  outlined  above.  Though  Jackson  does
understand folk morality to be the kind of thing that could conceivably be completely shared only
by a small number of agents11, he insists that there must be sufficient overlap between our folk
moralities for it to be even possible for people to share a moral language, and be able to coherently
argue with one another about moral issues. This position is demanded by his moral functionalism,
the view that “the meanings of the moral terms are given by their place in [the] network of input,
output, and internal clauses that makes up folk morality.”12 There must be “a considerable measure
of  agreement  about...  general  principles  broadly  stated.”13 Finally,  Jackson's  view  about  what
currently happens in moral philosophy, and society's moral development, is that “we are currently
seeking some kind of consensus about the nature and frequency of the exceptions to the general
principles we share.”14
This,  then,  looks  similar  to  the  kind of  coherence-building  method I  discussed before,
except understood on an interpersonal, rather than individual level:  we, society as a whole, have a
folk morality, but it is inconsistent with itself, as we lack agreement on the nature of exceptions to
9 Jackson (2000), p. 135.
10 Jackson (2000), p. 130.
11 Jackson (2000), p. 131
12 Jackson (2000), p. 131. Of course, this leaves open the position that as a matter of fact there is not much overlap, 
because a lot of us don't in fact share a moral language, and are talking past one another, but Jackson does not seem 
to want to take this position.
13 Jackson (2000), p. 132.
14 Jackson (2000), p. 133.
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our shared moral beliefs. This is still a rather conservative approach, one which naively ignores the
often political nature of moral disagreement. The assumption that any moral thinker will broadly
agree  with  some  societal  consensus  over  moral  principles  excludes  those  who  live  under
conditions  of  marginalisation  and  oppression,  which  make  it  perfectly  plain  that  the  moral
principles generally operative in their society are severely inadequate. However we cash out the
scope and content of “folk morality,” the idea that we all broadly agree on moral principles and are
merely trying  to  sort  out  exceptions  will  turn  out  to  be  untenable,  misleading,  or  insultingly
exclusionary.
Consider,  for  example,  moral  disagreement over abortion.  Perhaps  we are supposed to
assume a picture like: 'we all share a principle of a right to life, but we disagree over whether
fetuses are an exception to this.' However, this picture of course privileges one way of framing the
disagreement. We may insist on a more nuanced picture: 'we all share the principle of a right to
bodily autonomy, but we disagree over whether an exception to this right exists when it conflicts
with  a  right  to  life.'  However  this  still  glosses  over  the  fact  that  the  very  way to  frame this
argument, the question of what principles are even in play, is contested. We are given no clear way
to accommodate a feminist who argues “the right to life is simply irrelevant to this question.” We
are  also  left  unable  to  accommodate  arguments  that  don't  proceed  in  terms  of  exceptions  to
supposedly shared principles, such as the argument that access to abortions should be unrestricted
because otherwise abortion will continue in difficult and unsafe circumstances, or the argument
that restrictions on abortion should be opposed as they are expressions of a patriarchal interest in
the control of women's bodies and reproduction. What supposed shared principle is that argument
operating on, the principle that the patriarchy should not control things?
Even the idea of characterising our principles as shared principles is dubious. Take again
the right to life. Is this supposed to be a general right to life for all living things, whose exceptions
include most living things? Or is it a right to life for all persons, which would force vegans to argue
their  moral  case  on  different  grounds?  Our  very  understanding  of  the  general  principles
themselves, rather than just their exceptions, is contestable. Jackson could insist that we need not
find some characterisation of our principles that satisfies us all, but that, in keeping with moral
functionalism, we could see our moral principles as individuated by clusters of similarity between
their  input,  output  and internal  clauses:  similarity  between our  responses  to  moral  scenarios,
encountered or posed, and our reasons for the responses. This would still be inadequate. It seems
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unlikely that the experiences of two people with wildly different lives, even in the same society,
who encounter wildly different challenges and injustices, would share enough input and output
clauses to get us very far in characterising principles they could be held to share. Again, Jackson is
always free to answer this kind of claim by denying that such people share a moral language, and
he might be right to suggest that such people would never agree on much of moral weight under
ordinary circumstances, but this would give up way too soon on our being able to say anything
about how people with different views might interact morally, in moral disagreements and actions,
and the changes in views that each might bring to the other. 
The restrictiveness and conservativeness of Jackson's approach lies in the idea that unless
moral agents start with a sufficiently similar starting point, and can be expected to reach a totally
similar ending point,  then we won't have much more to say about them.15 This reduces moral
conflict to a friendly endeavour between harmlessly disagreeing thinkers, and completely ignores
the ways that understanding people's differing circumstances may be essential to understanding
their moral views. The weakness of this approach is compounded by the suggestion that agents
should be expected to converge on a mature folk morality through the methods of debate and
critical reflection. This utterly fails to acknowledge the role of research, evidence, experience, and
changing worldviews in moral development.  It  also glosses over the immense social problems
with the methods Jackson does allow, such as problems of who is heard in debate, what kinds of
things are taken as evidence, and what is available for agents to reflect on.
Of course, Jackson is just one example of a philosopher who talks of treating our moral
attitudes  as  a  starting  point,  and  is  perhaps  an  idiosyncratic  example.  However,  I  hope  this
discussion has revealed some of the more general limitations of simply speaking of our moral
attitudes as the starting point of moral philosophy: it fails to pay sufficient attention to how we
have reached our differing starting points, it relegates a whole lot of activity prior to whatever we
identify  as  our  starting  point  to  the  status  of  non-philosophical  activity,  not  philosophically
interesting.  It  tells  us  nothing  about  what  methods  are  to  be  employed to  move  beyond  our
starting point, and it leaves unanswered the question of how to understand and interact with those
who do not share our starting point. Such methodologies will tend to privilege and reproduce
socially dominant moral views, by simply assuming the unquestioned prevalence of such views,
15 It may not be that he believes there is nothing to say about such cases, but my point is just that he doesn't feel the 
need to say anything about such cases, where I would suggest they are absolutely crucial, and may characterise all 
interesting cases of moral disagreement.
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and not providing the right resources to challenge them.
MORAL ATTITUDES AS EVIDENCE
A moral philosopher may take their moral attitudes as some sort of privileged evidence for moral
theories. This Evidence view sees our moral attitudes, particularly our intuitions, as the material
which tends to justify our belief in particular moral theories, and on the basis of which we develop
and choose between moral theories, sometimes with explicit analogy to the role of observation in
forming  scientific  theories.  This  seems  to  describe  the  approach  to  moral  attitudes  in  many
versions  of  reflective  equilibrium.  In  some ways  this  view might not  be  too distinct  from the
previous  view;  they  both  see  our  moral  attitudes  as  material  to  be  synthesised  into  a  single
coherent theory. However, the Evidence view seems to allow a lot more nuance and flexibility than
at least the elaboration I've given of the Starting Point view.
The idea of moral attitudes as evidence allows us to attend to the idea that evidence must
be collected, explored and interpreted. Our moral attitudes do not simply come to us,  in their
totality, clear and transparent, ready to be systematised. As with observation, we must seek out the
evidence, make choices about what kinds of evidence to find, and what is relevant to particular
investigations. If we take seriously the idea of our moral attitudes being (merely) the starting point
of  philosophy,  we have to  either  ignore  these processes,  or  refuse  to count  them as a  part  of
philosophical activity. Of course, this oversight may just be an artificial oddness arising from the
rhetoric of the 'starting point.'
An Evidence approach to moral attitudes and intuitions also importantly introduces the
possibility of iterability, the possibility that our moral attitudes might change during the course of
moral philosophy, and so provide new inputs for the process. By the definition of methodological
conservatism I've given, it seems iterability could bring us a less conservative methodology if the
moral attitudes we hold before the process of moral philosophy begins hold no more privileged
role than the new ones we acquire and deploy during the process. How non-conservative this is
seems to depend on what the processes are, and how they influence our moral attitudes, and so
how different the iterated attitudes are from the original ones.
In  practice,  iterability  often seems to  do less  work  than it  is  touted to.  Often,  original
unmodified moral attitudes seem to get held back, to be a final arbiter on whether the final moral
theory as acceptable or not (though this may be the influence of the Desiderata view of moral
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attitudes, which I will discuss next). Part of the problem here may result from the limitations of
iterability when academic moral philosophy is understood to be a cooperative activity.
Suppose I have worked at developing my moral theories and attitudes for a while, to the
point that they are quite different to yours. Now, if I want to discuss my moral theories with you,
but, crucially, my only evidence consists in moral attitudes, I'm not going to get very far unless I
find a point of connection between our moral attitudes. Most obviously, I could try to return to
what my attitudes used to be, hoping they will be the same as what yours now are or used to be,
and then try to work through the changes I went through, to demonstrate how I reached my final
set of theories and attitudes. However, this limits me in two ways: firstly, practically speaking, I
would only be able to lead you through a certain amount of this process. I can't expect to take you
through more of my thinking that I could express in a few books, and I will particularly be in
trouble if something like taking time for new attitudes to sink in is supposed to be part of the
process. There is no prima facie reason to suppose that the amount of work required to get from a
person's initial attitudes to a stable and satisfactory resting point will be so contained, or so quick.
Secondly, we might not have much reason to suppose that I possibly could lead you through
a process mirroring my own moral development in this way. This will of course depend on the
kinds of processes that our attitudes are supposed to undergo, but to use a concrete example, most
elaborations of reflective equilibrium recognise that when we are faced with the necessity of either
revising  our  intuitions  or  adjusting  our  theory,  we  cannot  expect  “knock-down  judgement-
trumping reasoning”16 to determine our decision. Rather, judgements and choices will have to be
made – a great number of them, for any sufficiently lengthy process of theory building – and I
have no guarantee that you will go the same way as me in any of these choices. Indeed, given
differences in people's background experiences, the strength of their attitudes, their assumptions,
their temperaments, and their senses of what is important, we can expect huge divergence very
quickly. 
Both of these issues could be mitigated by changing how we see moral philosophy. On the
one  hand,  we  could  retreat  to  seeing  it  as  a  primarily  solitary  exercise;  I  engage  in  moral
philosophy to improve my own views, and it is no problem for philosophy if others can't follow
my reasoning. Of course, this may render moral philosophy more conservative in another way, by
limiting my exposure to unfamiliar views,  limiting the existence or  effect  of  challenges to my
16 Knight (2006) "The Method of Reflective Equilibrium: Wide, Radical, Fallible, Plausible," in Philosophical Papers
35:2, p. 225
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conclusions, and limiting the effect of my conclusions on the world. On the other hand, we could
continue to see moral philosophy as a cooperative activity, but understand it to be a very slow,
generational endeavour; I may be less concerned with the success of my arguments against other
contemporary philosophers, and more concerned having some slight cultural impact on those to
come, shifting their moral attitudes to better approximate a position where their own processes of
moral reasoning can more reliably lead them towards moral truth. Of course, in this the process of
moral philosophy comes to more closely resemble the general trajectory of moral change in our
society. This may not be an unfortunate or inaccurate conception of moral philosophy, but would
seem to be giving up on philosophy's aspiration to be a particularly good way to reach (moral)
truth, and may look like philosophy is only following the moral change of society, rather than
doing anything to lead it, or surpass it (which I take to be an ultimately conservative position).
Moving away from the issue of iterability, another important aspect for our assessment of
Evidence views about moral attitudes is the question of how defeasible we take that evidence to
be,  and how we  get  at  the  evidence.  Is  introspective  access  to  our  attitudes  supposed to  be
infallible, or might we accept claims of the form “you only think you have that attitude,” say, for
example, in cases in which a person's inegalitarian implicit biases seem to be at odds with their
explicitly egalitarian intuitions? Would we take people's repeated actions to be straightforward
evidence  of  their  moral  attitudes?  Would  we  only  pay  attention  to  the  attitudes  that  people
actually hold,  or would there be room to consider how our attitudes may change if  we were
confronted with a moral emergency, if we were more informed about relevant facts, or even if we
underwent some radical morally transformative experience?17 I take it that giving us more space to
employ a wider range of resources to understand and critically challenge our own attitudes will
help lead away from some of the conservative implications of giving a central evidential role to
our attitudes.
A related detail is the question of what, exactly, our moral attitudes are taken to be evidence
of. When thinking of moral attitudes as evidence in moral theory it is natural to assume that the
claim being made is along the lines of 'that I intuit x is evidence for x,' or 'that I am repulsed by x is
evidence that x is bad,' etc. But of course, our moral beliefs may be an important kind of evidence
without being evidence for what is believed. It may be crucially important for moral theories to take
note of what people actually believe,  without thereby endorsing those beliefs.  For example,  in
17 I address this question in chapter 6.
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feminist ethics, it would be difficult to advance a theory of patriarchal culture without discussing
how patriarchal  moral  attitudes  are  held  and  promoted  by  people  at  large.  Similarly,  careful
consideration  of  my  own  problematic  moral  attitudes  may  be  essential  to  seeing  how  these
attitudes have operated, how they should be overcome, and the exact reasons why they should be
overcome.  Though  more  often  applied  to  the  sciences,  where  a  researcher's  attitudes  have
traditionally not been taken to be a source of evidence for research projects, the notion of “strong
reflexivity,”  that  idea  that  our  own  attitudes  and  beliefs  are  a  part  of  the  subject  matter  for
investigation, forms an essential part of standpoint epistemology.18 To make room for these uses of
moral attitudes as evidence, I take only those views that privilege an attitude in favour of x as
evidence for x (or that x is good) to be methodologically conservative.
As a final point, perhaps one may count moral beliefs as evidence for some view without
giving any special privileged status to that evidence. One may take it that their belief that x tends
to indicate that x is true, but also be prepared to weigh this against other kinds of evidence, such as
empirical  evidence  about  consequences,  testimony from affected parties,  structural  analysis  of
relevant moral factors, etc.
This possibility looks similar to a difference that characterises what has been called radical
reflective equilibrium, as opposed to conservative reflective equilibrium.19 These views attempt to
accommodate  the  ways  that  revisions  in  a  thinker's  moral  views  may result  from a range  of
experiences, such as  “living through a situation in which serious moral choices must be made,
vividly imagining such circumstances (perhaps by way of literature, theatre, or films), coming into
intimate  contact  with  people  who  accept  very  different  systems  of  value  or  suddenly
understanding or appreciating such a system, listening to music, viewing paintings, or perhaps
even mystical experiences and experiences of the divine or sublime,"20 as well as more mundane,
everyday experiences.
However, it's often not clear what the relation is supposed to be between these experiences,
and the more familiar evidence of moral intuitions. Michael R. DePaul admits, in advocating this
kind of theory, "I do not see how one might go about categorizing such experiences nor is it clear
how the changes they effect in a person's moral beliefs should be evaluated."21 DePaul is concerned
18 Harding (1993), "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," in Feminist Epistemologies, eds. Alcoff & Potter 
(Routledge: New York), p. 69-72. I discuss standpoint epistemology in more detail in chapter 5.
19 These terms are from DePaul (1987) "Two Conceptions of Coherence Method in Ethics" in Mind 96:384. Note that 
"Radical" Reflective Equilibrium does not provide quite the same difference as "Wide" Reflective Equilibrium.
20 DePaul (1987), p. 470.
21 DePaul (1987), p. 470.
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with capturing the importance of these experiences, and even believes that these experiences are
"just about a necessary condition for achieving a point of reflective equilibrium of which a person
can justifiably be confident," but nonethless he seems to see the process of changing one's beliefs as
a  result  of  such  experiences  to  be  quite  mysterious  in  comparison  to  the  more  central  and
obviously evaluable, albeit less common, process of changing one's beliefs on the basis of resolving
conflicts between one's moral judgements and philosophical views - the more familiar process of
reflective  equilibrium.  He  sees  this  difference  even  in  some  cases  where  the  transformative
experience came as a result of reading a philosopher like Nietzsche or Marx.22
Carl Knight is perhaps a little clearer about the relation between the moral attitudes we use
in reflective equilibrium, and other experiences which may effect  our moral  views. Firstly,  it's
worth noting that he claims "each individual undergoing the radical reflective process is required
to engage in all (available) activities that may offset any of her formative biases."23 This places these
experiences as a necessary  part of reflective equilibrium, rather than some semi-optional adjunct
that  we need to  make room for.  However,  he  also  claims that  "the  move to  radical  reflective
equilibrium... is intended to boost the epistemological standing of the judgements of the person
undergoing  reflective  equilibrium."24 This  very  clearly  places  these  experiences  in  a  kind  of
subordinate epistemological role to the evidence of our moral attitudes. Wider sources of evidence
can be relevant, but only insofar as they ultimately work to change our attitudes, or undermine
them. In the terms I've been using, it looks like these views give some epistemological status to
evidence other than our moral attitudes, but leaves our moral attitudes with a privileged epistemic
status, as the kind of evidence that all other evidence must speak to.
By the definition I've given, this would make us class these views, both "conservative" and
"radical" reflective equilibrium, as quite methodologically conservative. But of course, as intended,
radical  reflective  equilibrium  does  seem  to  be  less  conservative  than  conservative  reflective
equilibrium, especially in the suggestion that actually seeking out experiences to challenge your
views may be an important part of coming to the right moral theory, and perhaps even a part of
the process of reflective equilibrium. Nonetheless, I would want to question why these experiences
should be relegated to a position of secondary epistemic and philosophical importance, to where
philosophers will "not tend to pay more than lip service to them" (as DePaul characterises their
22 DePaul (1987), p. 468-470.
23 Knight (2006), p. 215.
24 Knight (2006), p. 215.
26
current  status  in  philosophy),25 rather  than being  seen  as  centrally  important  as  a  potentially
positive driving force behind the development of our moral views.26
I  want  to  briefly  address  one  kind  of  argument  that  may  be  used  to  defend  the
subordination of these experiences to our moral attitudes. One may argue 'of course we are only
concerned with any kinds of experience or evidence insofar as they change our moral attitudes,
because the whole point of moral philosophy is to change our moral attitudes; insofar as our moral
attitudes  remain  unchanged,  these  experiences  can't  be  philosophically  relevant  to  our  moral
development.' There may be an element of truth to this, but I would first want to note that there is
a  difference  between  making  room  for  non-philosophical  experiences  to  change  our  moral
attitudes, and making room for the actual conscious, principled employment of a wide range of
sources of evidence to be used for developing our moral theory, as a part of philosophical activity.
The  idea  of  radical  reflective  equilibrium  only  seems  to  do  the  former,  or  at  least  fails  to
emphasise, explore, and explain the latter. Secondly, I suspect that requiring moral philosophy to
change our own moral  views may be too limited a conception of  the possible  goals  of  moral
philosophy,  which  may include  not  only changing our  beliefs,  but  also  changing our  actions,
changing our reactions, changing other people's beliefs, building new concepts, creating space for
new ways of seeing the moral landscape, exploring moral possibilities, and further goals.
MORAL ATTITUDES AS DESIDERATA
A moral philosopher may treat their moral attitudes as desiderata, or trumps. On this kind of view,
part of what it takes for a moral theory to be good, successful, or plausible is that it produces, or
leads us to moral verdicts that are identical or similar to our pre-existing moral intuitions. So, if we
intuit “it is wrong to steal,” then a moral theory that ends up telling us not to steal has more to be
said for it than a moral theory that fails to issue that verdict. To give an example, Kwame Anthony
Appiah has suggested that a moral theory's “plausibility comes from the ability to accommodate
our intuitions.”27 However, we need not cash this idea out in terms of plausibility. One might count
accommodation of our intuitions as a desiderata because of the thought that if we end up with
radically  unfamiliar  moral  verdicts,  this  could  be  a  sign  that  we  are  no  longer  talking  about
morality per  se,  but rather  our subject  matter  has changed.  Alternatively,  one might hold this
commitment for practical or dialectical reasons, assuming that people would be unable to accept,
25 DePaul (1987), p. 470
26 I explore this in more detail in chapter 6.
27 Appiah (2008), Experiments in Ethics (Harvard University Press: Massachusetts), p. 76.
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embrace, or act on a moral theory which generated currently counterintuitive implications; this
seems to express a deep pessimism about the plausibility or desirability of any kind of revolution
in moral thinking.
Appiah goes on to claim that moral theory's “power comes from the ability to challenge
still  other  intuitions.”28 This  of  course flags up that,  on this  kind of  view,  coherence with our
intuitions  may  be  just  one  desideratum  among  many.  On  these  kinds  of  view,  a  theory's
disagreement with specific intuitions may be outweighed by factors such as agreement with other
intuitions, theoretical neatness or simplicity, or other theoretical pressures.
As a prominent example, in Methods Of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick is concerned with showing
“that the Utilitarian estimate of consequences not only supports broadly the current moral rules,
but  also  sustains  their  generally  received  limitations  and  qualifications,”  but  also  that
Utilitarianism can  provide moral guidance by solving folk morality's “difficulties and perplexities
in  general  accordance  with  the  vague  instincts  of  Common Sense.”29 Inevitably,  much of  this
discussion has a profoundly conservative air,  as in,  to take an example passage discussing the
protection, upbringing, and training of children “it is commonly believed that the best or even the
only known means of attaining these ends in even a tolerable degree is afforded by the existing
institution of the Family, resting as it does on a basis of legal and moral rules combined.”30 Or
another, before introducing the moral duty of charity in the case of unexpected emergency, “the
main utilitarian reason why is not right for every rich man to distribute his superfluous wealth
among the poor, is that the happiness of all is on the whole most promoted by maintaining in
adults generally (except married women), the expectation that each will be thrown on his own
resources for the supply of his own wants.”31 Or most blatantly, “it is only by the present severe
enforcement against unchaste women of the penalties of social contempt and exclusion, resting on
moral disapprobation, that the class of courtesans is kept sufficiently separate from the rest of
female  society  to  prevent  the  contagion  of  unchastity  from  spreading;  and  that  the  illicit
intercourse of the sexes is restrained within such limits as not to interfere materially with the due
development of the race.”32
Sidgwick takes it to be important to demonstrate that the conclusions of utilitarian thinking
28 Appiah (2008), p. 76.
29 Sidgwick (1901) The Methods of Ethics (MacMillan: London), p. 425.
30 Sidgwick (1901), p. 435. Of course, we may not want to blame Sidgwick for failing to predict the critiques of the 
traditional family institution, and particularly family law, that would become prominent in the century to come. 
31 Sidgwick (1901), p. 436.
32 Sidgwick (1901), p. 452.
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will not diverge greatly from the dictates of common sense or intuitional  morality in order to
prove Utilitarianism to an Intuitionalist, one who proclaims faith in Common Sense morality. This
proof is supposed to work by demonstrating that the rules accepted by the Intuitionalist “have
only  a  dependent  and  subordinate  validity,”33 and  contain  vagueness,  indeterminacy  and
ambiguity that must be cleared up by reference to a further principle.  “If  systematic reflection
upon  the  morality  of  Common  Sense  thus  exhibits  the  Utilitarian  principle  as  that  to  which
Common Sense naturally  appeals  for  that  further  development  of  its  system which this  same
reflection shows to be necessary, the proof of Utilitarianism seems as complete as it can be.”34 So,
Sidgwick  wants  to  demonstrate  that  his  moral  theory  leads  to  the  conclusions  of  intuitional
morality  in  order  to  convince  Intuitionalists,  by  suggesting  that  they  are  actually  already
unconsciously or implicitly Utilitarians.35
What  remains  unclear  is  whether  this  concordance  between  the  conclusions  of
Utilitarianism and common sense morality is necessary for the truth of Utilitarianism, or just for its
demonstration. Suppose these conclusions significantly diverged (as indeed they actually may);
would Sidgwick want to say that Utilitarianism is still true, but unfortunately we have lost a way
of proving that to Intuitionalists, or is it part of what makes Utilitarianism a good theory that it
does tend to accommodate our intuitions?
This idea of intuitions as desiderata may also best characterise Rawls' understanding of
reflective equilibrium. In “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” he writes “what justifies a
conception  of  justice  is  not  its  being  true  to  an  order  antecedent  to  and given  to  us,  but  its
congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations,”36 and later that our
pre-existing moral  point of view “is that from which justice as fairness,  and indeed any other
doctrine, is to be assessed. Here the test is that of general and wide reflective equilibrium, that is,
how well the view as a whole meshes with and articulates our more firmly considered convictions,
at all  levels of  generality,  after due examination,  once all  adjustments  and revisions that  seem
compelling have been made.”37 These passages clearly suggest the use of our moral convictions as
a kind of test against an already completed theory, as something that our theory must reach in
33 Sidgwick (1901), p. 421.
34 Sidgwick (1901), p. 422. It must be said, the intense combination of misogyny, racism, classism, and stigmatisation 
of sex workers in just this short passage is staggering.
35 See also Sidgwick (1901), p. 387, where he offers a slightly different intuitional proof for Utilitarianism - reasoning
from a few self-evident intuitions, rather than our whole collection of common sense moral beliefs - and rejects 
Mills' attempt to demonstrate Utilitarianism without such a proof.
36 Rawls (1980) "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," in The Journal of Philosophy 77:9, p.519.
37 Rawls (1980), p. 534.
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order to be justified, rather than as material that we use in building up and constructing our theory
in  the  first  place  (though  I  should  emphasise,  again,  that  these  two  uses  are  not  mutually
exclusive).
I take it that these two ways of being concerned with showing that our moral theories yield
our pre-existing intuitions as judgements will tend to be quite conservative and limiting. They
limit us to kinds of moral theory which can only go so far in challenging our prior attitudes, and
methodologically exclude those radical theories that may insist we are importantly and widely
wrong in  our moral  attitudes,  and which demand deep,  fundamental  change.  They rest  on a
conservative presumption that our intuitions and attitudes are already more or less right,  and
must be supposed to be right. They rest on a presumption that our moral world is already more or
less in order, rather than deeply problematic; a claim that will seem downright bizarre to those
whose lives are destroyed or crushed in ways that seem to be endorsed or permitted by currently
prevailing moral systems.
That said, it is worth considering how some other philosophers could be deeply concerned
with the relation between their moral theories and our pre-existing moral attitudes, without any
kind of presupposition that those attitudes are in order, and without relying on those attitudes to
justify their theories. A striking example of this can be seen in the methodology of R.M. Hare. As a
Utilitarian, Hare was advocating a moral theory well known by his time to yield some deeply
counterintuitive judgements. Although Hare is very clear in his view that our moral intuitions
should not be the basis of moral of moral thinking,38 he is nonetheless probably most well known
for charting out the relationship between Utilitarianism and moral intuitions in such a way as to
allow us to keep, and continue employing, some of our intuitions. He does this through the idea of
a two-level moral theory, whereby we act on our intuitions in moments of moral emergency, but
spend  some  of  our  more  calm,  reflective  time  examining  those  intuitions  in  accordance  with
Utilitarian principles, and refining or correcting them.39
Of  course,  this  only  gives  intuition  a  place  on  the  level  of  moral  action  and  decision
making, not on the level of theory justification. However, Hare also was concerned with something
like the  objection  that  Utilitarianism  yields  counterintuitive  conclusions.  For  Hare,  moral
philosophy was about discovering what we mean by the moral terms we use (by consulting our
linguistic, rather than moral, intuitions), and then determining what things we are logically led to
38 Hare (1981), Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Clarendon Press: Oxford) p. 12.
39 See Hare (1981), chapters 2 & 3.
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hold  we  must  do,  given  the  meaning  of  our  moral  language.  It  would,  then,  be  an  obvious
objection to any moral  theory if  that  theory conflicted with our  linguistic intuitions,  and Hare
accepts such objections.40 However, what of the case more commonly raised against Utilitarianism,
that it conflicts with our moral intuitions? Hare thinks such objections can be valid, in the following
way:
Suppose  we  all  intuit  “it  is  wrong to  steal.”  Now  suppose  I  have  a  theory  about  the
meaning of moral words, including the word “wrong,” such that, if that theory were true, along
with a whole lot of background understanding about what kind of people we are, our desires and
aversions, and the form of our society, then it would be utterly baffling why we would believe “it
is wrong to steal.” This, Hare accepts, speaks against the theory. He is perhaps most clear about
this when he writes “What if the analysis which is being advocated [of moral terms] makes the
opinions of ordinary people, not indeed self-contradictory, but such that it is very strange that they
should hold them? Or, putting it the other way around, it is a strong point in favour of an ethical
theory if it enables a natural and readily acceptable explanation to be given of why people hold the
moral opinions that they do, given that that is what they mean by them.”41
This last sentence may sound exactly like taking congruence with our moral intuitions as a
desiderata for a moral theory, but note that Hare emphasises strongly that “we do not have... to
assume... that the moral opinions of ordinary people are correct; we have to assume only that they
are the natural outcomes of the fact that people are as they are, on the hypothesis that the words
have certain meanings.”42 Thus, we can meet this kind of objection not only by showing how the
theory does generate our intuitions, but also by offering some kind of plausible explanation of
why we might have those intuitions despite the truth of the theory. It is not a problem if the theory
contradicts the content of our intuitions, but rather it is a problem if the theory contradicts the fact
of our having those intuitions.
Although few philosophers would give much credence to Hare's entirely language-based
approach to moral philosophy, I think this discussion of his methodology reveals an important
way that philosophers legitimately can, and perhaps should, be interested in how our pre-existing
moral attitudes cohere with our moral theories, without either conservatively assuming the truth
of those attitudes, or limiting ourselves in principle to theories which can't take us very far from
40 Hare (1981), p. 13.
41 Hare (1971), "The Argument from Recieved Opinion" in Essays on Philosophical Method (Macmillan: London), p. 
125.
42 Hare (1981), p. 14.
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our original beliefs: there may be value in providing theories of error about our beliefs. That is, not
theories that show our beliefs to be wrong, but theories that explain to us  why we hold or held
those beliefs despite their being wrong; theories which demonstrate to us why we were in error. I
do not think we would have to assume that unexplained beliefs have some prima facie epistemic
weight in order to see that such theories of error can add to the completeness and plausibility of
our overall moral theory. Without such theories, something important to moral philosophy is left
unexplained.
In the following chapter, I step away from these particular ways that intuition may feature
in our moral methodologies, and more generally examine three broad arguments against the use
of intuition in moral philosophy, each of which is advanced on the basis of a different theory of
theory of error for our pre-existing moral beliefs. I discuss the merits of these various theories of
error,  and draw out  what  particular  moral  implications  and methodologies  they may lead us
towards.
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 CHAPTER 2 - THREE APPROACHES TO GENEALOGICAL CRITIQUE
Though many of the most widespread methodologies in moral philosophy give a prominant role
to pre-theoretical, intuitional judgements, there are many philosophers who have argued, for fairly
diverse reasons, that our intuitions should not be relied on. One fairly obvious and straightforward
objection to the frequent use of intuition in moral philosophy is simply that our intuitions may be
widely  and  systematically  mistaken,  such  that  any  theory  built  on  them  will  be  liable  to
perpetuate,  rather than correct  these mistakes.  This kind of objection,  in some forms,  will  cast
suspicion not just on intuitions, but on the central use of  any kind of immediate, pre-theoretical
attitudes, such as admiration and revulsion, in crafting moral theories, by suggesting that these
attitudes, too, may be conditioned by some systematic influences which lead us astray. Obviously
there is much that needs to be filled out in such an objection. One issue in particular is that, in
making the sceptical claim that our intuitions might be mistaken, it does not seem to be enough to
merely suggest this as a possibility. Rather, we are called upon to tell some kind of story to suggest
how the particular beliefs or dispositions that constitute our moral intuitions are particularly liable
to be mistaken, or how we came to have these false beliefs.
As a matter of fact, there is no shortage of such stories in the philosophical literature. These
stories can identify the source of our mistaken attitudes in a number of different places. In what
follows, I broadly group these stories into three distinct approaches (without meaning to suggest
that this classification is exhaustive), each of which has its own advantages and disadvantages for
those interested in critiquing or  reforming the methodology of  moral  philosophy,  and each of
which  could,  if  sustained,  prompt  a  different  response;  different  in  terms  of  the  kind  of
philosophical project or methodology it may support, different in terms of the kind of moral beliefs
it could lead us to abandon or adopt, and different in terms of the practical moral behaviours it
may  demand  of  us.  I  call  these  three  approaches  the  historical  approach,  the  evolutionary
approach, and the social approach, and will discuss each in turn, ultimately focusing on the social
approach. Of course, bear in mind that these approaches need not be undertaken exclusively of
one another. Indeed, in some ways they may be mutually supporting.1
1 An interesting example of a discussion that blends the historical and social approach appears in Flikschuh (2014), 
"The Idea of Philosophical Fieldwork: Global Justice, Moral Ignorance, And Intellectual Attitudes," The Journal of 
Philosophy 22:1. Similarly, Nathaniel Adam Tobias Coleman's work on the philosophy of slavery has employed a 
great deal of historical detail and awareness within a critical theoretic approach. 
33
THE HISTORICAL APPROACH
The historical approach is to note that our intuitions and many moral attitudes are, by-and-large,
the result of particular, no longer held religious, superstitious, or political beliefs, and so to argue
that these intuitions are just as likely to be in error as the beliefs they were based on, or that we are
acting irrationally by holding on to these moral beliefs when their foundations have been stripped
away.  Peter  Singer  briefly  employs  this  approach  in  arguing against  the  practice  of  reflective
equilibrium,  particularly  against  the  assumption  that  our  particular,  pre-theoretical  moral
judgements can serve as fixed points in theorising:
Why  should  we  not  rather  make  the  opposite  assumption,  that  all  the  particular  moral
judgments  we  intuitively  make are  likely  to  derive  from discarded religious  systems,  from
warped views of sex and bodily functions, or from customs necessary for the survival of the
group in social and economic circumstances that now lie in the distant past? In which case, it
would be best to forget all about our particular moral judgments2
Brandt also briefly employs this approach, quoting Singer, as part of a larger, sometimes piecemeal
argument against the use of intuition in moral philosophy, adding:
What we should aim to do is step outside our own tradition somehow, see it from the outside,
and evaluate it, separating what is only the vestige of a possibly once useful moral tradition
from what is justifiable at present. The method of intuitions in principle prohibits our doing
this.3
In both of these cases, the critique is confined to a single paragraph. In both cases, the accuracy of
the critique is assumed to be obvious, and so the immediate move to rejecting our particular moral
judgements is assumed to be desirable. The problem immediately raised is whether some alternate
methodology,  which  will  constitute  stepping  outside  our  tradition,  is  possible,  which  Singer,
questionably, takes himself to have already shown through the course of his paper, and which
Brandt takes as his task for the rest of his book. That is to say, in these cases the historical critique
of  intuition  is  roughly  and  briefly  sketched,  in  order  to  prompt  a  rejection  of   intuitional
methodology, and then basically forgotten, as it plays no part in the ongoing philosophical project
(which, after all, is taken to be now free from the use of intuitions, and so, according to this limited
critique, free from the pernicious influence of the rejected tradition).
Of  course,  this  is  not  to  say  that  the  historical  critique  must  proceed  this  way.  Most
2 Singer, (1974) “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,”  The Monist, 58, p. 516
3 Brandt, (1979) A Theory of the Good and the Right (Clarendon Press: Oxford) p. 21-22.
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obviously, Nietzsche engages in a very extensive version of this critique in  On The Genealogy Of
Morals.  Nonetheless, there is  something about the familiarity,  and perhaps obviousness, of this
approach, which seems to lend itself to quick, dismissive treatments.
For  those  interested  in  presenting  a  serious  challenge  to  the  standard methodology  of
moral philosophy, the historical approach has some fairly serious limitations. The first is that it
may be reasonably easy to incorporate this kind of critique into the intuitionist's toolkit. Every
philosophical  methodology  based  on  intuition  must  acknowledge  that  our  intuitions  are
sometimes wrong, and may need to be examined and refined, to weed out the distorting influence
of  things like self-interest,  phobias,  and,  perhaps most  importantly,  false empirical  beliefs.  For
example, if I intuit that it is wrong to donate money to charity only because it has been drilled into
me  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  giving  money  to  charity  tends  to  counterproductively  foster
dependence,  then anyone would agree that  the truth of  my empirical  belief,  that  charities  are
counterproductive, is highly relevant to the reliability of my intuition.
With this in mind, the situation of our intuitions being based on no longer held religious or
political  beliefs  appears  to  just  be  a  slightly  grand,  historical  case  of  intuition  based on  false
empirical beliefs, albeit an unusual one, where the false beliefs are no longer held, but the intuition
is  yet  to be updated on the basis  of  new beliefs.  So the intuitionist  may be able to suggest  a
solution to this situation, such as evaluating the intuition while firming holding the falsity of the
superstition in mind. This would be, at most, a very slight departure from ordinary, introspective,
intuitional methodology.
We may very reasonably question whether this kind of procedure would actually work,
but, at least in the brief form presented by Singer, the historical critique provides no particular
reason to doubt that it should. Why would a dead religious or historical belief be more intractable
than a dead economic, or biological belief? If I use a computer simulation to demonstrate, to a
gambler,  that  she  is  wrong to stick with her  first  choice  in situations akin to  the  Monty Hall
Problem4, I can expect her to update her beliefs, and her actions, in light of this new information.
Why should the situation be different for moral beliefs based on superstition? In fact, I suspect this
question could be answered, but the answer would take us beyond a brief presentation of the
historical critique, and probably towards an explanation from psychology, or in terms of the third,
social approach I will discuss.
4 A famously counterintuitive result in statistics.
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Peter  Singer  does  address  the  possibility  that  his  brief  historical  critique  could  be
incorporated into the methodology of reflective equilibrium, describing his critique as a “limiting
case, in which there are no moral judgments that survive consideration,”5 and arguing that the
ordinary practice of reflective equilibrium would be unlikely to ever actually reach such a limiting
case, and so cannot be said to be taking the historical critique seriously. The problem here is that
Singer seems to overestimate the power of the historical critique, and so too the conclusions that it
must lead us to. Singer supposes that taking seriously the fact that some of our moral beliefs have
been formed in the light of now outdated and rejected superstitious beliefs must lead us to assume
that all of our moral beliefs were, or may as well have been, so formed, and that none are reliable.
However, this seems unwarranted. It is common, in discussions of moral intuitions, to cite the
extremely widely shared belief that torturing babies for fun is morally unacceptable. This is partly
because it simply seems implausible that any of us  only hold this belief because of an outdated
historical tradition, and arguing otherwise would be, at least, very uncomfortable.
This brings us neatly to a second major limitation of the historical approach: intuitionists
may  often  plausibly  deny  that  the  moral  intuitions  in  question  truly  were  derived  from  the
outdated religious belief and superstitions rather than vice versa. In particular, if we come to see a
particular religious tradition to be mistaken, then it looks particularly plausible that the religion
had the form that it did, including rules like 'don't murder' and the Golden Rule, precisely because
people were already inclined towards certain beliefs, and to intuitively believe these particular
moral rules.6 After all, having rejected the metaphysical edifice of the religious belief, we no longer
can admit that these rules came from a source such as divine revelation, so where else might they
have come from? In some cases, that they already had some kind of intuitive grip may be the most
plausible  answer.  For  course,  we may then ask whether a completely unexplained intuition is
really any more reliable than one for which we can provide a debunking explanation, but this line
of thought would make the historical approach somewhat redundant.
THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
A second approach to the genealogical  critique of intuition is the evolutionary approach.  This
rather empirical approach is associated with experimental philosophers. Through a combination of
5 Singer (1974), p. 516.
6 Derek Parfit implicitly makes this point, when he claims that the Golden Rule was “independently discovered in at 
least three of the world's earliest civilizations,” in Parfit (2011) On What Matters, Volume 1 (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford) p. 321, emphasis mine.
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experiments designed to test subjects' moral reactions to various situations, neurological methods,
and speculation about the evolutionary history of human development, the evolutionary critique
aims to demonstrate that our intuitions are largely shaped by psychological adaptations to no
longer existing, and perhaps no longer relevant, evolutionary pressures. This approach draws on a
variety of empirical results, not all of which were established specifically in order to build this
critique.
For example,  those making this evolutionary critique may point to experimental results
which demonstrate that feelings of disgust, manipulated by the experimental set-up, can strongly
influence subjects' moral judgments regarding some scenario, even when those feelings are not
connected to  the  scenario  itself.7 They may try  to  combine this  result  with some claim about
irrelevance or arbitrariness of feelings of disgust to reach the conclusion that intuitions, so easily
swayed by irrelevant factors, cannot be a reliable source of evidence for, or foundation of, moral
claims.  For  another  example,  a  philosopher may argue,  on the basis  of  speculation about  our
evolutionary history, combined with some game-theoretic arguments, that our moral intuitions are
sensitive  to  violent,  direct  action in  a  way that  they are  not  sensitive  to  indirect  actions,  like
flipping a switch, due to the major role violence played in our evolutionary past. From this, they
may  argue  that  our  intuitions  are  not  reliable  when  dealing  with  evaluation  of  the  kinds  of
scenarios we encounter in modern life.8
The implication in some, though not all, of this work is that none of our intuitive moral
judgements could be free from these seemingly irrelevant influences. One reason this approach
looks to be more powerful than the historical approach is that it looks harder to incorporate these
criticisms raised against intuition into the normal business of reflective equilibrium, or critiquing
and refining intuitions. This is because the kind of influences revealed by this approach will cover
more area, and be more subtle in their effects. It may be reasonably easy to find some neat list of
moral concerns that are particularly likely to have been influenced by, say, a Christian tradition,
but the kinds of  influences revealed by the evolutionary approach,  such as  the influence of  a
person's background levels of disgust on their moral judgment, are inevitably going to influence
all moral judgements, rather than only those in some particular domain. Furthermore, any attempt
to account for these influences may also be harder, as, to stick with the disgust example, there may
7 As in Schnall, et al, (2008) “Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
34 (8).
8 Peter Singer makes this kind of argument, along with many others following the evolutionary approach, and some 
more from the historical approach, in Singer (2005), “Ethics and Intuitions,” The Journal of Ethics 9.
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be no obvious baseline level of disgust to treat as an unmarked case, a case where judgement is not
being distorted.
One philosopher who does try to combine and reconcile an evolutionary critique of (some)
intuitions with something resembling the ordinary practice of reflective equilibrium is Kwame
Anthony Appiah. Appiah is sometimes very critical of the role of intuition in moral philosophy,
and ultimately holds a somewhat conflicted view, best illustrated by his claim, of moral theories,
that “if their plausibility comes from the ability to accommodate our intuitions, their power comes
from the ability to challenge still other intuitions.”9 Of evolutionary critique, on the one hand he
agrees  that  if  we  can  trace  the  character  of  some moral  intuition  back  to  some evolutionary
distorting influence, then we should reject that intuition. Nonetheless he maintains that the claim
“if something seems intuitively wrong and you have no special knowledge that suggests your
moral intuition is distorted, you shouldn't do it” is actually “a constitutive element of the very idea
of wrongness.”10 Thus, in Appiah's methodology,  evolutionary critique is used to question specific
intuitions, while leaving a general, foundational reliance on intuition untouched.
However, Appiah's approach is convincing challenged by Edouard Machery.  In Machery's
words, Appiah seems to propose that “knowing the nature of the mechanisms that deliver our
moral intuitions...  can enable philosophers to evaluate whether these intuitions are genuine or
whether  they  should  be  jettisoned.”11 However,   Machery  argues  that  Appiah  provides  no
principled, non-circular way of declaring some method of forming an intuition to be the result of a
distorting influence, and some other method of forming an intuition to be evidence of sound, valid
moral  judgment.  As an example,  Machery cites  de Brigard's  evidence that  peoples'  judgments
regarding the Experience Machine thought experiment might be influenced by a conservative bias
in favour of the status quo.12 However, he argues, Appiah gives us no grounds, and could not non-
circularly give any grounds, on which to judge whether conservativeness is a distorting factor,
which should lead us to reject this intuition, or rather a genuinely important moral factor, which
leads us to a correct intuition.13
Like the  historical  approach,  the evolutionary approach has some limitations,  from the
9 Appiah (2008), Experiments in Ethics (Harvard University Press: Massachusetts), p. 76.
10 Appiah (2008), p. 112.
11 Machery (2010) “The Bleak Implications of Moral Psychology,” Neuroethics 3, p. 228
12 See De Brigard (2010), “If you like it, does it matter if it's real?” Philosophical Psychology 23:1.
13 One interesting possibility Machery fails to discuss is that an influence such as the bias towards the status quo could
be seen as a distorting influence just in case it also demonstrably leads to incorrect results in cases of non-moral, 
non-ethical judgment.
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perspective of those who want to challenge the standard methodology in moral philosophy. One is
just that it  may be,  in a sense, too powerful. Rather than just problematising the intuitions on
which we base our moral theories, some see this kind of evolutionary critique as undermining
morality as a whole, showing the entire business of modifying our own behaviour in response to
the concerns of others to be entirely rooted in arational and unjustifiable psychological tendencies.
Thus, this approach may incline us towards a full-blown error theory of morality. This path is
taken by Richard Joyce, who argues that knowledge of evolution should undermine our belief in
the  truth  of  all  moral  claims,  by  providing a  plausible  genealogy of  our  moral  practices  and
attitudes which does not vindicate the truth of moral claims.14
On the other hand, one may react to evidence for the evolutionary basis of morality by
arguing that morality simply is this collection of evolutionarily based psychological tendencies –
and their manifestation in our modern environment and society – and that moral philosophy is
just in the business of charting and tidying up these tendencies.  Though this position may be
thought  to  involve  a  fairly  radical  departure  from  the  usual  characterisation  and  self-
understanding of the business of moral philosophy, there is a sense in which it is a deeply morally
conservative position, insofar as it refuses to go much beyond the moral beliefs that we happen to
start  with,  and completely cuts  off  the possibility of  any radical  revaluation of  our normative
attitudes.
I suspect the evolutionary approach can encourage this kind of conservatism by, on the one
hand,  providing  evidence  that  there  is  some kind  of  psychologically  common,  deeply  rooted
human moral nature to be studied, rather than just a jumble of culturally influenced beliefs and
attitudes, and, on the other hand, by suggesting a debunking explanation of any loftier goals for
ethics;  both by suggesting that we only feel the pull  towards a radical,  potentially revisionary
ethics due to these evolutionary factors, and by suggesting that any methodology which attempts
to develop such a revisionary ethics will struggle to face the systematic influence, on our moral
judgement, of these psychological tendencies.
Though he advocates studying morality empirically, rather than intuitively, an example of
this kind of moral conservatism, which identifies the content of morality simply with those moral
tendencies promoted by our evolutionary history, can be seen in the work of Michael Ruse.15 Of
course,  the  boundary  between  what  constitutes  an  evolutionary  moral  conservatism  and  an
14 In Joyce, (2006) The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, Massachusetts), particularly chapter 6. 
15 For example, in Ruse & Wilson (1986).
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evolutionary moral scepticism is not entirely stable. One might argue that any view that simply
reads moral facts off of empirical facts about evolution has simply given up talking about genuine
moral facts; David L. Hull points out that most philosophers will see an evolutionary epistemology
or ethics as “the abandonment of these endeavours as they have been traditionally construed.”16
Ultimately, I think that this kind of challenge, from psychological data and evolutionary
speculation, could be important,  and must be met by any realist moral theory which wants to
allow for the possibility that morality may be a radical source of practical demands and guidance.
Furthermore, I see the increased interest in empirical study of the methods of, and influences on,
ordinary moral judgment as important, useful, and desirable. Nonetheless, in what follows I want
to focus on the third approach to the genealogical critique of intuition, the social approach, which I
see lending itself to more practical, less meta-ethical considerations.
THE SOCIAL APPROACH AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE
This approach to the genealogical critique is markedly different from the previous two approaches
insofar as it doesn't just see our intuitions as leftover relics of a distant past, but rather as beliefs
and attitudes created by and  maintained by continuing systematic influences.  In particular,  the
concern is with systems of oppression and privilege, which may be created by, perpetuated by, and
manifest in economic,  political,  social,  cultural  and legal  factors  (among, perhaps,  others).  The
kinds  of  attitudes  discussed  include  prejudice,  stereotype,  ideology,  false  consciousness,  and
implicit bias. These factors are partly the subject matter of a collection of related fields of academic
study including feminism, critical race theory, and some forms of Marxist theory.17
There is a wide range of conceptual resources available to help one develop this approach,
which  brings  some  advantages  and  some  disadvantages.  One  advantage  is  that  there  is  an
16 Hull (1988), review of Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously, in Ethics 98:2.
17 I had previously collectively referred to such theories under the name “critical theory,” but have moved away from 
that for a number of reasons. These include the strong association, particular within philosophy, between the term 
“critical theory” and the particular approach of what is known as the “Frankfurt school” of critical theory. In 
particular, I found that the account of what it takes to be a critical theory provided by Raymond Geuss's The Idea of
a Critical Theory (focusing on the Frankfurt school and its inheritors), though somewhat appropriate in its 
insistence that “Critical theories aim at emancipation and enlightenment, at making agents aware of hidden 
coercion,” (p. 55), was otherwise too specific, making a few epistemological and methodological claims that may 
not necessarily be supported by all of the theories I wish to include. (Geuss (1981), The Idea of a Critical Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge)) For example, Geuss argues a critical theory must be self-referential, 
"part of the object-domain which it describes," (p. 55). Though this feature is central to the feminist standpoint 
epistemology which I describe and advocate in chapter 5, I believe it need not be a part of all the feminist theories I 
discuss in this chapter, for that theory to be considered genuinely feminist. Ultimately, I think my own philosophical
work, in this thesis, could be considered to be critical theory, but I have not been sufficiently familiar with the term, 
or its history, to make much of this connection through this thesis.
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enormous wealth of material that can be drawn upon to motivate, develop, and respond to this
critique, from Marxist thought, feminist philosophy, critical race theory, queer theory, and related
fields.  A possible disadvantage lies in the difficulty of managing,  or restricting the scope.  The
various  factors  which  social  theory  identifies  as  leading  to  problematic  cultural  attitudes  are
complicated even in isolation, and tend to interact in complex ways, making any simple or brief
discussion  of  these  problems  inevitably  doomed  to  be  over-simplistic.  The  social  approach
certainly does not lend itself to being briefly raised as a sceptical argument, then immediately
forgotten,  as  we saw the  historical  approach  used.  Of  course,  this  resistance  to  brevity  could
certainly be seen as an advantage, as it may force us to think through the full implications of our
critique (rather than allowing us to replace one set of criticised attitudes with another, which may
ultimately fall to the very same critique, as seems to be the case with Singer's rejection of intuition
in favour of "self-evident principles"18). It may also provide us with further guidance as to where to
look for an alternative methodology, one resistant to the problems it raises, rather than simply
leaving us with the old methodology torn down.
It should be fairly obvious how those intellectual resources which aim to demonstrate how
our beliefs and attitudes can be shaped by systems of oppression could be used to challenge the
use of intuitions, or similar attitudes, in moral philosophy. Insofar as these resources reveal some
of our beliefs to be inaccurate (or, in some cases, such as cases of stereotype threat, true because
self-fulfilling), ideological, or morally problematic, they should fairly straightforwardly cast doubt
upon  any  methodology  that  gives  a  central,  foundational  role  to  such  beliefs.  Nonetheless,
explicitly methodological criticism of the practice of moral philosophers along these lines is not so
familiar in what I take to be the mainstream of moral philosophy as either of the two approaches
previously  discussed.19 With  that  in  mind,  I  will  now demonstrate  just  one  way  that  such  a
criticism may proceed, with reference to Miranda Fricker's discussion of epistemic injustice.20
Fricker identifies two kinds of phenomena as cases of epistemic injustice, both widespread
in our society. The first is testimonial injustice, where “prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated
level of credibility to a speaker's word.” The second, which Fricker discusses less, is hermeneutical
18 Singer (1974), p. 516-517. He does not discuss exactly why what strikes us as self-evident would be less 
historically conditioned than what strikes us as intuitive.
19 During the rest of this thesis I will discuss many texts which explicitly or implicitly make such a challenge from 
outside the mainstream of moral philosophy. One in particular is so relevant as to be worth mentioning here: 
Schwartzman (2012) “Intuition, Thought Experiments, and Philosophical Method: Feminism and Experimental 
Philosophy,” The Journal of Social Philosophy, 43: 3.
20 Fricker, (2007) Epistemic Injustice (Oxford University Press: Oxford).
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injustice, a situation wherein “a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair
disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences.”21 Both types of injustice
are rooted in marginalisation, and the operation of social power.22 Roughly speaking, testimonial
injustice operates via well documented and widespread psychological effects, such as implicit bias
and stereotype threat, which lead people to doubt the reliability, sincerity, and ability of members
of  marginalised  groups,  perhaps  despite  their  holding  explicit  egalitarian  beliefs.  By  Fricker's
account,  hermeneutical injustice operates primarily through the exclusion of oppressed groups
from practices wherein they could contribute to creating social meaning, such as media, politics,
law, and academia.
Fricker  does  not  attempt,  in  Epistemic  Injustice,  to  relate  this  work  to  the  practices  of
philosophers and moral theorists, as her interests are primarily epistemological, secondarily moral,
and rarely methodological. Nonetheless, making this connection should be a fairly straightforward
matter.  The implications of testimonial  injustice,  though hugely important,  are not particularly
unique  or  distinct  to  moral  philosophy,  or  philosophy  in  general;  the  discounting,  or
disproportional  challenging,  of  the claims,  arguments and concerns of  those labouring against
testimonial  injustice  will  obviously  lead  to  the  moral  positions  and  ethical  concerns  that  are
particularly salient for such people being given less weight or less serious attention, whether they
come  to  the  attention  of  philosophers  as  moral  claims  typically  advanced  by  members  of
marginalised groups, or more directly in the form of arguments made by minority philosophers.
Meanwhile, the positions and concerns distinct to more privileged philosophers – white, male,
middle-class  academics  –  will  be  given  a  relatively  free  ride;  less  challenged,  given  more
immediate credence, finding more widespread support.23
21 These are both early definitions, from Fricker (2007), p. 1, and may be too simple, or otherwise flawed. In 
particular, I would question Fricker's restriction of hermeneutical injustice to cases of people trying to understand 
their social experiences. For example, difficulties encountered by a person born intersex in understanding their own
body with the limited cultural resources available to them would seem to be a clear instance of hermeneutical 
injustice  (as it is rooted in cultural and social marginalisation, serves the interest of a dominant ideology (the 
gender binary), and has systemic, unjust practical ramifications), but does not clearly involve an effort to make 
sense of social experience, unless our sense of “social experience” is broad enough to cover just about anything (as,
perhaps, it should be, as I will discuss in relation to Harding's standpoint epistemology in chapter 5).
22 Her discussion of social power is mainly contained in Fricker (2007) chapter 1, particularly pages 9-17.
23 Though I don't plan to focus on it, there is an interesting question regarding how distinct philosophy might be in 
resisting this problem. Analytic philosophy is certainly a discipline that prides itself, with some justification, as 
being especially challenging. A philosopher may argue that no view or concern would be given a free pass in 
philosophy, whether it is presented by a white man or a woman of colour. Everything is challenged, everything 
needs to be justified. Though there may be some truth in that, it may not go very far in addressing the problem. 
Even if every philosopher is challenged, we would have to look at such factors as exactly what kinds of claims are 
seen as worth challenging, to what degree different philosophers are challenged, exactly how they are challenged 
(as helpful critique versus dismissal, deflection, or ad hominem attack), what is taken as an acceptable or successful
response to such challenges, and whether wider support against such challenges is forthcoming. I see no particular 
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The  implications  of  hermeneutical  injustice  bear  more  specifically  on  the  intuitional
methodology  of  moral  philosophy.  Fricker  discusses  how  hermeneutical  injustice  renders
individuals'  experiences  “obscure,  even  unspeakable,”  shareable  only  through  “half-formed
understandings” employing “ill-fitting meanings.”24 She illustrates this kind of situation, and some
of the problems it can cause, through the real-life example of women struggling to understand the
experiences we now call 'sexual harassment,' before these experiences were widely discussed, and
before there was appropriate language readily available to easily discuss them.25 Of  particular
interest is her suggestion that the reality of hermeneutical injustice was “positively disguised by
the  existing  meaning  attributed  to  the  behaviour  ('flirting'),”  and  that  “the  whole  engine  of
collective  social  meaning was  effectively geared to  keeping these  obscured experiences  out  of
sight.”26
This  non-accidentally  dismissive  conceptualisation  of  behaviours,  which  we  now
understand  to  be  sexual  harassment,  as  'flirting'  would  severely  hamper  any  attempt  to
understand  the  ethical  import  of  such  behaviour,  within  philosophy,  so  long as  the  methods
available to us were based on intuitive judgement. There are two important ways this is so.
Firstly, when we are led us to understand a set of behaviours as 'flirting,' even if we see
them as  particularly  aggressive  or  persistent  instances  of  flirting,  it  seems inevitable  that  our
background  understanding  and  assumptions  about  flirting  will  be  triggered.  These  are
assumptions such as that flirting is harmless, playful, reciprocal, personal, private, normal and
natural.  Fighting  against  these  associations  will  make  any attempt  to  judge  the  behaviour  as
morally wrong an uphill battle.
We  could  perhaps  try  to  avoid  this  problem  while  still  employing  our  intuitions  by
steadfastly refusing to see the case or thought experiment under consideration as an instance of a
general category, such as 'flirting,' but rather to just intuitively evaluate it in all its specific details.
However, there are problems with this approach. For one thing, it is doubtful to what extent we
could consciously refrain from employing our ordinary concepts. For another, there is reason to
expect that issues of hermeneutical injustice will also touch on how we understand the particular
details;  what  was  once  understood  as  confidence,  in  the  context  of  flirting,  may  now  be
understood as intimidation, as part of sexual harassment. Similarly, a focus on the details of a
reason to assume philosophy will fare any better in these regards than any other academic discipline.
24 Fricker (2007), p. 148.
25 Fricker (2007), p. 149-155.
26 Fricker (2007), p. 153.
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particular case may occlude some details relevant to our evaluation of some particular behaviour
as an instance of a pattern of behaviour. For example, to see the harm of sexual harassment, we
plausibly must understand it  as  a potentially widespread phenomenon, one that could not be
easily or reliably avoided by, for instance, changing job. It plausibly must also be understood as
something that women suffer from men (at some level of generality), with all of the structural
analysis that entails. A third problem is that by refraining from performing any kind of general
categorisation, we limit the scope of our ethical conclusions. We can no longer reach a conclusion
like “this kind of act is wrong,” but are limited to the much weaker “something wrong was done in
this case.” 
A  second  important  way  that  hermeneutical  injustice  will  be  problematic  for  moral
philosophy is by influencing what kinds of cases come to the philosopher's attention in the first
place.  Insofar  as  a  certain  pattern  of  behaviour  is  conceptualised  as  'flirting,'  philosophers,
including  moral  philosophers,  are  unlikely  to  pay  much  attention  to  it,  seeing  it  as  trivial,
unimportant, insignificant. Insofar as there are no hermeneutical resources available to understand
some  phenomenon,  not  even  ill-fitting  ones,  but  only  what  Fricker  calls  a  “hermeneutical
lacuna,”27 the situation may be even worse, as the opportunity to have an intuitional judgment of
the phenomenon will not even arise; intuition will have no concepts to latch on to. This is not to
say that philosophers could not come to see some such phenomenon as philosophically interesting,
but just  that  the work of  countering hermeneutical  injustice would have to be done first. 28 Of
course,  the  problem of  what  is  considered philosophically  interesting extends  far  beyond any
particular way of doing ethics, and beyond moral philosophy.29
The question of what our response should be to epistemic injustice is a large one, and the
answer  will  probably  overlap  significantly  with  similar  questions  regarding  other  kinds  of
injustice rooted in social power. Fricker's own answer to this question is somewhat limited, and
shaped by her primary interest in epistemological issues.30 With regard to both testimonial and
27 Fricker (2007), p. 151.
28 Though obviously hard to diagnose ahead of time, it appears as though something like this kind of work has been 
collectively undertaken in the past few years with regard to the increased discussion of, and awareness of, online 
harassment and “bullying,” which had previously been understood as “trolling,” a mostly harmless, randomly-
targeted, best-ignored practice, fuelled by boredom and anonymity, but is now increasingly being seen as a 
concerted, sometimes organised organised campaign of exclusion and intimidation, targeting marginalised groups, 
fuelled by misogyny, racism, and other oppressive attitudes, which systematically maintains online spaces as being 
exclusively for privileged groups (with obvious parallels to the case of sexual harassment). Needless to say, this 
hermeneutical work is not being led by academic moral philosophers. See Cross (2014b).
29 I will return to this problem later.
30 These discussions appear in Fricker (2007), chapter 4, p. 86-108, and a small part of chapter 7, p. 169-175
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hermeneutical injustice, she considers only the response of an agent who, in the course of hearing
testimony from a possibly marginalised speaker, becomes aware of the possibility that testimonial
injustice is  operating.31 In both cases,  she recommends the development of  a different kind of
epistemic virtue. 
The first is a virtue of testimonial justice, which most basically involves neutralising the
impact  of  prejudice  in one's  credibility  judgements by consciously “compensating upwards  to
reach the degree of credibility that would have been given were it not for the prejudice.”32  The
second  is  a  virtue  of  hermeneutical  justice,  which  involves  a  hearer  revising  upwards  their
judgement as to the “degree to which what is said makes good sense.”33 She stresses that, in practice,
this will not just involve some internal revaluation, but rather may involve practices such as a
more socially aware kind of listening and the seeking of corroborating evidence.
Nonetheless,  both these virtues  are corrective,  in  the  sense  that  they aim to  correct  for
epistemic injustice (not aiming directly to correct it) while leaving the patterns of epistemic activity
in  which  these  injustices  manifest,  and  the  underlying  social  and  political  causes,  mostly
untouched. This seems rather limited in two regards.
Firstly,  it  does  not  provide  much  guidance  in  epistemic  contexts  where  prototypical
exchanges of testimony do not play a major role, such as mainstream moral philosophy, and many
other academic fields. Perhaps Fricker intended to restrict the scope of what she calls “epistemic
injustice”  only  to  those  injustices  which  arise  within  testimonial  contexts,  with  the  implicit
understanding that her theory could be supplemented with other work from the broad field of
social and critical theory. Her contribution would still be significant, as testimonial exchanges do
play a particularly huge and important role in some epistemic contexts which have huge practical
and ethical ramifications; most obviously legal and bureaucratic contexts, as well as some political
contexts. Fricker may be happy to acknowledge that some other “distinctively epistemic kind(s) of
injustice”34 exist.
Secondly,  limiting  our  response  to  epistemic  injustice  to  the  development  of  corrective
virtues seems somewhat unwarranted. Straightforwardly, to focus on hermeneutical injustice, it
seems that a more wholehearted response to the observation that the exclusion of certain groups of
31 It is particularly striking that she gives much less attention to the question of what the speaker's response could be, 
which may be a more interesting and important question, particularly in cases of hermeneutical injustice. 
32 Fricker (2007), p. 92.
33 Fricker (2007), p. 170, italics hers.
34 Fricker (2007), p. 1.
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people  from  hermeneutically valuable  practices  should  involve  some  effort  to  combat  that
exclusion, perhaps by creating space for, and drawing attention to marginalised voices. Fricker
briefly argues, in the last paragraph of the book, that the cultivation of a virtue of hermeneutical
justice would go some way to eradicating hermeneutical injustice, by involving “the creation of a
more inclusive hermeneutical micro-climate shared by hearer and speaker.”35 Nonetheless, as she
acknowledges, this could hardly be enough to seriously combat the “unequal relations of social
power more generally” which cause and sustain hermeneutical  injustice;  her virtues leave the
macro-climate mostly untouched.
She defends this limitation by claiming that combating the underlying causes of epistemic
injustice “takes more than virtuous individual conduct of any kind; it takes group political action
for social  change.”36 Fricker  is  probably right,  here,  to be  passing the  buck to  more  explicitly
political theories regarding social change, but it nonetheless seems plausible that individual action
undertaken as part of that collective effort may constitute good epistemic practice, rather than only
good moral or political practice. Insofar as society's epistemic injustice has an epistemic cost for all
individuals, hampering every individual's ability to reliably reach true belief when some evidence
is hidden behind prejudice or hermeneutical lacunae,  it  seems plausible that broader, practical
action to eliminate epistemic injustice, whether undertaken individually or collectively, could be
seen as a part of good epistemic practice, as it helps us come to have true beliefs, and correct our
false beliefs.
I hope to have shown how the social approach to genealogical critique could be advanced
through the  resources provided by Miranda Fricker's  work on epistemic injustice.  However,  I
should stress that this is just one way that such a critique could be developed. A wide range of
other conceptual resources are also available, such as (to name just a few) invisibility, stereotype,
false  consciousness,  privilege,  and  implicit  bias,  which  would  help  develop  this  critique  in
different ways. Approaches focusing on these different concepts will often overlap significantly –
for  example,  the  concept  of  hermeneutical  injustice  shares  some overlap with the  concepts  of
invisibility and false consciousness – but together they will help paint a more complete picture of
the  factors  which  may  distort  our  moral  judgements,  within  philosophy  and  society  more
generally,  and  different  concepts  may  be  more  suited  to  addressing  particular  issues  within
methodology (such as the role of intuitions, the subject matter of philosophical ethics, the kinds of
35 Fricker (2007), p. 174.
36 Fricker (2007), p. 174.
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arguments and evidence used in philosophical ethics,  the demographics of philosophy and its
effects on theory, etc.).
FURTHER DIFFERENCES IN THE THREE APPROACHES
The differences between these three approaches is not limited to the differences in how a critique
of  intuitions  or  intuitional  methodology is  made,  and the  plausibility  of  these  critiques.  Each
approach also carries a different set of assumptions and implications, may lead to different kinds
of responses,  prompting a different kind of philosophical project,  and may support a different
kind of adjustment to philosophical methodology.
In some ways,  the implications of the social approach to genealogical critique of moral
attitudes are less extreme than the implications of the other two approaches. Focusing on how
these critiques may influence our understanding of intuitions, the social approach may appear less
radical insofar as it seems to leave the basic meta-ethical assumption that intuitions could be a good
guide to moral truth untouched.
When  employed  by  someone  like  Singer,  the  historical  approach  suggests  that  our
intuitions are shaped by morally irrelevant, shifting cultural factors, which are not adopted due to
any strong connection to moral truth, and which we may later come to reject, and which therefore
lack epistemic legitimacy. It constitutes a critique of intuition as a  whole,  rather than just of the
intuitions that we happen to have, insofar as it seems to close off the possibility of a world where
our intuitions are not influenced by these contingent, epistemically unreliable factors. A world
without cultural influences on our moral beliefs is perhaps unimaginable, or at least so unlike our
actual  world  as  to  make  the  intuitions  we  may  counterfactually  have  in  such  a  world  seem
irrelevant to us.
Similar thoughts  apply to the evolutionary approach;  our intuitional  moral  judgements
seem so bound up in our arational psychological natures, formed in distant circumstances to meet
no-longer-relevant challenges, that accounting for these influences seems impossible. Similarly, the
moral  judgements  of  creatures  with  psychologies  entirely  unlike  our  own  may  seem  totally
irrelevant.
In contrast, the social approach seems to leave open the possibility that our intuitions could
be, or become, entirely free from the distorting influences it discusses, and so perhaps (turning on
the outcome of a few more meta-ethical or moral epistemological arguments), a good guide to
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moral  truth.  Though  we  perhaps  can't  hope  for  an  opportunity  to  develop  intuitional  moral
attitudes  free  from  any  historical  contingency,  or  any  innate  psychological  inclinations,  we
plausibly (hopefully) can hope for a world free from systematic social injustice.
Furthermore, insofar as this approach conceptualises the distorting influences on our moral
attitudes through thick concepts such as "prejudices," and "biases," it may demand that we actually
engage with and correct these attitudes, rather than simply ignoring them and putting them aside.
That is to say, to a significant degree the social approach will cast our problematic moral attitudes
as  themselves  a  moral  problem  to  be  addressed,  and  so  corrected,  rather  than  merely as  a
methodological problem which gets in the way of our understanding some other moral problems.
To put this another way, for some sufficiently broad ways of understanding what is involved in
'reflective  equilibrium,'  a  social  approach  may  actually  demand  that  we  engage  in  reflective
equilibrium, rather than leading us to reject it.
Similarly, where the historical and evolutionary approaches can lend themselves to a kind
of scepticism about morality as a whole, through the suggestion that our morality simply is this
collection of non-justifying cultural or evolutionary influences, active engagement with the social
approach seems to rule out this kind of scepticism from the start, as taking seriously the key, thick
concepts, such as "oppression" and "injustice," involves some kind of moral commitment, some
understanding of these forces as bad, wrong, or in need of redress. It seems that to engage with
this approach, these theories, and these concepts without incurring any kind of moral commitment
would require either denying that any oppression or injustice actually exists,37 or employing these
central concepts but failing to take them seriously.
However, despite the possibly more radical meta-ethical implications of the historical and
evolutionary  approaches,  I  would  like  to  suggest  that  the  challenge  which  a  social  approach
presents to the currently practised methodology of moral philosophy actually has more significant
implications than either of the two other approaches. However, first I will discuss how the meta-
ethical issues raised by the historical approach may serve to draw philosophical attention away
from more immediate, practical concerns, and so mute the effectiveness of the historical approach
as a way of addressing our actual moral attitudes.
That the historical critique lends itself to a certain kind of sceptical project should be no
surprise, given that we have come into this topic seeking to cast doubt upon some of our moral
37 In chapter 6 I discuss what it may take for some people to achieve the starting point necessary to take a social 
critique seriously.
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beliefs.  However,  inevitably this doubt is  not  contained to just those beliefs  we actually have.
Beyond leading us to reevaluate our particular moral beliefs, the historical critique tends to reveal,
and focus our attention on, a fundamental contingency in all moral beliefs and attitudes. Just as
our possession of certain moral beliefs is contingent, so too are the circumstances that have led us
to question these beliefs, the methods we use to do so, and the standards we have accepted for a
belief to count as deeply justified.
We are then faced with questions regarding the relationship between this contingency and
justification in philosophy, or the nature of moral belief. Must contingency undermine justification,
or can we accept some beliefs as true and justified despite this contingency, or perhaps even in
virtue of certain kinds of contingent historical facts? On the other hand, might it be possible to find
some beliefs or standards which relevantly avoid this kind of contingency, or which hold a kind of
universal justificatory power in spite of their contingency, and so “step outside of our tradition”? 38
These are not simple questions, and they go to the heart of some long-standing and profound
debates within philosophy.39
Though these questions may be philosophically interesting and important, they can be an
unwanted  diversion  for  any  more  practically-focused  moral  philosopher,  or  anyone  who  is
primarily concerned with actually examining and criticising our dominant moral attitudes and
beliefs.  It  must  be  remembered  that  so  long  as  we  are,  for  example,  investigating  the  very
possibility  and limits  of  radical  critique  of  our  own moral  beliefs,  we  are  no  longer  actually
engaging in such critique,  and have taken a step away from the kind of philosophical  practice
which may most immediately bring about an understanding or improvement of our moral attitudes
(which could partly explain why the historical critique is discussed so briefly by a philosopher
such as  Peter  Singer,  one  more  interested  than most  in  making  moral  philosophy  practically
relevant).  This  threat  of  diversion  should  not  be  simply  dismissed.  The  kinds  of  questions
mentioned above have a number of features which make them particularly diverting. 
For one, they are seen as foundational, such that anyone attempting to actually employ
historical critique of moral attitudes must first be committed to, and so willing to defend, some
position on these matters. In theory, this seems plausible. However, in practice this attitude could
mean the end of practical, first-order philosophy. Of course, the answer to any question about an
38 Brandt (1979), p. 21 
39 See for example Nagel (1997) The Last Word, (Oxford University Press, New York) and Williams (2005), In The 
Beginning Was The Deed (Princeton University Press, Princeton), chap. 6.
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immediate moral issue may be influenced by our answer to a question about the right general
moral  theory,  which  may  be  influenced  by  meta-ethical  debates,  which  may  turn  on  certain
positions in the philosophy of language, which may depend on some particular theory of truth,
and  so  on.  Sometimes,  this  kind  of  theoretical  ascent  may  be  dialectically  appropriate,  but
obviously  it  must  sometimes  be  resisted,  otherwise,  as  Kristie  Dotson  puts  it,  “one  can  lose
herself/himself  in  the  infinite  regress  of  criticism  and  rival  theories  without  ever  acting  in
accordance with a single idea.”40
These questions also carry a certain kind of philosophical prestige, making them harder to
resist. They are seen as the kind of questions that philosophers do engage with, and should engage
with, which may lead philosophers to feel obliged to engage with them, or to be judged negatively
for  putting  them  aside.  That  said,  there  is  definitely  a  strong  counter-current  in  modern
philosophy, which sees more transcendental questions as esoteric or senseless, and so best ignored.
A third  feature  of  these  questions  is  that  they  are  deeply  intractable.  They  have  been
discussed, in some form, for hundreds of years, with no consensus emerging. This is just to say
that we could not hope to quickly and simply answer them, to everyone's satisfaction, and then get
on with our critique of moral attitudes.
Here,  we may see  attempts  to  develop a  historical  critique as  running afoul  of  certain
features of how philosophy is done. Graham Priest argues plausibly that “the nature of philosophy
is unrestricted critique: everything is fair game for challenging and questioning.”41 He calls this the
idea of 'Philosophy as Critique.' Whether or not we take this as definitional of philosophy, it is
certainly true that philosophy takes itself (in a sense) to be that discipline in which everything is
available for critique. On the one hand, it is this openness to critique that makes it so natural to
critique society's moral attitudes from within philosophy. But on the other hand, we need to be
mindful of the ways that some kinds of critique can shut down or push out others.
It may be too simple to insist, as Priest does, that “the fact that philosophy involves critique
necessarily limits philosophy in no way whatever.”42 Though it may be true that this feature alone,
or ideally practised, could not be a limitation, it may nonetheless serve to limit the activities of
philosophers when combined with other features, such as those mentioned above. A certain kind
of critique being seen as especially prestigious, important and fundamental will certainly act to
40 Dotson (2012), “How is This Paper Philosophy?” in Comparative Philosophy 3:1, p. 23.
41 Priest (2012) “In the Same Way that This One Is: Some Comments on Dotson,” in Comparative Philosophy 3:2, p. 
6.
42 Priest (2012), p. 8, his emphasis.
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limit  interest  in,  and  engagement  with  other  kinds  of  critique.  This  will  be  especially  true  if
philosophers feel obliged or bound to offer some answer to absolutely any kind of critique offered,
an attitude which the practice of Philosophy as Critique must encourage.
Of  course,  even  if  this  situation  proves  to  be  particularly  a  problem  for  a  historical
approach  to  critiquing  moral  attitudes,  it's  not  immediately  clear  what  our  response  to  this
problem should be.  Though I  see this situation as  one reason to be less attracted to historical
critiques, some other response may be more appropriate; for example, we may rather locate the
problem in the  distribution  of  prestige  amongst  philosophical  projects,  or  we may,  as  Dotson
suggests,  aim to  change the  culture  of  philosophy,  to  put  more  value  on “seeking issues  and
circumstances pertinent to our living.”43
At this point it may be worth looking at how engagement with the historical origins of our
moral attitudes can play out in a philosopher's work. Bernard Williams provides a good case for
this task, as much of his later political work demonstrates an interest in historical engagement,
along with a broader interest in the genealogy of normative attitudes and concepts.
Certainly, Williams does engage heavily with the kinds of abstract, higher-order questions I
talked about above. He ultimately dismisses the possibility of our radically stepping outside of our
intellectual tradition, insisting that "we cannot overcome our outlook,"44 but he rejects the usual
conservative  implications  of  that  position,  the  "undiscriminating  acceptance  of  whatever
conceptual  resources  of  the  society  actually  exist,"45 by  emphasising  the  strong  resources  for
criticism that are provided by our outlook, and by a consciousness of diverse ways of living. 46
However,  despite  this  engagement  he  seems  aware  of  the  danger  of  getting  bogged down in
abstract questions, as he writes "I want to emphasise the importance of thinking politically about
human rights abuses, and I hope that this may... emphasise reality at the expense of philosophical
abstraction."47 Still, he seems to think that some engagement with more abstract questions "is the
ineliminable consequence which follows from a philosopher's discussing the subject at all."48
There are a number of scattered passages in which Williams discusses the importance of
taking a historical perspective on our concepts and attitudes.  Most  obviously,  he thinks that  a
historical perspective is necessary for understanding the nature of our concepts. For example, he
43 Dotson (2012), p. 24. In fact, I also argue for such a change in chapter 6.
44 Williams (2000), "Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline," in Philosophy 75:4, p. 494
45 Williams (2005), p. 35.
46 Williams (2005), particularly chapters 3 & 6.
47 Williams (2005), p. 64
48 Williams (2005), p. 64
51
writes "various conceptions or understandings of freedom, including the ones we immediately
need for ourselves, involve a complex historical deposit, and we will not understand them unless
we grasp something of that deposit, of what the idea of freedom, in these various connections, has
become...  It is the same here as it is with other values."49 He suggests that this understanding will
help  "relieve  puzzlement  about  the  basis  of  these  values  and  their  implications."50 This  could
obviously help a philosopher fend off criticism of some ethical attitude, if that criticism were based
on  some  puzzled  misunderstanding,  but  it's  not  so  clear  that  Williams  sees  it  as  having  the
potential to help a philosopher mount some positive critique in the way I have been discussing.
He also sees historical awareness as necessary for resisting conservatism, or an uncritical
acceptance of our pre-existing concepts, presumably by emphasising their contingency: "we have
to recall that our form of life, and hence, more particularly, our ethical concepts and thoughts, have
a  history,  and  that  a  society  such  as  ours  is  conscious  of  that  fact."51 This  will  give  us  "less
temptation to assume that [our ethical life] is a satisfactorily functioning whole; and we shall be
more likely to recognise that some widely accepted parts of it may stand condemned in the light of
perfectly plausible extrapolations of other parts."52 Here, the historical engagement seems to play a
limited role; it makes space for an internal critique of our moral attitudes, but the actual work of
that critique is being done not by the historical analysis itself,  but by other, currently accepted
moral attitudes.
When he does talk about the importance of taking a historical perspective, it is rarely in the
context of  generating criticism of  our own moral  attitudes.  For example,  in his  essay "Human
Rights and Relativism,"53 Williams seem to be primarily concerned with two questions. The first is:
given the contingency of our moral and political attitudes, can we be confident in the legitimacy of
our own political order?54 The second is: given this contingency, do we have space to critique other
societies that come to our attention?55 That is to say, here Williams seems to be interested primarily
in making space to defend the social order he finds himself in (which he identifies as 'liberalism'),
while  criticising the  social  orders  of  others.  This  is  most  starkly  indicated in  the  passage "the
influences of the past include, now, theocratic conceptions of government and patriarchal ideas of
49 Williams (2005), p. 75-76.
50 Williams (2000), p. 489.
51 Williams (2005), p. 36.
52 Williams (2005), p. 36-37.
53 Williams (2005), chapter 6.
54 Williams (2005), p. 67 particularly presses this question.
55 Williams (2005), p. 70.
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the rights of women. Should we regard practices elsewhere that still express such conceptions as
violations of fundamental human rights?"56 At least here, he seems either to miss the possibility
that  our  own practices  might  still  express  such  conceptions,  or  to  assume  that  we  could
straightforwardly identify and condemn these conceptions when they operate in our own society.
Williams usually casts his own social order as something to be defended, not critiqued.
One  possible  exception  to  this  appears  in  "Philosophy  as  a  Humanistic  Discipline."
Williams believes that historical explanations can show why certain moral and political outlooks
make sense to us,57 and he also briefly discusses how they can also help us understand why, in
particular situations, our own outlook might not make sense to us. As an example, he diagnoses a
difficulty with the concept of autonomy in a modern liberal outlook as resulting from its origins in
"Enlightenment conceptions of the individual which do not fully make sense to us now."58 Williams
identifies three roles for this kind of understanding: it  helps us explain ourselves to those not
entirely  committed  to  our  outlook  (perhaps  including  ourselves),  it  helps  us  to  understand
ourselves in relation to others, and it helps us get a handle on the kinds of more abstract questions
I discussed in the previous section. 
Though this use of history is concerned with examining our own concepts, it is still fairly
weak as a form of critique. It only involves investigating a pre-existing uneasiness, rather than
providing resources to challenge firmly (or unconsciously) held attitudes. In this way, historical
engagement seems to be more about coming to know why we are being led to reject or challenge
some attitude, rather than being a force which might itself lead us to make such a challenge. This is
reflected in the way Williams talks about these situations. He writes that when there is a severe
failure of coherence in our outlook, "there is a real question whether these ideas will survive and
continue to serve us."59 This makes it sound as though whether or not we continue to hold, or come
to reject our outlook is determined by some force beyond our control, some contingent historical
fact leading us one way or the other.  At least,  Williams doesn't  explicitly suggest any role for
historical critique in guiding or influencing our choice of some outlook over any alternatives. In
fact, in this essay he claims that "there are no alternatives for us," that we "cannot overcome our
outlook."60
56 Williams (2005), p. 70.
57 See for example Williams (2005), p. 10-11.
58 Williams (2000), p. 491.
59 Williams (2000), p. 491.
60 Williams (2000), p. 494.
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Prima  facie,  there  is  a  problem  squaring  this  philosophical  fatalism  with  the  anti-
conservatism  expressed  (originally  eight  years  earlier)  in  "Pluralism,  Community  and  Left
Wittgensteinianism."61 It  is  tempting  to  interpret  this  as  resulting  from  a  distinction  between
philosophical  argument  and political  critique;  that  as  a  matter  of  philosophical  fact,  we must
acknowledge that we are radically bound by our own outlook, and can't hope to get beyond it, but
also that, when it comes to political argument and critique, it would be a mistake to ever try to
reason  along  these  lines,  as  our  even  attempting  to  mount  some  kind  of  critique  manifestly
demonstrates that we do, in fact, have the resources to do so within our outlook. 62 However, this
philosophical/political distinction is questionable,  and doesn't fit  neatly with some of Williams'
expressed views, such as that “whether it is a matter of philosophical good sense to treat a certain
practice as a violation of human rights, and whether it is politically good sense, cannot ultimately
constitute two separate questions.”63 Of course, we should not discount the possibility that this
tension simply reflects Williams having changed his mind.
When it comes to challenging or justifying the practices or governmental structure of some
society, Williams focuses on two questions. The first is whether the practice makes sense as being
legitimate to those governed or coerced by it.64 A historical investigation may reveal why a practice
does or does not make sense to someone, as we saw, but seems to play no role in answering the
question of whether the practice makes sense to those affected. This is presumably best answered
by gauging the mood and attitudes of the population, revealed through dissent and protest (or
perhaps, for our own society, and on a smaller scale, introspectively).
The second question William asks  is:  if  some practice  of  domination makes sense  to  a
dominated population, to what extent can “the acceptance of these ideas... be plausibly understood
as an expression of the power relations that are in question.”65  Of course,  in this,  Williams is
moving away from what we might see as a historical approach, and towards an approach utilising
the resources of critical theory, bringing us closer to what I've called the social approach. He refers
to critique suggested by this question as “the critical theory test.”66 In discussing this test, Williams
is again most concerned with the case of our liberal society finding the resources to critique some
61 Reprinted in Williams (2000), chapter 3.
62 See Williams (2005), p. 35.
63 Williams (2005), p. 72.
64 Williams (2005), p. 71.
65 Williams (2005), p. 71.
66 Williams (2002), Truth and Truthfulness (Princeton University Press, Princeton), p. 225-232.
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other society;  he  tellingly describes this  test  as  “one of  liberalism's  most  powerful  weapons.”67
Williams  suggests  we  can  apply  this  test  by  imagining a  dominated  population,  which  holds
attitudes that we are inclined to identify as serving to exploit them, going through a process of
reflective criticism by which they come to see their beliefs as apparently justified by nothing other
than the authority claimed by a dominant group,  an authority only apparently legitimated by
those very beliefs. Williams claims this process “resembles traditional critical theory in a number
of respects.”68
In Williams' discussion, neither this process,  nor the process of applying this test as an
external critic,  seems to involve any deployment of historical awareness.  Again, historical facts
seem to emerge,  for Williams, as  something that could possibly help justify some problematic
attitudes (just  in case they reveal  some legitimation of  those attitudes which does not  fail  the
critical  theory  test),  but  which  don't  play  a  strong  role  in  actually  critiquing  the  attitudes  of
ourselves, or others. Though Williams' version of a critical theoretic critique of a society's attitudes
is rather limited, and his discussion rather brief, it is striking that, for a philosopher so closely
associated with arguing for the value of a historical awareness of the genealogy of social attitudes,
when it comes to actively criticising a society's ethical outlook, in ways that go beyond internal
consistency, Williams seems to see a lot more power in a critical theoretic approach.
THE POWER OF THE SOCIAL APPROACH
Whether  or  not  a  historical  or  evolutionary  approach  ultimately  can  ground  any  significant,
specific  critiques of  our current moral  beliefs  and attitudes,  I  think there are  good reasons to
believe that an approach employing the resources of social and critical theory will constitute a
more powerful, and so in some ways more radical challenge to ordinary practice within moral
philosophy. One reason is just that, as I discussed earlier, the social approach seems to demand
moral engagement, rather than scepticism. This is partly because of the morally-infused discourse
involved in this approach, but also because the approach raises strongly practical concerns, rather
than primarily abstract theoretical issues.
To illustrate this contrast: the historical approach raises sceptical worries about our current
moral beliefs and judgements on such a wide scale, and such a high level of generality, that our
minds may turn to the usual array of detached moral issues favoured by philosophers,  which
67 Williams (2002), p. 220.
68 Williams (2002), p. 230.
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rarely, if ever, touch our lives, such as the moral status of principles like “never kill” or “don't
steal.” On the other hand, the social approach focuses a philosopher's attention on real, continuing
injustices  or  inequalities,  and  makes  the  philosopher  aware  of  their  own  complicity  in  these
situations.
The discussion of implicit bias provides a striking example of this. Implicit biases (also
sometimes referred to as implicit prejudices) are well-documented, widespread, automatic, non-
conscious,  non-introspectively-available  attitudes  or  processes  which  lead  most  people  to
systematically judge members of  marginalised groups more negatively,  in many respects,  than
members of privileged, or unmarked groups, even when they explicitly and sincerely disavow any
such  prejudice.  The  implications  of  widespread  implicit  bias  for  the  methodology  of  moral
philosophy are worth considering.
It is plausible that these biases will tend to illegitimately influence our moral judgements
when they are directed towards individual agents who belong to marginalised groups, or towards
types of act which are implicitly or explicitly associated with marginalised groups, as, for example,
abortion is associated with women, and particular types of recreational drugs tend to be associated
with particular social classes and racial groups. Furthermore, they seem to undermine the use of
introspection  to  identify  the  reasons  that  we  judge  things  as  we  do.  Suppose  we  identify  a
particular  act  of  self-defence  as  immoral,  because  disproportionate.  If  we  have  been  partly
influenced by an implicit bias against the agent, which we cannot introspectively detect, and so do
not acknowledge, we must be, to some degree, wrong in attributing our judgement to a perception
of  disproportionality.69 Thus,  these  biases  can  undermine  not  just  the  accuracy  of  our  moral
judgements, but also our knowledge of the reasons that we came to our judgements.
However, in addition to posing a problem for the methodology of moral philosophy, implicit
bias also poses a particular first-order moral problem, insofar as it influences our judgements of,
and attitudes towards members of marginalised groups in many everyday contexts. Strikingly, one
of the more heavily discussed contexts in which implicit biases have been shown to operate is
within  academia,  particularly  in  the  context  of  teachers  marking  students'  work.70 This  is  an
activity that  most  professional philosophers engage in frequently,  many times a year,  in sharp
69 Or, perhaps, we are right to attribute our judgement to a perception of disproportionality, but our perception of 
disproportionality was illegitimately influenced by implicit bias.
70 Kelly & Roedder have plausibly claimed that, although no studies have explicitly investigated the connection 
between implicit bias and academic marking, it is reasonable to suppose such a connection would be found. I am 
unaware of any more recent studies investigating this. Kelly & Roedder (2008) “Racial Cognition and the Ethics of 
Implicit Bias”, in Philosophy Compass 3:3, p. 534.
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contrast to the more dramatic activities more commonly discussed by moral philosophers, such as
those to do with killing, which most of us rarely, if ever, encounter.
I see engagement with this kind of approach as having a stronger impact on the ordinary
methodology of a philosopher insofar as it can help focus their attention away from abstract and
distant cases, and towards everyday cases which are not only highly relevant to the philosopher
themself, but which also suggest that the philosopher may actually be frequently acting, in some
way and to some degree, wrongly, and so may need to morally engage with this material in a
direct, first-personal way. The responses and solutions to the first-order moral problem can also
help inform the response to the methodological problems, allowing philosophers to be quite self-
reflective about their methodology, without losing sight of immediate and important moral issues,
and their own moral development.
Furthermore,  the  impact  of  this  approach  may  be  very  different  to,  in  particular,  the
historical approach. Some philosophers, such as Brandt and Singer, seem to use a historical critique
of  intuitions  much like  one might  employ any negative  argument  in  philosophy,  to  create  an
objection in order to tear down an opposing view, and then to be forgotten. Though this may be a
bad idea in any case, this would be particularly strange way to employ the social approach, given
the way it demands engagement with particular, pressing moral issues, and given that its reach is
such that the problems it raises for standard methodology are, unless addressed head-on, likely
recur for any alternate methodology developed.
Of course, this alone, that the social approach demands some kind of practical engagement,
may not be too much; after all, it should hardly be radical to demand that moral philosophers
actually  engage  in  moral  philosophy.  However,  in  addition  this  approach  may  demand
engagement in entirely unfamiliar ways, as it has the potential to challenge the use of two of the
most familiar pillars for the improvement of moral beliefs, or at least to show them to be in need of
supplementation. The first, intuition, seems to be undermined insofar as our intuitions are shown
to  be  systematically  distorted,  in  ways  that  mere  acknowledgement  of  this  distortion  cannot
overcome. The second, empirical research into morally relevant subjects, like economics, is effected
insofar as the processes and interpretation of empirical research appears to be vulnerable to the
distorting  influences  discussed by  a  social  approach,  such  as  privilege  and implicit  bias,  and
because mere  awareness  of  these distortions does  not  seem to  be sufficient  to  eliminate them
(though some empirical,  particularly psychological,  research will  doubtlessly be invaluable for
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discovering exactly what will help to eliminate certain kinds of distortion).
METHODOLOGY AFTER THE SOCIAL CRITIQUE
Exactly  what  kind  of  methodology  will  emerge  from  an  extended  development  of  the  social
approach I have been discussing is a large question, which I will answer,  in part,  through the
course  of  this  thesis.  However  it  will  be  worth  discussing  some  of  the  more  apparent
methodological  implications,  to show how they may differ  in quite  significant  ways  from the
implications of other approaches to critiquing ordinary methodology. 
One fairly likely methodological implication of this kind of approach is an emphasis on the
personal moral development of the philosopher, as part of the activity of philosophy.71 Insofar as
we are subject to distorting biases, oppressive assumptions, and misguiding ideologies, which get
in the way of our accessing moral facts, and insofar as we see moral philosophy as that activity
which aims to get us towards holding true moral beliefs, it seems natural to suppose that freeing
ourselves from these influences may be part of the activity of moral philosophy. Furthermore, it is
natural to see the processes of freeing ourselves from these influences as one of personal moral
development. 
Exactly  how  surprising  or  unorthodox  this  implication  will  seem  may  vary  from
philosopher to philosopher; in particular, some virtue ethicists may see this as obvious. However,
it may be more natural to see, in the normal work of philosophers, a view whereby philosophy,
done right, tells us how, why, and in what ways we (all people) need to develop ourselves morally,
without this moral development actually being a part of philosophy itself. Moral development is
the  subject  matter,  or  at  best  the  result,  of  moral  philosophy,  and not  necessarily  part  of  the
process. Certainly, philosophy papers rarely, if ever, contain accounts of the authors undergoing
processes of moral development, or  discussions of how this could be done; other, of course, than
in terms of changes of explicitly held moral beliefs through philosophical argumentation.
This  supposed  separation  between  the  activity  of  doing  moral  philosophy,  and  the
processes of moral development, is sometimes reflected in the work of Eric Schwitzgebel, who has
studied the relationship between an engagement in moral  philosophy, and inclination towards
moral  behaviour.  For example,  he begins one paper:  “One might suppose that  ethicists  would
behave with particular moral scruple. After all, they devote their careers to studying and teaching
71 I address this matter in much greater detail in chapter 6.
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about morality. Presumably, many of them care deeply about it. And if they care deeply about it, it
is  not  unreasonable  to  expect  them  to  act  on  it.”72 Though  Schwitzgebel  is  interested  in  the
connection between moral behaviour and engaging in moral philosophy, he only  supposes that
there should be a connection due to the philosophers' demonstrated prior interest in morality, and
increased skills of reflection. The idea that some kind of moral development, that we could expect
to manifest in action, might actually be part of doing philosophy is not one that he mentions. The
idea that immoral ethicists may necessarily be doing their job badly does not appear.  Indeed, on
his blog, Schwitzgebel has noted that ethicists sometimes respond to his work by claiming "my job
is to theorize about ethics, not to live the moral life,"73 and that he agrees with the word, if not the
spirit, of this claim. If certain claims of the social critique of moral methodology are borne out, such
a distinction  between theorising  about  ethics,  and being  ethical  (in  certain  ways)  may not  be
tenable.
Of course,  for  this  entwining of  personal  moral  development  and moral  philosophy to
constitute a change in the ordinary methodology of moral philosophy, it must be the case that the
relevant kind of moral development must proceed through unfamiliar processes. There would be
no change to the methodology of moral philosophy if we came to recognise moral development as
an essential part of the activity,  but saw this development as being advanced through familiar
processes of theory-building, intuition-checking, and argumentation. However, it seems unlikely
that this is the case. Schwitzgebel's experimental results show some evidence that studying moral
philosophy seems to  do  little  to  change moral  behaviour,74 though the  kinds  of  attitudes  and
behaviours he is concerned with are somewhat different to those I have been discussing. However,
more generally, there seems to be some reason to believe that different processes would be called
for, to change the kinds of problematic influences I have been discussing.
Focusing on the problem of  implicit  bias,  there  is  good reason to  suppose  that  merely
changing  and  improving  philosophers'  explicit  beliefs,  the  activity  that  moral  philosophy  is
primarily  concerned  with,  will  not  necessarily  lead  to  much  improvement  in  their  implicit
attitudes. Indeed, the academic attention towards implicit bias began when researchers noticed
that, despite changing patterns of explicit (self-reported) prejudice, prejudicial attitudes seemed to
72 Schwitzgebel & Rust (2009) “The Moral Behaviour of Ethicists: Peer Opinion,” in Mind 118, p. 1044.
73 Schwitzgebel (2012) “On Whether the Job of an Ethicist Is Only to Theorize about Morality, Not to Be Moral,” 
from The Splintered Mind, http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.ca/2012/04/on-whether-job-of-ethicist-is-only-to.html.
74 Particularly in Schwitzgebel & Rust (2014) “The moral behavior of ethics professors: Relationships among self-
reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly observed behavior,” Philosophical Psychology 27:3.
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persist. There is some evidence to suggest that affective, rather than cognitive processes may be
necessary  to  reduce  implicit  biases75;  suffice  to  say,  the  ordinary  methods  of  philosophy  are
overwhelmingly geared towards the cognitive. Furthermore, there is some evidence that people's
implicit  and explicit  attitudes  are  unlikely  to  change  when some kind of  educational  effort  is
imposed externally, without their possessing any strong internal motivation to be non-prejudiced.76
This  fact  could  limit  the  potential  for  methods  of  adversarial  argumentation to  bring  about  a
philosopher's moral development.
How  different  are  these  implications  from  those  of  the  other  critiques  of  moral
methodology? In the work of Richard Brandt, who has discussed a historical critique of intuitions,
we may see an interesting parallel in the notion of “Cognitive Psychotherapy,” a process meant to
eliminate “desires and aversions which have something wrong with them.”77 This process (for
which Brandt offers no empirical evidence of efficacy) is one of “repeatedly bring[ing] to mind,
with full belief and maximal vividness, all the knowable facts that would tend either to weaken or
to  strengthen  [a]  desire  or  aversion...”78 It  is,  perhaps,  a  cognitive  process,  but  one  which
acknowledges the resistance of our implicit attitudes to direct cognitive control, and one which is
not taken to be a usual part of moral philosophy. However, for Brandt, this process appears not in
a discussion of the methodology of philosophy – not as a process that he explicitly recommends
philosophers, or those who seek moral truth, should undergo – but rather as part of what it takes
to be an ideal rational agent, within what is roughly an ideal observer theory of morality. That is to
say,  he  is  not  directly  recommending  that  anyone,  philosopher  or  otherwise,  undergo  such  a
process, but rather sees this as a process that helps define the hypothetical agent whose desires are
a guide to correct ethical action. Thus, it is not necessary for us, as philosophers, to undergo such a
process, unless it turns out that attempting to approximate an ideal agent is actually the best way
to discover moral truths.
Besides suggesting that  some kind of  personal  moral  development may be an essential
component  of  moral  philosophy,  another  fairly  natural  implication  of  a  social  critique  of
methodology is the possibility that philosophers will need to change the kinds of material that they
75 Rudman, Ashmore & Gary (2001), “'Unlearning' Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and 
Stereotypes”, in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81:5, p. 866
76 Rudman et al (2001), p. 857-858, and Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones & Vance (2002), “The Regulation of 
Implicit and Explicit Race Bias: The Role of Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice,” in Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 82: 5.
77 Brandt (1972), “Rationality, Egoism, and Morality,” in Journal of Philosophy 69:20, p. 682.
78 Brandt (1972), p. 683.
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take to be evidence or data for moral philosophy, or perhaps rather the way they come to find and
gather that material. In particular, consistent with some threads in feminist and anti-racist theory,
there may be call for an increased emphasis on listening, to first-personal accounts of experiences
of injustice and moral harm, as a way to come to understand those injustices and harms. As a
critique casts doubt on the ability of techniques such as introspection and intuition to avoid being
distorted by bias  and limited by a  philosopher's  particular  social  privileges,  new methods  for
understanding  and  even  identifying  moral  harms  will  be  called  for.  It  seems  fitting  that  an
emphasis on listening to personal accounts of harm and injustice could fill this need, and help us
see harms that might not be apparent from mere statistical analysis, given problematic background
assumptions, and that will not occur to individual philosophers, due to their lack of relevant life
experiences.  Richard Delgado has written that “stories,  parables,  chronicles,  and narratives are
powerful means for destroying mindset – the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and
shared understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes place.”79
This seems to apply just as well to moral discourse.
To some extent, this kind of method is not entirely unfamiliar in philosophy, as the use of
narrative,  particularly  fictional  narrative,  is  common,  and  implicated  in  the  use  of  thought
experiments. However, the way narrative is currently often used may need to be reconsidered. The
use of the kinds of sketchy fictional narratives that often appear in thought experiments seems
particularly  problematic,  as,  far  from  revealing  the  particular  moral  harms  experienced  by
individuals, these usually merely invite philosophers to bring their own assumptions, inclinations
and  preconceptions  to  a  case,  inviting  all  the  problems  of  implicit  bias  and  ideology.80 This
approach is antithetical to the idea of really listening to an unfamiliar perspective or narrative.
Something closer may be seen in the occasional use of narratives sourced from literature, or
the general culture. A striking example is provided by the widespread use of a story from  The
Adventures  of  Huckleberry  Finn in  moral  philosophy.81 This  story  has  been particularly  used to
inquire into the nature of akrasia, and examine how our moral beliefs and moral emotions may
come apart. Though interesting, it is notable that these can be fairly abstract, theoretical moral
issues,  of more concern to a relatively detached agent considering how to act,  like Huck Finn,
rather than a person immediately facing, and needing to deal with, injustice, like his companion,
79 Delgado (1989), “Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,” in Michigan Law Review 87:8, 
p. 2413.
80 I discuss thought experiments in more detail at the end of chapter 5.
81 Originating with Bennett (1974) “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn”, in Philosophy 49:188.
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Jim. One might wonder how different the concerns of moral philosophy might be, or might have to
be, were any particular slave narrative, or modern account of institutional prejudice, to enjoy a
prominence within philosophy comparable to the Huckleberry Finn narrative.
I have argued for the value of an approach to philosophical methodology which departs
radically from methodologically conservative, intuition-based methodologies, by taking seriously
the influence of oppressive social forces on our pre-theoretical moral attitudes. Through most of
the rest of this thesis, my attention is more directly focused on exploring themes and insights from
critical social theories in order to develop specific methodological critiques and recommendations
for moral philosophers. However, first I will address a particular objection one may raise against
the  force  and  relevance  of  the  social  approach  to  genealogical  critique,  one  I  call  the  scope
challenge.
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CHAPTER 3 - THE SCOPE CHALLENGE
Presented with the three different geneological critiques of moral methodology in the previous
chapter, one may suspect that the implications of the social approach will be not be particularly
significant, especially as compared to the other two approaches, due to the social approach having
a kind of limited scope. The historical approach and the evolutionary approach both intend to
implicate our entire set of pre-theoretical moral intuitions in error, by claiming that intuitions, per
se, derive from these questionable sources. On the other hand, we can only plausibly maintain that
the kinds of errors highlighted by the social approach are at work when the moral issue under
consideration has some kind of link to systematic oppression in society. So, one may object, while
the social approach has a lot to say about moral issues regarding, for example, gender relations,
our discussion of many other cases of concern to moral philosophers – indeed, some of the most
central, and frequently discussed cases, such as lying and promise keeping – will be untouched by
this critique. In this chapter, I want to discuss three ways that we might challenge, and severely
mitigate the strength of this objection.
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE SOCIAL APPROACH
To explore the first  way of  mitigating the strength of  the scope challenge to a social  theoretic
critique of moral philosophy, we must carefully examine the kinds of issues and cases that are of
most interest to moral philosophers; in doing so, we will probably discover that the kinds of issues
which involve issues of social justice and oppression come up a lot more than we might expect. As
Kristin Waters has put it, “In philosophy, common topics that are often assumed not to be raced or
gendered may reveal themselves to be so under closer scrutiny.”1
Let's start with an obvious case. The moral permissibility of abortion and infanticide has
been a major issue in philosophical ethics  over the past  half  century, of interest both to those
engaged in practical ethics, given its prominent political profile, particularly in the United States of
America, and to more theoretical ethical philosophers, as it sheds light on moral issues regarding
1 Waters (2014), “Past as Prologue: Intersectional Analysis from the Nineteenth Century to the Twenty-First,” in 
Goswami, O'Donovan & Yount (2014), p.33. Note, in this statement her attention is not restricted to moral 
philosophy.
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life and death, the nature of harm, the nature of personhood, and the scope of personal autonomy. 2
Abortion is an obvious case because those employing an explicitly feminist approach enjoy a fairly
major  presence  within  discussions  of  the  moral  permissibility  of  abortion,  both  in  academic
philosophy and in society at large. This is partly because the moral dimensions of abortion, and
restrictions upon abortion,  can only be fully understood with some awareness of  traditionally
feminist concerns, most obviously the patriarchy’s historical and continuing interest in ownership
and control of women bodies, and women's reproductive choices.
However,  though the  connection between the  ethics  of  abortion and feminism is  fairly
obvious, further investigation of the issue reveals the relevance of other kinds of social and critical
theory.  For  example,  studies  have  indicated  that  a  large  number  of  abortions  are  sought  for
financial reasons, and that those denied access to abortion are significantly more likely to become
unemployed, or move below the poverty line.3 These findings indicate a prima facie case that some
critical class-based analysis of abortion could be relevant to our analysis of its moral permissibility.
Indeed, due to the systematic and intersectional nature of oppression, this kind of spreading of
critical relevance will be common.
Widening our attention out from the case of abortion, most of the issues that are prominent
within the philosophical field of practical ethics will tend to have some connection to topics of
interest to social justice theories. To briefly go through some examples: Euthanasia will relate to
issues of ageism (marginalisation of the basis of age),  ableism (marginalisation on the basis of
ability or health) and mental health. Discussion of overseas aid will relate to issues of classism,
capitalism and racism. Discussion of the genetic modification of crops will also relate to issues of
classism and racism (as these programs are often directed by large corporations in non-western
countries, and touted as making food cheaper, and so more available for the poor). Discussion of
transhumanism, or genetic modification of people, will run up against issues of classism (through
the  issue  of  accessibility)  and  ableism (which  influences  our  understanding of  the  conditions
looking to be eliminated).  Reproductive ethics will generally be bound up with issues of gender,
while medical ethics and bioethics will often be bound up with issues of ableism. The relevance of
social theoretic approaches to animal and environmental ethics is not so apparent, as the treatment
2 A very small selection of the vast amount of philosophical work on Abortion includes: 
Thomson, (1971) “A Defence Of Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1.
Marquis, (1989) “Why Abortion is Immoral,” Journal of Philosophy 86.
Tooley, (1972) “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2.
3 e.g. The Turnaway Study, discussed at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/magazine/study-women-denied-
abortions.html and http://www.ansirh.org/research/turnaway.php.
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of animals has not traditionally been a concern of these kinds of theories, but it is interesting that
one of the most influential philosophers in the field of animal ethics, Peter Singer, has explicitly
argued that our views on animal ethics are influenced by a “speciesism,” directly analogous to the
racism and sexism that have been among the most prominent concerns of some kinds of critical
theory.4 Discussion of the death penalty (and criminal justice more generally) will run up against
issues of class and race, given how the poor and the racially marginalised are massively over-
represented in the criminal justice system.
It  may  be  illustrative  to  go  into  this  last  point  in  more  detail.  Criminal  justice  and
punishment  form  important  topics  in  moral  and  political  philosophy,  both  practical  and
theoretical. Even when not explicitly discussed, we can suppose these considerations help form the
background of discussions around moral wrongs that also are, or could be crimes, such as murder
and theft.  Punishment,  in  one  form or  another,  also  appears  in  many  examples  and  thought
experiments within moral philosophy, such as in the Magistrate and the Mob case, often employed
in arguments for or against Utilitarianism, where a magistrate must decide whether to frame and
convict an innocent man in order to prevent a dangerous riot.5 Issues of punishment are also of
major moral concern outside of philosophy, particularly in the American context where civil rights
activists are fighting the mass incarceration of the black population, and pushing for fundamental
changes to the criminal justice system, such as prison abolition.
The relevance of racial issues to discussions of criminal justice and punishment are deep,
and cannot be simply stipulated aside. Toni Morrison has said that “Blackness and criminality are
merged in the minds of most white Americans.”6 That includes many philosophers. A study by
Eberhardt, et al has suggested that the mental association between blackness and criminality is
bidirectional, i.e. it is not just that “The mere presence of a Black man... can trigger thoughts that
he is violent and criminal,” but also that “thinking of crime can trigger thoughts of Black people.”7
In the context of these psychological realities, we cannot assume that it is possible to simply not
think about  race while  thinking about crime and punishment.  Nonetheless,  that  is  how much
philosophy  of  punishment  attempts  to  proceed;  remarkably,  the  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of
4 Singer, (1993) Practical Ethics, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), p. 55-61.
5 See Nielsen (1972), p. 223.
6 This quote appears in an interview that can be found at TheAntiIntellect (2012), “Toni Morrison Calls Out The 
Racist Association of Blackness with Criminality,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvcJ1YyQCkA, accessed 
20th May 2015.
7 Eberhardt, et al. (2004), “Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, p. 876.
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Philosophy  articles  on  Punishment,  Legal  Punishment,  Retributive  Justice,  and  Theories  of
Criminal Law all contain no mention of race.8 Similarly, cases like  the Magistrate and the Mob are
presented with only an oblique reference to “a much smaller and quite vulnerable section of the
community,”9 despite the obviousness of the cases' situation within a context and history of mass
incarceration of  black  populations,  and violent,  racist  vigilante  actions  used to  terrorise  black
communities.10 Punishment is a highly racially loaded topic in moral and political philosophy, but
is rarely treated as such.
We should now widen our attention again, to those moral issues which are of less interest
to practical ethics,  but which often crop up as examples and cases studies in more theoretical
works of ethics. It is not always clear what exactly marks this distinction, but I see it as roughly that
when  specific  moral  acts  are  discussed  in  the  context  of  more  theoretical  ethics,  the  larger
discussion is  rarely  about those particular  acts,  but  rather about  some more  general  issues of
morality. For example, when Peter Geach talks about murder in his article “Murder and Sodomy,”
he is  primarily concerned with the possibility of  deriving a moral  conclusion from non-moral
premises.11 Similarly, discussions of the morality of breaking promises are often raised in service of
arguments for or against Utilitarianism.12
Again we can see the relevance of social justice concerns to these issues. To focus on just
one example, one of the most common acts used in such abstract contexts is murder. To name a
few cases, murder forms the basis of thought experiments about Utilitarianism and integrity, in the
Jim & The Indians case13, about the distinction between acts and omissions, in the Smith & Jones
case14,  and about  the doctrine of  double effect,  in many trolley cases.15 This  common use  can
probably be explained by murder's potential  simplicity (as  simple as  agent A shoots and kills
victim B), flexibility (the circumstances - such as the intentions, actors, methods, and consequences
– can be manipulated in a way that would be difficult with some other acts, such as tax evasion),
and relative lack of controversy (almost everyone agrees that acts of murder tend to be prima facie
8 See Zalta ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/
9 Nielsen (1972), p. 223.
10 This situation is particularly obvious in, but not unique to, the United States: in Australia, the incarceration rates for 
Aboriginal people are comparable to those of African Americans in the U.S., and the racial disparity is actually 
significantly greater. See Korff (2015), “Aboriginal Prison Rates,” on Creative Spirits, 
http://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/law/aboriginal-prison-rates, accessed 20th May 2015.
11 Geach, (1976) “Murder and Sodomy,” in Philosophy 51.
12 For example, in Narveson, (1963) “The Desert-Island Problem,” in Analysis 23:3.
13 Williams (1973), 'A Critique of Utilitarianism’ in Smart & Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.)
14 Rachels (1975), 'Active and Passive Euthanasia' New England Journal of Medicine, 292. 
15 Foot (1967), “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” Oxford Review 5.
66
immoral). For better or worse, they are also some of the most obviously dramatic acts there are.
Acts  of  murder,  fictional  and  real,  are  ubiquitous  in  modern  media.  The  most  highly
publicised acts of murder are mass shootings, which tend to receive wide, detailed coverage. One
of the immediate public reactions to such events tends to be to label the perpetrator as 'crazy,' or
'psychotic,'  usually on the basis of nothing other than the act they committed. The implication
seems to be that we simply cannot fathom how anyone could commit such a terrible act without
being psychologically completely unlike 'us,' the mentally healthy, that “anyone who murders en
masse and then commits suicide must be insane.”16 In this way, our attitudes towards these kinds of
crimes  are  completely  bound  up  in  our  attitudes  towards  mental  health,  an  area  where
stigmatising and marginalising attitudes are rife.  Particularly in the U.S.,  mass shootings often
spark call for investment in mental health services, even when the perpetrator has shown no signs
of poor mental health other than in the act of murder itself. In fact, “there has not been a strong,
consistent link between mass murder and mental illness,” and “it is rare for [mass murderers] to
present with psychosis.”17
The context of more common-place acts of murder also makes space for analysis in terms of
the  resources  of  social  theory.  Murder  overwhelmingly  occurs  in  two  particular  contexts,  the
context of wider criminal activity, and the context of intimate relationships; between partners, or
within families.18 The frequency of murder, particularly in a criminal context, is strongly correlated
with low levels of political and economic development,  and high levels of income inequality, 19
which clearly suggests some role for a class-based understanding of many acts of murder. On the
other hand, in regions where economic development is stronger, a greater proportion of murders
take place in domestic or intimate contexts.  The victims of these murders are overwhelmingly
women.20 This  kind  of  murder  is  “both  an  extreme  manifestation  of  gender  inequality  and
discrimination,  and a deadly tool used to maintain women's subordinate status.”21 It  has been
argued that this kind of crime can be reduced through “higher levels of female education... and
financial  independence  of  women.”22 From  this,  the  relevance  of  feminist  analysis  to  our
16 Lee, et al (2007), “Reflections on a Mass Homicide,” Annals of the Academy of Medicine 36:6, p. 444-447.
17 Aitken, Oosthuizen, Emsley & Seedat (2008), “Mass Murders: Implications for Health Professionals,” 
International Journal of Psychiatry in Medicine 38: 3, p. 264.
18 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2011), “2011 Global Study on Homicide,” p. 10
19 UNODC (2011), p. 29-37
20 UNODC (2011), p. 11.
21 UN Women (2011), “Progress of the World’s Women 2011-2012: In Pursuit of Justice,” quoted in UNODC (2011), 
p. 57.
22 UNODC (2011), p. 61.
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understanding of real-life acts of murder should be obvious.
We can now move away from consideration of the actual context of murder, and instead to
philosophical attitudes regarding factors which may influence our moral judgements about acts of
murder. Philosophers and people at large will discuss the morality of acts of murder, qualifying
them  as  self-defence,  provoked,  permissible  killings  in  just  war,  foreseen  but  unintended
consequences (as in Trolley cases), collateral damage (as in civilian causalities in war), etc. While
the judgement that “murder is  wrong” is usually held fast,  and taken to be common ground,
differences of judgement will be apparent in drawing distinctions between “murder“ and (mere)
“killing,” and in assessing exactly how wrong some particular acts of killing may be, given certain
kinds of purported mitigation. These attitudes are also reflected in the law. In our understanding
of these distinctions, social justice concerns will often be very relevant.
For example, within philosophy, law, and common moral opinion, self-defence is thought
to eliminate the blameworthiness of what would otherwise be considered murder. To count as
acting in self-defence, a perpetrator must assess their situation to be one of immediate danger.
However, this kind of assessment, whether made first-person and in the moment, or later by a jury,
will  obviously  be  prone  to  distortion  by  stereotypes,  particularly  racial  stereotypes. 23 These
problems were  recently  brought  to  international  attention by the  killing of  an unarmed black
teenager, Trayvon Martin, in the United States, for which the perpetrator claimed self-defence, and
by the more recent Black Lives Matter movement.
Though less  explicitly  called  upon in  philosophical  contexts,  provocation has  a  similar
problem; it is based on the idea that a person may lose control upon being confronted by some
offensive behaviour, but what kinds of events can make a person lose control, and what kind of
events  we  accept  as  sufficiently  offensive  in  the  relevant  way,  will  be  highly  influenced  by
problematic social attitudes. In fact, examination of the legal use of provocation seems to reveal the
concept  as  primarily  functioning  to  legitimate  certain  forms  of  gender-based  male  violence.24
Gorman has argued that, in the context of Canadian law, provocation's “primary purpose appears
to be to reward men who are so possessive of their spouses that they are willing to kill in order to
23 The effects of race in determinations of self-defence, in a legal context, is explored in Armour (1994), “Race Ipsa 
Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes,” Stanford Law Review 46:4, 
reprinted in Delgado and Stefancic (2000) “Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, Second Edition,” (Temple 
University Press: Philadelphia), p.180-193. Also Lee (1996), “Race and Self-Defence: Towards a Normative 
Conception of Reasonableness,” Minnesota Law Review 367,  reprinted in Delgado and Stefancic (2000), p. 204-
210. Much in these discussions will be as relevant to philosophy and morality as to law.
24 See Fitz-Gibbon (2012) “Provocation in New South Wales: The Need for Abolition,” in Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology 45, p. 210. 
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ensure their spouse does not leave them for another man.”25
Provocation is also the basis of 'gay-panic' and 'trans-panic' defences against murder, where
male defendants claim that they panicked, and killed a gay man who was making a sexual advance
on them, or killed a trans woman upon realising that she was transgender. 26 These defences, which
follow the above pattern of provocation invoked to defend the use of violence to protect perceived
male sexual interests, are “also troubling because they seek to capitalise on an unconscious bias in
favour of heterosexuality” and gender normativity.27 Note this crucial point: these problems with
self-defence  and  provocation,  though  most  obvious  in  a  legal  context,  are  not  merely  legal
problems. These legal realities can only exist by reflecting and exploiting systemic cultural biases
and attitudes which allow people to believe that murder may be less serious when, for example,
committed against a gay man, or against a woman exercising sexual agency. Furthermore, prima
facie, there is no particular reason to believe that philosophers will be immune to these biases. I
believe  these  kinds  of  concerns  could  be  uncovered through a  detailed  examination of  many,
though plausibly not all, of the kinds of cases employed in theoretical discussions of ethics.
One might object that even though real world judgements about moral acts such as murder
tend to be shaped by problematic cultural biases, this needn't be a problem for moral philosophers
employing  thought  experiments  to  discuss  theoretical  issues,  as  we  can  carefully  craft  our
examples such that the particular features which trigger these biases are avoided. However, there
are problems with this approach.
Firstly, there is a problem regarding how this could be done. Suppose, in crafting a thought
experiment involving murder, we are worried that murders in which the victim is white seem to be
treated more seriously than murders in which the victim is a person of colour, 28 and we want to
avoid triggering implicit biases which might influence readers' judgement of our case. Explicitly
describing the victim as a person of colour may trigger racist biases tending to soften readers'
25 Gorman (1999), “Provocation: The Jealous Husband Defence,” in Criminal Law Quarterly 42, p. 479. 
26 Lee (2008), “The Gay Panic Defence,” in U.C. Davis Law Review 42, p. 471 & 513. Note the murder rate for trans 
women, particularly trans women of colour, is staggering. Something like a trans panic defense was attempted by 
the murderer of trans woman Jennifer Laude in the Philippines. The murderer's testimony reveals how the idea of 
provocation can be bound up with patriarchal notions of honour, and transmisogynistic ideas of gender. See Whaley
(2015), “U.S. Marine Testifies in Killing of Transgender Woman in Philippines,” New York Times, August 24, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/25/world/asia/us-marine-joseph-scott-pemberton-testifies-in-transgender-killing-
in-philippines.html. He has since been convicted of homocide – a less serious charge than murder – and Ms. 
Laude's gender was considered a mitigating circumstance.
27 Lee (2008), p. 471.
28 As may be indicated by the finding that, in the United States, “those who murdered whites were found to be more 
likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks,” reported in United States General Accounting 
Office (1990), “Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities,”  p. 5 
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moral judgement. On the other hand, explicitly describing the victim as white may lead readers' to
inflate the severity of their judgement; we can't simply assume that prejudiced judgements made
regarding  marginalised  groups  are  problematic  deviations  from  an  otherwise  perfectly
unproblematic norm. 
The obvious solution, and the de facto standard practice, is to simply leave any mention of
race out of the case altogether; after all, if it's irrelevant to the philosophical problem, why mention
it? Instead, the thought is, we should abstract away from any particularities which will bias our
judgement one way or the other. However, this approach may still be problematic.
There  is  a  problem  regarding  whether  it  is  even  possible.  Some  social  identities  are
privileged in such a way that they become assumed as default. For example, in actual, fictional,
and theoretical cases, people will tend to assume an individual is  heterosexual, unless there is
some  reason  given  to  believe  otherwise.  Thus  any  attempt  to  be  neutral  between  possible
sexualities of a character in some example by simply not mentioning any will be bound to fail;
readers will simply assume, and judge as though, the character is heterosexual. A similar thing
seems to happen with default assumptions of whiteness.29
However, even if possible, such an approach may not be desirable. By abstracting away
from these details, we abstract away from much of the context which may be relevant to any full
understanding of the acts involved (as indicated, in the case of murder, by the relevance of a class-
based and gender-based understanding, evidenced by a statistical analysis of the context of real-
life murder cases). It seems implausible that such abstraction could bring us to better understand
these cases.30 Furthermore, as we have seen, the mental associations between concepts like crime
and blackness are liable to be triggered without any explicit mention; in abstracting away from
these details we would leave problematic factors which influence our judgement in play, while also
failing to bring our attention to factors which may prompt a more critical response. For example,
abstracting away from the gender of agents in a case about domestic violence may leave in play
patriarchal attitudes which allow people to see domestic violence as less serious than other forms
of violence, or a purely private matter, while also failing to draw attention to the systematic gender
29 Relatedly, and more generally, Thomas Ross, writing in a legal context, discusses how describing a case abstractly 
may invite an audience to fill in details in way that introduces problematic elements from their cultural influences. 
Ross (1989), “The Richmond Narratives,” in Texas Law Revue 68, reprinted in Delgado and Stefancic (2000), p. 
42-51.
30 Mills (2005), “'Ideal Theory' as Ideology,” Hypatia 20:3, discusses the plausibility of using idealisation, and 
abstracting away from particularities of gender and race, in order to advance our understanding of actual ethical 
cases. See particularly p. 168-169, 173. I will discuss this much more in chapter 4.
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inequality which lies  at the heart  of the vast majority of  domestic violence,  and enables  those
problematic attitudes. I will be discussing the use of abstraction in moral theory in more detail in
the following chapter.
At this point, one could argue that, as these theoretical discussions aren't  really about the
morality of the act featured in their thought experiments, but rather about some more theoretical
moral concern, none of the complications raised by social justice concerns could be relevant to their
use. In some cases, this claim is clearly implausible. If a conclusion that there is something wrong
with  Utilitarianism  is  only  reached  via  the  view  that  Utilitarianism  cannot  account  for  the
immorality  of  promise  breaking,  then  anything  that  could  cast  doubt  on  the  judgement  that
promise breaking is wrong must cast doubt on whether that conclusion has been established. In
other  cases,  the  claim is  much more  plausible.  In  “Murder and Sodomy,” Geach employs  the
concept of murder in his examples, but he is only concerned with whether certain forms of logical
argument are valid. As such, one could even fully agree with everything Geach says while actually
denying that murder is immoral. At no point does Geach's paper rely, explicitly or implicitly, on
the judgement, whether intuitional or otherwise, that murder is wrong.
Of course, there are also some less clear cases. For example, take James William Forrester's
paper “Gentle Murder, or The Adverbial Samaritan.”31 In this paper, Forrester aims to construct a
paradox, to prove that there is some problem with standard deontic logic. As such it is, like the
Geach paper, at a fairly abstract level. However, after setting up the paradox, in order to reach a
conclusion as to how to fix deontic logic, Forrester makes the claim that “A deontic system from
which we can derive that Smith has a legal obligation to murder Jones is not the sort of system we
are likely to want to adopt.”32 Though couched in qualifying language, clearly this is a specific
moral claim about the morality of murder, and trades on our judgement (intuitional or otherwise)
that murder is wrong.
The hope may be that, because Forrester's argument is not really about murder, but rather
about deontic  logic,  the  details  could always  be  adapted to  make the case  work.  Murder just
happened to be part of the case that Forrester used, but it could be replaced by some other act
about which no relevant concerns could be raised; perhaps even by some purely schematic idea of
“an immoral  act.” I  think we have reason to be wary of  being too quick to assume that such
adjustments can be made, without checking whether they really can, and without checking how
31 Forrester, (1984) “Gentle Murder, or The Adverbial Samaritan,” in The Journal Of Philosophy 81:4.
32 Forrester (1984), p. 197.
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much the persuasive power of our arguments rests on the intuitive judgements as they stand.33
Nonetheless, this may be possible for some arguments.
TWO OTHER RESPONSES TO THE SCOPE CHALLENGE
We have seen how the scope of social justice concerns may cover many kinds of moral issues that
we might otherwise not immediately suspect to be bound up in issues of systematic oppression
and marginalisation. Nonetheless, it is plausible that some other moral concerns will ultimately
remain outside the immediate reach of this kind of critique. Still, there are two other responses to
be made, which may challenge the methodology of moral philosophers even when they deal with
those particular moral issues.
The first response is just to note that, in the practical domain, moral issues inevitably must
be weighed against each other, and when the kinds of problems revealed by social justice theories
lead us to systematically over- or underestimate the moral significance of some issue, this will
influence our judgement in those instances when this issue must be weighed against any other
issue.
For  example,  the  debate  about  the  morality  of  pornography  is  sometimes  framed  as
involving a weighing of women's right to equality, or freedom from sexual violence, against a more
general right to freedom of speech.34 Thus, even if (implausibly) our understanding of free speech
were generally outside the scope of a social justice critique, any full understanding of the limits and
importance of free speech would inevitably be impacted by social justice concerns, as issues of free
speech ran up against other moral concerns. So, when Ronald Dworkin claims that any moral case
for restricting pornography must rest on the “frightening principle that considerations of equality
require  that  some  people  not  be  free  to  express  their  tastes  or  convictions  or  preferences
anywhere,”35 a feminist could reply that to see this principle as frightening, rather than compelling,
must rest on an overestimation of the value of free expression, enabled by an underestimation of
the disvalue of the violence, degradation and oppression that constitutes inequality. 36
33 Consider Hewitt's suggestions that if we fill in details about the Experience Machine thought experiment, rather 
than simply assuming that they can be filled in, we may see our intuitions change. Hewitt (2010) “What do our 
intuitions about the experience machine really tell us about hedonism?” in Philosophical Studies 151:3.
34 See for example MacKinnon (1987) “Not a Moral Issue” in in Feminism Unmodified, (Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA), 
35 Dworkin (1993) “Women and Pornography,”in The New York Review of Books, Oct. 21, 1993.
36 That said, there is also an important line of argument that attempts to more directly includes freedom of speech 
under the scope of feminist theory, and argues that pornography actually violates women's freedom of speech by 
silencing them. See for example West (2003), “The Free Speech Argument Against Pornography,” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy, 33:3. 
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More generally, in a world where moral agents have limited resources, such as attention,
and funds for social programs, our response to most moral problems, especially in non-emergency
situations, must be bound by how important that particular problem is in relation to others which
demand our resources.
The  second  response  is  to  point  out  that  the  boundaries  of  what  is  considered
philosophically interesting should not be immune to critical  scrutiny.  Of course,  not  all  moral
issues are considered equally by philosophers, nor considered in proportion to their severity. In the
words of Lucius T. Outlaw (Jr.), “Concerns for the right to life of anti-abortionists are much more
likely to be explored in ethics courses in [philosophy] departments than the right to life denied of
the Peoples inhabiting this  continent [North America]  when the explorers  and settler-colonists
from Europe arrived, or the right to freedom and full citizenship denied to Africans and their
descendants for more than three centuries.”37
The scope challenge works by claiming that many cases of concern to moral philosophers,
and perhaps in particular the central cases, are not the kinds of cases that will be influenced by the
concerns  of  social  justice  theories.  Thus,  the  methodological  implications  of  such  theories  are
limited,  to just  those cases where these concerns can be shown to be relevant.  But,  of  course,
philosophers' choices to look at particular cases rather than others is, itself, a methodological issue.
As Lisa H. Schwartzman puts it, “One's culture and perspective can shape the questions that are
defined  as  philosophically  important  and  the  assumptions  that  are  taken  as  'obvious'  by  the
theorist.  Because  philosophers  are  overwhelmingly  white,  predominantly  male,  and  generally
come from the upper-middle class, their work may reflect the interests and concerns of a small,
particularly privileged, subset of the population.”38
The  processes  by  which  particular  issues  and  concerns  come  to  be  regarded  as
philosophically  important  are  obviously  going  to  be  rather  complex,  more  complicated  than
people simply writing about the issues that are most salient and concerning to them. There will be
a great deal of influence from the history of philosophy, as those topics that have already been
established as canonically philosophically important continue to hold the profession's attention.
There will be influence from society at large, as those moral issues that gain widespread societal
attention come to be discussed in philosophy. Similarly,  cultural  influences will  play a role,  as
37 Outlaw (2014) “Social Ordering and the Systematic Production of Ignorance,” p. 208, in Race and Epistemologies 
of Ignorance, eds. Sullivan & Tuana (2014) (State University of New York Press: Albany)
38 Schwartzman (2012), p. 307-308
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philosophers discuss the kinds of cases and moral issues that come up in influential literature, or
pop culture. Some issues may be rendered invisible through processes such as cultural silencing
(for  example,  the  failure  or  inability  to  discuss  sexual  harassment  before  the  1960s 39),  or
normalisation (what is seen as a normal/natural part of life may not be salient as something in
need of examination, for example, childhood bullying). Some issues may be consciously dismissed
as too specific a concern, or not a sufficiently universal experience to count as philosophically
relevant.40
These  processes  will  tend  to  be  self-perpetuating;  what  is  seen  as  philosophically
interesting  gets  discussed in  philosophical  papers,  establishing  itself  as  a  topic  of  interest  for
philosophy, and so gathering more philosophical attention, and papers.41 Similarly, philosophical
focus on the issues that are most salient and relevant to a privileged subset of the population will
establish an image, and reality,  of philosophy not being relevant to those outside this subset42,
which  will  inevitably  work  to  perpetuate  the  current  demographics  and  focus  of  academic
philosophy.
A social approach will be relevant to understanding and critiquing many of these processes
by which  topics  come to  be  seen  as  philosophically  interesting,  philosophically  relevant,  and
philosophically central. However, it is worth noting that these processes will often, but not always
work in the direction of pushing the kinds of moral cases to which social justice concerns are most
relevant out of philosophy, and pulling those cases to which these concerns are not relevant in. To
illustrate, consider these two cases:
First,  take  the  case  of  street  harassment.  Street  harassment  is  roughly  “any  action  or
comment between strangers in public places that is disrespectful, unwelcome, threatening and/or
harassing,” and directed towards socially vulnerable individuals.43 Most paradigmatically, street
harassment is directed towards women, and “ranges from leers, whistles, honks, kissing noises,
and non-sexually explicit evaluative comments, to more insulting and threatening behaviour like
vulgar gestures, sexually charged comments, flashing, and stalking, to illegal actions like public
39 Fricker (2007), p. 149-155.
40 Kristie Dotson discusses this kind of problem in terms of norms by which philosophical work is called to justify 
itself as counting as philosophy, in Dotson (2012).
41 cf. Dotson (2012) p. 7-8.
42 Dotson discusses the perception and reality of academic philosophy's relevance to black women, and other diverse 
peoples, at the start of  Dotson (2012).
43 Definition from http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/about/what-is-street-harassment/   (2013). Their definition is 
limited to harassment “motivated by gender,” but this seems unnecessarily restricted, and elides the role of other 
factors, such as race, sexuality, and perceptions of disability, in street harassment.
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masturbation,  sexual  touching,  assault,  and murder.”44 It  serves  to  intimidate  and terrorise  its
victims, establish them as subject to control by dominant groups, and establish the public space as
not safe for, or not belonging to, these people. It also serves to modify potential victims' behaviour
towards social norms, such as towards heteronormativity and cisnormativity, in the case of queer
victims of harassment.
Street harassment is  a clearly moral issue that has a large,  persistent impact on a huge
number of people;45 significantly wider impact than popular philosophical topics such as murder,
euthanasia, and promise keeping. It would also raise extremely interesting theoretical issues. For
example,  there  are  issues  concerning  the  role  of  motivation  in  immoral  action  and  moral
judgement,  as  street  harassment  often  seems  to  be  conceptualised  by  its  perpetrators  as
complementary or trivial. There are issues concerning our understanding of cumulative actions, as
the negative impact of harassment derives particularly from repeated and ubiquitous action, such
that any hypothetical, isolated, one-off incident would be much less significant, and qualitatively
different.  It  also  provides  an  interesting  case  study  for  moral  education  and  culture,  as  the
prevalence and form of street harassment seems to vary wildly between societies. Despite all this,
it has received extremely little philosophical attention.46 It is easy to attribute this lack of attention
to the factors discussed above, particularly the lack of immediate relevance and salience of this
issue to the predominantly white, male, cisgender demographic of professional philosophy, and
the normalisation of street harassment in our society obscuring its moral importance.
Secondly, take the case of abortion, a topic to which critical concerns are centrally relevant,
but which has received a great deal of philosophical attention. Exactly why abortion has gathered
so much attention within academic philosophy is a complex subject. On the face of it, it is not a
subject which is directly relevant to the majority of practising philosophers, who, as cisgender men,
will  never face  the  possibility  of  personally  having an abortion.  Naturally  there  will  be  some
influence on topics of  interest  to philosophers from the wider culture -  the abortion debate is
prominent outside of philosophy, especially in the United States – but this cannot be the whole
story,  as  other  moral  debates  gathering  widespread  public  attention,  such  as  that  over
44 http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/about/what-is-street-harassment/ (2013)
45 One large Canadian study revealed harassment from strangers to have been experienced by more than 80% of 
Canadian women, and showed this harassment to have a significant impact on women's feeling of safety in public 
spaces. MacMillan, Nierobisz, & Welsh (2000), “Experiencing the Streets: Harassment and Perceptions of Safety 
Among Women,” in Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 37:3, p. 306-322. Other studies are listed at 
http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/resources/statistics/statistics-academic-studies/ (2013).
46 One exception is Crouch (2009), “Sexual Harassment in Public Places” in Social Philosophy Today 25.
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homosexuality and gay rights, do not enjoy such a level of prominence in academic philosophy.
Part of the story probably involves the connections between philosophical debates about abortion
and more general topics of moral interest, such as autonomy, personhood, and the role of religious
assumptions in public moral debate. But again, we saw similar connections to topics of general
interest as potentially arising in the study of street harassment, which is not so widely discussed.
An  important  question  to  ask,  which  emphasises  the  role  of  social  justice  concerns  in
abortion's  coming  to  be  a  topic  of  interest  in  moral  philosophy,  is  why  abortion  should  be
considered a moral issue at all.  Why should it not be considered a moral non-issue, like blood
transfusions generally are, or considered so obviously permissible as to be not worth discussing, as
alcohol consumption generally is, within philosophical circles?47 A strong feminist answer to this
question,  that  “the commitment  of  the  political  right  wing to opposing abortion [is] part  of  a
general  strategy to  reassert  patriarchal  control  over  women in  the  face  of  significant  feminist
influence,”48 and that this commitment, advanced through moral language, will resonate within
philosophy, is at least plausible.
So, while these processes will not always work to push topics that fall under the scope of a
social  approach out  of  philosophy,  nonetheless  this  response  shows that,  even if  social  justice
concerns may not be relevant to our responses to some particular moral issue, we may always be
subject to more general methodological concerns about why we are talking about these issues and
not  others;  about  whether  we  are  going  about  the  activity  of  moral  philosophy  in  a
methodologically and morally good way. Thus, given the sometimes hidden relevance of social
injustice and oppression to many prominent topics within mainstream moral philosophy, and to
moral  philosophers'  choice  of  what  topics  to  highlight  and  discuss,  these  concerns  cannot  be
legitimately ignored by any moral philosophers, and must inform our methodologies.
47 Susan Sherwin critiques the entire state of the abortion debate within philosophy, pointing out anti-feminist 
tendencies in both anti-abortion and pro-choice articles. She argues that a truly feminist approach to abortion must 
not treat abortion as an abstract moral issue, and must insist on examining abortion in the light of the actual context 
of women's lives, and broader feminist concerns. Sherwin (1991), “Abortion Through A Feminist Ethics Lens” in 
Dialogue 30:3. I return to this in chapter 5.
48 Sherwin (1991), p. 330.
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CHAPTER 4 - ABSTRACTION AND IDEALISATION
There  is  an  ongoing  methodological  debate  in  feminist  ethics  regarding  the  role  of  abstract
theorising in ethical reasoning; we have already seen in the previous chapter how abstraction is
sometimes used as a sort of defence against the need to deal with the kinds of detailed moral
issues of interest to feminist philosophers. Critiques of abstraction have come from a number of
traditions of philosophy, including from particularist ethicists and communitarian philosophers,
but it is those critiques that arise particularly from feminist approaches, and related approaches,
such as those from critical race theory, that interest me in this chapter. These critiques tend to focus
on the idea that in attempting to form certain kinds of abstract moral theory, philosophers often
abstract away from details of substantial ethical importance, particularly regarding oppression and
ideology, and that by doing so they end up with theories that fail to satisfactorily deal with these
problems,  that  render  injustices  invisible,  and  that  systematically  privilege  the  interests  of
members of dominant groups.
In this chapter, I intend to examine arguments for and against certain kinds of abstraction
in ethics,  and to  stake  out  a  methodological  position.  I  will  start  by  introducing  the  feminist
arguments against abstraction, and then examining Onora O'Neill's response, which suggests that
the problem is not with abstraction per se, but rather with a kind of idealisation. I will then discuss
the way that  Charles  Mills  expands on this  idea of  idealisation in ways that  go quite  beyond
O'Neill's point, and that seem to again cast doubt on the value of much abstraction. I will next look
at Lisa Schwartzman's criticism of O'Neill, which defends the use of ideals in ethics, and argues
against O'Neill's use of abstraction. Finally, I will offer my own critiques of the methods of both
O'Neill and Schwartzman, and will attempt to illustrate how both abstraction and idealisation may
be problematic through a discussion of the concepts of essentialism and intersectionality. Finally, I
will  attempt  to  illustrate  my methodological  conclusions  through investigation of  a  particular
moral issue - one rarely discussed in philosophical literature - misgendering.
O'NEILL ON ABSTRACTION AND IDEALISATION
The origins of the recent philosophical feminist critique of abstraction in ethics may be most easily
identified in a set of feminist challenges that have been made to the work of John Rawls. These
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responses criticised Rawls for failing to significantly challenge patriarchal institutions, beliefs and
practices in his Theory of Justice, and traced this failure to the kind of abstraction deployed in his
formulation of  the  original  position.  There  are  a  number of  related charges  here.  One charge
concerns  the  rationality  of  the  hypothetical  agents  who reason in  Rawls'  original  position.  In
abstracting away from the kinds of agents we actually find in the world, to characterise a more
abstract sort of agent that exists in the original position, it is claimed Rawls removes the agents'
knowledge  of  their  position  in  society,  particularly  their  class  and  economic  status.  He  also
arguably abstracts away from certain features of their rationality, leaving agents that only possess
a  “self-interested  prudential  rationality,”  and  are  “characterised  as  mutually  disinterested,
unaware  of  strong  ties  to  others.”1 Some early  feminist  critics  of  Rawls  suggested  that  these
abstractions implicitly assumed a particular model of rationality that reflects a male bias, and ends
up supporting the gender status quo, failing to challenge gender injustice.2 A slightly different
charge is that in abstracting away from any details about the specific political and social structures
occupied by the agents supposed to be in the original position, Rawls has nonetheless left intact,
and simply assumed the justified existence of certain patriarchal institutions and modes of social
organisation, such as a family structure much like that found in our own society, and a coherent
and legitimate division between private and public spheres of activity. Feminists have argued that
by assuming these structures in his characterisation of the original position, Rawls has made them
seem natural and unproblematic, put them beyond certain forms of moral and political criticism,
and locked any inequality that may arise from them into the very structure of his theory of justice.3
O'Neill has, in a number of pieces, disputed these feminist criticisms of Rawls, agreeing
with much of their description of the problem in Rawls' work, but disagreeing with their diagnosis
of  the  problem.  That  is,  O'Neill  agrees  that  Rawls'  formulation  of  the  original  position
problematically  makes  unfounded  assumptions  which  “[bury]  the  question  of  gender  justice
rather  than  resolving  it.”4 However,  she  argues  that  this  is  not  a  problem  resulting  from
abstraction,  but  rather  from  idealisation.  O'Neill  makes  a  great  deal  of  this  distinction.  She
understands abstraction to be a process of “bracketing, but not of denying, predicates that are true of
1 Nussbaum (2003), "Rawls and Feminism," in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. Freeman (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge), p. 492.
2 This charge is particularly pushed in Jaggar (1983), Feminist Politics and Human Nature, (The Harvester Press: 
Sussex), p. 27- 48. 
3 This charge, particularly pushed by Susan Okin, is described in Nussbaum (2003), p. 499-507.
4 O'Neill (1993), "Justice, Gender, and International Boundaries," in The Quality of Life, eds. Nussbaum & Sen. 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford), p. 310
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the matter under discussion.”5 Abstraction is a kind of formalism. We stop talking about certain
details, and move our reasoning to a higher level, where we can form more general principles. 
Across her works she offers many reasons for engaging in abstraction, reflecting the fact
that  she  attempts  to  defend  abstraction  from  a  number  of  different  types  of  critic,  including
particularists,  communitarians,  political  conservatives,  relativists  and  feminists,  offering  each
slightly different arguments, though she is not always successful at clearly distinguishing these
distinct criticisms. Her reasons include that abstraction is theoretically and practically inevitable -
“all uses of language must be more or less abstract; so must all reasoning” 6 - that it is common in
practical thought, such as in law, and that it gives our conclusions wide scope, letting them cover a
variety of situations.7 She also suggests that “by pruning away assumptions whose truth cannot be
ascertained, and relying on a meagre and parsimonious set of plausible assumptions, [we] lend
credibility to [our] conclusions,”8 and that abstraction is “indispensable to all communication that
succeeds in the face of disagreement” and will reduce “the likelihood that [our reasoning] hinges
on premises that others will dispute and that its conclusions will seem irrelevant to those others.”9
At first glance this can seem precisely backwards. Surely, one might think, by failing to talk
about  some specific  details  and assumptions,  we risk  failing to  notice  when those  details  are
important, and actually make a difference. Insofar as abstract communication succeeds in the face of
disagreement, it does so by hiding disagreement, rather than resolving it; if interlocutors agree
only when we abstract away from detail, and will once again disagree when that detail is returned,
then the  success  of  communication seems to be illusory.  However,  this  thought  depends on a
misunderstanding  of  what  O'Neill  takes  abstraction  to  involve.  If  abstraction  is  a  kind  of
formalisation,  a  technique  of  merely  bracketing  detail  so  we  can  perform  reasoning  on  less
specified,  less  complicated,  and less  disputed grounds,  then  all  valid  reasoning done  on  that
abstract  level  must  remain  valid  when  those  specifications  and  complications  are  returned.
Supposing  we  have  abstracted  correctly,  and  correctly  reasoned  on  the  abstract  level,  if
disagreement returns when the detail returns, this points to our disagreement over those details;
our agreement over the abstract principles should remain.
5 O'Neill (1996), Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning, (Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge), p. 40. 
6 O'Neill (1996), p. 40.
7 These three "prima facie defences" appear in O'Neill (1987), "Abstraction, Idealization, and Ideology in Ethics," in 
Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Problems, ed. J. D. G. Evans (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge)
8 O'Neill (1996), p. 39-40.
9 O'Neill (1988), "Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism," in Ethics 98:4, p. 711.
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That  is  to  say,  when  abstraction  allows  communication  to  succeed  in  the  face  of
disagreement,  it  does  this  by  creating  agreement  over  something  other  than  the  disputed
assumptions and details: agreement over the abstract principles. Of course, we might then say that
abstraction allows communication to succeed in the face of disagreement only by changing the
subject.  This speaks to the necessary limitations of abstract reasoning. Abstract principles alone
cannot determine what to say about the matters that we have abstracted away from. The need for
deliberation in the application of abstract principles remains. Nonetheless, O'Neill finds abstract
reasoning  and  abstract  principles  useful  as  they  allow  “disagreements  to  be  formulated  and
debated in mutually comprehensible and accepted ways.”10
A  different  problem  arises  when  abstract  reasoning  proceeds,  and  perhaps  gathers
agreement, not just by bracketing details and assumptions, but by making “the further, unjustified
assumption that features not mentioned were missing, or allow[ing] or even encourag[ing] others
to assume that they were missing.”11 In these cases, reasoning proceeds by not only bracketing, but
also denying predicates. This is a form of idealisation.
For O'Neill,  idealisation is generally to be avoided. “An assumption, and derivatively a
theory, idealizes when it ascribes predicates - often seen as enhanced, 'ideal' predicates - that are
false of the case in hand, and so denies predicates that are true of that case.”12 Obvious cases of
idealisation may include an economist's assumption of rational, self-interested economic agents, or
a utilitarian's working through some example with a hypothetical agent assumed to have perfect
knowledge of a complex situation.
Idealisation produces theories which are “inapplicable to the human case.”13 “Reasoning
that idealizes does make claims that hinge on the objects to which it is applied satisfying certain
predicates. Where those predicates are unsatisfied the reasoning simply does not apply.”14 O'Neill
identifies idealisation as what is going wrong in the cases that feminists had previously picked out
as problematic uses of abstraction. So, for example, Rawls idealises by assuming agents in the
original position to possess only a self-interested rationality, which is false of agents in the actual
world,  and  by  structuring  some  considerations  of  justice  around an  idealised  kind  of  family
structure, which not all actual families resemble, and to which not all agents belong. 
10 O'Neill (1988), p. 719.
11 O'Neill (1996), p. 40, ft. 7.
12 O'Neill (1996), p. 41.
13 O'Neill (1996), p. 41.
14 O'Neill (1993), p. 309.
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For  O'Neill,  the  problem  with  this  kind  of  idealisation  is  not  only  that  the  idealised
predicates are false. She suggests that she could accept the use of such idealised models, provided
those using them “offer reasons for starting from the idealizing assumptions - which might require
demanding metaphysical arguments,”15 and so long as care is taken when applying these models
to actual circumstances. She obviously thinks the conditions on proper use of idealisation are not
met by Rawls, who “takes for granted that there is some just 'sexual contract,'  that justice can
presuppose a legitimate separation of 'private' from 'public' discourses.”16 The thrust of O'Neill
argument definitely suggests that she finds these conditions to be rarely met, and believes that
idealisation is generally best avoided from the start.
MILLS ON IDEAL THEORY
Though we'll return to O'Neill soon, it's worth looking at how Charles Mills has developed and
extended O'Neill's objections to idealisation into his own critique of ideal theory. Though Mills
identifies his work on ideal theory as contributing to the development of “an ethical strategy best
and most self-consciously  developed in feminist theory in the writings of Onora O’Neill,"17 his
understanding  of  idealisation  is  much  broader  than  O'Neill's,  and  he  sometimes  seems  quite
critical of the kind of methodology that O'Neill wants to employ.
Mills identifies “ideal theory” as a particular way of doing moral philosophy, roughly a
way that involves trying to discover moral truth by examining various idealised models of ethical
agents, behaviour, and situations. Though he rarely specifically identifies his philosophical targets,
he  clearly  identifies  ideal  theory  with  the  dominant  approach  in  modern  moral  and  political
philosophy, and specifically mentions Rawls as engaging in this kind of theory.18 He distinguishes
this approach from nonideal theory, which involves closer attention to the ethical realities of our
world.19 He identifies nonideal theory as the approach of most feminist moral philosophers, early
Marxists (insofar as they departed from Hegelians in their attention to the realities of class), and
those working in race theory.20
“What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least 
marginalization, of the actual. As O’Neill emphasizes, this is not a necessary corollary of the 
15 O'Neill (1996), p. 41.
16 O'Neill (1993), p. 310.
17 Mills (2005), ""Ideal Theory" as Ideology," in Hypatia 20:3, p. 165.
18 See Mills (2005), p. 169.
19 It is perhaps easiest to get an idea of what nonideal theory might look like, for Mills, by looking at Mills (1997) The
Racial Contract (Cornell University Press: Ithaca).
20 See Mills (2005), p. 170.
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operation of abstraction itself, since one can have abstractions [...] that abstract without 
idealizing. But ideal theory either tacitly represents the actual as a simple deviation from the 
ideal, not worth theorizing in its own right, or claims that starting from the ideal is at least the 
best way of realizing it."21
Mills offers a list of six kinds of assumptions and methods that may be employed in ideal theory22:
 Idealised  social  ontology:  an  account  of  the  agents  under  moral  consideration  which
abstracts  away from, ignores,  and fails  to account for  realities,  such as  oppression and
hierarchy, which in actuality profoundly shape the moral situation of the agents that exist
in our society.  This  is  a  form of  idealisation,  rather  than mere  abstraction,  because  the
theorists do not just fail to talk about these realities, but also produce a kind of theory that
depends upon their absence23,  and so fails  to apply to a world in which these features
operate. Mills identifies this feature of ideal theory in the kind of abstract individualism
that Jaggar identified in liberal theory.24 
 Idealised Capacities: attributing unrealistic capacities to the agents included in the theory,
and ignoring differences in capacities, especially those that might result from differences in
opportunities  to  develop capacities.  This  form of  idealisation seems particularly  rife  in
moral theory, and Mills specifically mentions idealisation of agents' “degrees of rationality,
self-knowledge, ability to make interpersonal cardinal utility comparisons, and the like.”25
 Silence on Oppression: ideal theory says little or nothing about past oppression, its legacy,
or current ongoing oppression. Of course, this silence also forms part of the other features
of ideal theory, but I believe Mills wants to emphasise here the importance to non-ideal
moral theory of taking oppression seriously as a subject matter for moral theory, in addition
to considering  how it  must  influence  the  more  abstract  structure  of  our  theories.  This
feature may be just an issue with certain kinds of abstraction, rather than idealisation per
se, as Mills' specific concern here is not necessarily that ideal theories may tacitly assume
that past and current oppression does not exist, but just that failure to discuss these ethical
realities will lead to a theory lacking the resources or concepts to understand or deal with
them. However, it is also clear that Mills sees this feature as deeply bound up with, and as
21 Mills (2005), p. 168.
22 See Mills (2005), p. 168-169.
23 Recall this is what O'Neill objects to in O'Neill (1996), p. 40, ft. 7.
24 See Jaggar (1983), p. 27- 48. 
25 Mills (2005), p. 168.
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tending to lead to, the forms of idealisation he discusses.
 Ideal  Social  Institutions:  institutions  such  as  the  family  and  the  economic  system  are
introduced as idealised models, “with little or no sense of how their actual workings may
systematically disadvantage women, the poor, and racial minorities.”26
 An Idealised Cognitive Sphere: differing subtly but importantly from the issue of idealised
capacities, this feature concerns the way that ideal theory ignores the effects of oppression
on the social cognition of both the oppressed and the privileged, in such a way as to ignore
actual difficulties certain groups will have understanding the social and moral situation
faced by others, and to privilege the kind of information and concepts available to, and
supportive  of,  the  privileged.  This  often  manifests  as  an  assumption  that  normatively
significant facts and reasons must be straightforwardly available to all moral agents, and
may  make  it  impossible  to  account  for  concerns  such  as  those  raised  by  feminist
epistemologies, epistemologies of ignorance, and discussions of ideology.27
 Strict Compliance: perhaps the original use of “ideal theory,” as used by John Rawls, this
involves the methodological assumption that the best way to identify the best moral theory
or political arrangement will be by looking at a theoretical construct in which every agent is
assumed to always act in full compliance with the normative requirements set down by the
moral  theory  under  consideration.  This  involves  idealisation  both  in  its  assumption  of
agents that, contrary to the behaviour of actual agents, always obey moral requirements,
and in its assumption, contrary to the actual history of the world, of a political situation
where agents always had acted in accordance with moral rules, and so there is no history of
injustice to be addressed.
After failing to find any good reason to believe that these kinds of approaches might constitute the
best way to get at moral truths, or bring about a more ideal society, Mills identifies ideal theory as
an ideology. He argues these features are “a  distortional complex of ideas,  values,  norms, and
beliefs  that  reflects  the  nonrepresentative  interests  and experiences  of  a  small  minority  of  the
national population—middle-to-upper-class white males—who are hugely  over-represented  in the
professional philosophical population.”28
The relationship between Mills' thoughts and those of O'Neill is complex, though perhaps
26 Mills (2005), p. 169.
27 See, for example, Mills (2007), “White Ignorance,” in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, eds. Sullivan and 
Tuana (SUNY Press: Albany). I will discuss this issue in more detail in chapters 5 & 6.
28 Mills (2005), p. 172.
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ultimately remains fairly harmonious. Most of the features Mills identifies in ideal theory can be
seen as a form of idealisation, in O'Neill's sense, but his critical attention is not always so sharply
focused on idealisation as O'Neill's, and even just from the above list we can already see some
suspicions regarding certain forms of abstraction, quite apart from the issue of idealisation; note
how he objects to mere silence on oppression, and not only the idealised assumption of its absence.
Though Mills acknowledges and agrees with O'Neill's point that idealisation is not a necessary
result  of  abstraction,  he is  also critical  of  certain kinds  of  abstraction which do not  appear to
idealise, in O'Neill's sense, including some that O'Neill engages in herself. 
Mills  rarely  directly talks about abstraction in this  paper.  The biggest  exception to this
comes when he explicitly defends the use of abstraction, against the claims of particularists (also a
major  target  of  O'Neill's).  However,  this  defence  does  not  make  much  use  of  the  concept  of
idealisation. Rather, it grants the particularist point that dominant abstractions in moral theory can
be problematic,  but claims that  the problem with these abstractions “arguably arises not from
abstraction and generality per se, but an abstraction and generality that abstract away from gender
and race... What one wants are abstractions... that capture the essentials of the situation of women
and nonwhites, not abstract away from them.”29 Though Mills obviously thinks that  this kind of
abstraction is bound up, perhaps necessarily, with idealisation, he nonetheless seems to be simply
objecting to a certain use of  abstraction,  that  which abstracts  away from, or in O'Neill's  sense
brackets, forms of oppression. Again, he sees a specific problem merely with silence on oppression.
It is telling that the kind of abstract entities that Mills is eager to defend the use of are quite
different to those of O'Neill. Where O'Neill is interested in the defence of abstract principles and a
formalised  Kantian  methodology,  Mills  is  interested  in  defending  abstract  concepts  such  as
patriarchy, white supremacy and class society.30 We can immediately see how Mills' abstract concepts
could not be a part of ideal theory, as they are entirely orientated around theorising oppression,
and would have no place in a theory based on strict compliance, where we must assume such
inherently negatively understood social structures would simply not be present. This is in sharp
contrast to O'Neill's abstract principles, and her abstract concept of autonomy, which would be as
much at home in an ideal theory as in a nonideal theory.
In fact,  it  seems as though O'Neill  commits  precisely the kind of abstraction that Mills
objects to. In short, she abstracts away from, or brackets, gender and race. Looking at the brief
29 Mills (2005), p. 173.
30 Mills (2005), p. 173, 175.
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illustration of her abstract method in  Justice, Gender, and International Boundaries,  she starts only
with the assumption of a plurality of interacting and diverse agents, and asks what basic principles
for action such a plurality could adopt, consistent with their remaining that plurality.31 Of course,
O'Neill has not idealised here. She has not assumed, or even implied the absence of oppression, or
the  moral  insignificance  of  gender  and race.  Indeed,  this  paper is  specifically  concerned with
demonstrating how her theory can be particularly fruitful in dealing with these issues. Though
explicit mention of gender and race are absent in her abstraction, she soon mentions them in her
justification  for  using this  kind  of  abstraction,  and  gender  is  discussed  in  some detail  in  her
illustration of an abstract principle's application.
Along  these  lines,  one  may  argue  that  although  O'Neill  has  not,  at  this  point,  talked
specifically about gender, race, or oppression, she nonetheless is concerned to capture them in her
abstract principles. Though she initially abstracts away from these things, her choice of exactly
what to abstract away from is strongly guided by these concerns. We can see this in more detail in
Towards  Justice  and  Virtue.  Here  O'Neill  is  clear  that  the  abstract  agents  characterising  her
methodology display plurality, connection, and finitude.32 That is, there are separate agents, they
can act on each other, and their powers are limited. She insist that these features of agents are ones
that  we cannot,  must not  abstract  away from, and she explicitly mentions how denying these
features could play a role in promoting oppression and injustice.33 This resembles Mills' insistence
that we must not abstract away from gender and race. Could we perhaps say that although O'Neill
has not included gender and race in her abstraction, she has nonetheless managed to “capture the
essentials  of  the  situation  of  women  and  nonwhites”?34 Certainly,  this  way  of  getting  at  the
autonomy of abstract agents explicitly avoids the feminist concerns that Mills mentions in his brief
discussion of traditional conceptions of autonomy.35
However,  despite  her  intentions,  and  the  uses  of  her  theory,  I  think  it  would  be  too
generous  to  suggest  that  O'Neill's  abstraction  (as  opposed to  her  later  application  of  abstract
principles) really captures the essentials of the situation of women and nonwhites. Though that
situation does include being finite, interdependent, interconnected agents, it also crucially involves
living  under  conditions  of  oppression.  This  last  feature  is  not  included  among  her  initial
31 O'Neill (1993), p. 313-5
32 O'Neill (1996), p. 101. See also p. 106 ft. 24
33 O'Neill (1996), p. 107-113.
34 Mills (2005), p. 32.
35 Mills (2005), p. 177.
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abstractions.
Why then do I suggest that the thought of Mills and O'Neill is ultimately harmonious? This
has to do with how O'Neill  sees the move from abstract principles to our application of those
principles.  Now,  Mills  is  actually  very  critical  of  attempts  to  defend  ideal  theory  by  simply
gesturing towards such a division, and of any view that claims engaging with the concrete ethics
conditions of the world “is just a matter of applying principles, not of theory (applied ethics rather
than ethical theory).”36 He discusses and rejects the idea that “nonideal theory and its various
prescriptions  are  somehow  already  “contained”  within  ideal  theory.”37 However,  O'Neill  also
importantly  rejects  precisely  this  idea,  with  regard  to  abstract  principles.  Contrary  to  the
dismissive  tone  of  the  ideal  theorists  Mills  is  targeting,  O'Neill  sees  the  task  of  getting  from
principles to applications as rather involved and complicated. She rejects the idea that principles
must determine their own application - that application is somehow contained within principles –
and emphasises the point that application is a matter of judgement and deliberation.38 Indeed, she
identifies overly meagre and cursory accounts of deliberation as the motivating force behind most
particularist objections to abstraction.39
Again, O'Neill's sentiments are echoed by Mills, who identifies the problem with most ideal
theorists who dismiss the importance of application as “a failure to appreciate the nature and
magnitude of the obstacles to the cognitive rethinking required, and the mistaken move... from the
ease of logical implication to the actual inferential patterns of human cognizers who have been
socialized by... systems of domination.”40 He emphasises what is required to make ideal theories
inclusive  of  and  applicable  to  the  marginalised  cannot  simply  be  a  matter  of  terminological
extension, nor “spun out, a priori,”41 from the theory's concepts. Rather, to take the example of
theorising about the family, “they require empirical input and an awareness of how the real-life,
nonideal family actually works. But insofar as such input is crucial and guides theory (which is
why it’s incorrect to see this as just “applied” ethics), the theory ceases to be ideal.”42
Looking both at what O'Neill says about moral deliberation, and an actual illustration of
the application of her principles to the situation of poor women in poor economies, we can see that
36 Mills (2005), p. 177.
37 Mills (2005), p. 177.
38 See O'Neill (1988), p. 719, O'Neill (1993), p. 316, and  O'Neill (1987), p. 64. 
39 O'Neill (1987), p. 65.
40 Mills (2005), p. 178.
41 Mills (2005), p. 178.
42 Mills (2005), p. 178, emphasis his.
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she is eager to engage in exactly the kind of nonideal, empirically-informed theorising that Mills
requires.  In  “Justice,  Gender,  and International  Boundaries”  she  discusses  (albeit  briefly)  such
issues  as  the  undervaluing  of  women's  labour,  problems  arising  from  family  structures,  the
problem of identifying consent under conditions of inability, incapacity, and commitment to others,
differences in economic power,  and problems arising from women's isolation, seclusion, and lack
of  access  to  education.43 In  short,  she  discusses  how  actual  institutions  render  some  women
powerless and vulnerable. Though her abstract principles may not, her  application of principles
does  seek  to  capture  the  essentials  of  the  situation  of  women,  at  least  of  the  women  under
discussion.  Though  she  initially  abstracts  from  these  features,  she  ultimately  insists  that  in
“applying abstract, non-idealizing principles we have to take account... of others' actual capacities
and opportunities to act – and their incapacities and lack of opportunities.”44 Ultimately, O'Neill has
a methodology that Mills would identify as nonideal.
However, while the thought of Mills and O'Neill might be compatible, it would be well not
to overestimate their similarity. It remains a striking fact that the work of Mills and O'Neill seems
so distinct, that Mills maintains a sharp focus on oppression, nonideal moral systems 45, and actual
conditions of injustice, where O'Neill spends relatively less time focusing on these details, wants to
at  least  start  theorising  from a  higher,  more  abstract  level,  and  is  more  content  to  see  Mills'
concerns as matters of application (though perhaps not merely application in the dismissive sense).
This  difference seems to come,  again,  to a difference in treatment of  the role  and objective of
abstraction. I will continue to look at the role of abstraction in moral theory by examining Lisa
Schwartzman's objections to O'Neill's use of abstraction and idealisation.
SCHWARTZMAN ON O'NEILL'S ABSTRACTION AND IDEALISATION
In  her  book  Challenging  Liberalism:  Feminism  as  Political  Critique Lisa  Schwartzman  delivers  a
sustained  attack  on  the  abstraction  that  she  sees  as  central  to  liberal  political  thought. 46 This
includes a specific critique of O'Neill's defence of abstraction. Though Schwartzman is sensitive to
many of the same problems as O'Neill and Mills, she insists again that abstraction is at the heart of
these problems, and even defends the use of specific ideals in moral theory, though perhaps not
idealisations in O'Neill's sense. Like O'Neill and Mills, she acknowledges that abstraction, in some
43 O'Neill (1993), p. 317-321.
44 O'Neill (1993), p. 321.
45 As explored in Mills (1997).
46 Schwartzman (2006), Challenging Liberalism: Feminism and Political Critique, (Pennsylvania State University 
Press: University Park, PA).
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forms, may be useful or unavoidable, but, in contrast to O'Neill, she insists that it is a mistake to
employ  methods  that  aim  at  creating  highly  abstract  models.47 Her  point  is  sharply
methodological; it is not that abstract reasoning or liberal theory cannot be employed in ways that
are supportive of feminist critique, but rather that they will tend to lead us astray.48
Schwartzman's critique of abstraction is lengthy and well developed, but rests on many of
the  same  points  more  briefly  touched  on  by  O'Neill  and  Mills.  She  develops  her  critique  of
abstraction primarily through close examinations of the work of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls,
and it is striking that many of the problems she identifies in their theories would obviously count
as  idealisations  in  O'Neill's  sense.  For  example,  she  suggests  that  Dworkin  goes  astray  by
theorising  about  a  hypothetical  scenario  where  abstract  agents  possess  more  knowledge  than
actual  agents  do,  by  falsely  assuming  that  inequalities  in  society  result  merely  from  lack  of
resources  rather  than  systematic  oppression,  and  by  falsely  assuming  a  coherent  concept  of
ambition  which  is  independent  from  an  agent's  circumstances.49 All  three  of  these  would
straightforwardly be identified by O'Neill as idealisations. 
Late  in  the  book,  she  even  states  “The  problem  is  not  that  liberalism  makes  use  of
abstraction in [O'Neill's  bracketing] sense;  rather,  it  is  that liberal methods of abstraction often
permit objectionable features of the social structure to enter into a theory despite the bracketing.” 50
Again, this seems like a straightforward endorsement of O'Neill's idea that idealisation, rather than
abstraction, is the problem. Nonetheless, Schwartzman takes herself to be objecting to O'Neill's
methodology, and it is clear that their actual approaches to the methodology of moral philosophy
are very different.
A difficulty that arises in discussing Schwartzman's objections of O'Neill is that, though she
takes the concept from O'Neill's work, she nonetheless seems to operate with a slightly different
understanding  of  idealisation  than  O'Neill  gives  us.  The  most  significant  difference  is  that
Schwartzman draws a distinction between two types of idealisation, where O'Neill does not clearly
make this distinction. Initially, Schwartzman identifies idealisation as the act of adding to allegedly
abstract  theories  assumptions  that  “presuppose  particular  conceptions  of  human  rationality,
independence, preference formation, or some other capacity,” which are false of actual agents, and
“tend to privilege men, whites, upper-middle-class people, and others who have power within
47 Schwartzman (2006), p. 8.
48 See Schwartzman (2006), p. 3-4.
49 Schwartzman (2006), p. 37-53.
50 Schwartzman (2006), p. 160.
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sociopolitical  structures.”51 This  is  consistent  with  O'Neill's  stated  idea  of  idealisation,  though
Schwartzman notes that O'Neill does not include this explicit focus on the issue of sociopolitical
power in her account of idealisation.
However, Schwartzman identifies a second type of idealisation, which she suggests is also
described and criticised by O'Neill, and which involves a theory's aspiring “to particular ideals
that it posits as worthy and desirable goals but that are unproved and merely assumed from the
start.”52 She also describes these as “ideals that the theorist acknowledges are not yet descriptive of
actual persons but are offered as goals to be achieved.”53
Clearly  identifying  this  line  of  thought  in  O'Neill's  work  is  difficult.  Though she  does
occasionally  speak about  the  dangers  of  “assuming unvindicated ideals,”54 these  passages  are
completely bound up with her discussion of idealisation in the previously discussed sense. Her
thought seems to run as follows: some theorists, as they attempt to abstract, also idealise, in the
sense of assuming capacities and situations that are false of actual agents. These idealisations tend
to operate by attributing, to agents, conformity to some 'ideal,'55 such as that of perfect rationality
or independence. So, in idealisation, some particular ideal is posited, or implied. This is dangerous
both because the 'ideals' may lack justification, and because “agents and institutions who fail to
measure up to supposed ideals may be blamed for the misfit.”56
Schwartzman's interpretation of O'Neill separates O'Neill's discussion of 'ideals' from her
discussion of idealisation in the original, narrow sense, and attributes to O'Neill a blanket objection
to all use of ideals that have not been explicitly justified, whether or not those appear in the context
of some act of idealisation. It is simply unclear whether O'Neill intends her objections to 'ideals' to
spread this far.  However, it does seem that such a reading is consistent with O'Neill's goals in her
project of finding abstract principles. As we have seen, O'Neill engages in abstraction partly in
order to reduce “the likelihood that [our reasoning] hinges on premises that others will dispute.”57
Or, more particularly, as O'Neill is looking to find basic abstract principles that could be adopted
by, and shared, by a plurality of agents, she must reject the use of particular ideals that are only
51 Schwartzman (2006), p. 79.
52 Schwartzman (2006), p. 80.
53 Schwartzman (2006), p. 81.
54 O'Neill (1996), p. 43.
55 O'Neill herself tends to enclose the word 'ideal' in scare quotes here, presumably to indicate that these putative 
ideals are not genuinely ideal, but rather idealised reflections of the position of certain dominant social agents. See 
O'Neill (1996), p. 42-43. See also O'Neill (1993), p. 312.
56 O'Neill (1996) p. 42.
57 O'Neill (1988), p. 711.
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available to particular agents, perhaps because of their contingent historical circumstances, or their
particular social situation. Presumably, if such ideals were available to all agents, they would be
abstractly  justifiable.  So,  though O'Neill  is  not  always  so  clear  on this,  it  seems Schwartzman
would be right to suggest that it is in keeping with O'Neill's project to reject the use of specific,
unvindicated ideals.
It  may  help  to  consider  an  example  here.  Take  an  ideal  of  “righteous  resistance  to
domination.” Such an ideal may not be justifiable to everyone, particularly not to those who live in
some (counter-factual) society where domination does occur, and perhaps not to those who do not
suffer under domination in the actual society they inhabit. Even leaving abstract concerns about
rationality aside, we may want to employ such an ideal while simply not concerning ourselves and
our moral theory with finding ways to justify this ideal to those to whom it is less accessible. 58 This
is the kind of ideal that Schwartzman wants to make room for, and which O'Neill's methodology
seems to rule out, as its use would hinge on premises that others would dispute.
But,  of course,  O'Neill's  reasoning here would not stop merely at ruling out the use of
specific unjustified ideals, but rather would extend to excluding, from our most abstract practical
reasoning, the use of any particular conceptualisations when those conceptualisations are not, in
some sense, available to all of the agents in some plurality. This restriction seems to be demanded
by O'Neill's methodology whether or not the conceptualisations can be seen as, in any way, ideals.
Schwartzman identifies this thought in O'Neill's work, specifically as O'Neill aiming to “proceed
without any particular conception of gender or national sovereignty.”59
We can look more closely at the concept of gender to see how this restriction seems to be
called  for  by  O'Neill's  method.  The  way  that  various  groups  in  society,  and  across  societies,
conceptualise gender will differ wildly. The understanding of gender held by a 'complementarian'
Christian will differ from that of a second wave radical feminist, and perhaps again from that of a
more recent,  more inclusive feminist,  and again from members of  a number of  non-European
societies which recognise various non-binary systems of gender. Not all of these ideas of gender
will count as even purported ideals. Perhaps most clearly the complementarian Christian's may,
insofar as they see gender as consisting of a mapping of normative social behaviours onto a set of
'natural' physical traits. However the second wave radical feminist's certainly won't, insofar as they
see gender as a distinctly non-ideal system of categorisation, created and enforced by patriarchy,
58 I discuss why we might want to do this in Chapter 6.
59 Schwartzman (2006), p. 82.
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and  central  to  the  oppression  of  certain  classes  of  people.  More  importantly,  these  various
understandings of gender do not look to be in principle available to all agents. Understanding the
complementarian  Christian's  concept  would  require  at  least  familiarity  with,  and  perhaps
commitment to, a certain Christian worldview, including its particular history and social context.
Understanding the radical feminist's concept would require some familiarity with the particular
form  and  history  of  patriarchy  in  some  society,  and  perhaps  a  stance  of  opposition  to  that
patriarchy.60 If these concepts can be seen as in principle available to all agents, surely all must be. If
they are not, then, for O'Neill, they must be kept out of our most abstract moral theorising.
Schwartzman writes “O'Neill is not suggesting that we simply replace false or oppressive
conceptions of rationality, independence, gender, and national sovereignty with ones that are more
accurate  or  less  oppressive,  but  rather  that  we  attempt  to  theorize  without  employing  any
particular  conceptions  at  all.”61 This  is  certainly  too  strong;  O'Neill  herself  recognises  “Every
articulation of a situation privileges certain categories and descriptions”.62 We are allowed some
concepts, so long as they are in principle available to all, and there may be a lot of room to dispute
what kinds of concepts that may be true of. However, what does seem to be true is that a lot of the
concepts most important for understanding and articulating some of the most pressing issues in
moral philosophy, and certainly those, such as patriarchy and white supremacy, which Mills insisted
we must use, will be disqualified from O'Neill's highest level of moral thinking.
So long as we are only considering the disqualification of specific conceptions from our
most abstract level of practical reasoning – the discovery and articulation of abstract principles –
this is nothing new. I've already pointed out that notions such as race and gender do not appear in
O'Neill's most abstract reasoning, but suggested that this might not be a problem so long as some
critical  understanding  of  these  concepts  appeared  in  the  application  of  principles.  However,
Schwartzman wants to suggest that O'Neill aims to keep any particular conceptualisations out of
our  applied  reasoning  as  well,  that  she  supposes  “ideals  can  be  avoided  not  only  in  the
construction of abstract principles but also in their application.”63 This does seem to be suggested
by  O'Neill's  claim  that  we  can  “take  account  of  the  context  and  particularities  of  lives  and
societies” without endorsing “established ideals of gender and of national sovereignty,” and that
60 It would probably require undergoing some transformative experience of feminist awakening, as I discuss in 
chapter 6.
61 Schwartzman (2006), p. 82.
62 O'Neill (1987), p. 66.
63 Schwartzman (2006), p. 82.
91
we can “take account of certain differences” without “tacitly reintroducing restricted ideals (e.g. by
privileging certain views of gender and sovereignty)”.64 Though she is much less clear about this, it
may  be  that  O'Neill  is  as  eager  to  keep  disputed  and  non-sharable  conceptions  out  of  her
application of  principles  as  she  is  to  keep them out  of  her  abstract  formulation  of  principles.
Schwartzman objects to this both on the grounds that the use of specific ideals or conceptions is
unavoidable  (she  suggests  O'Neill  unwittingly  relies  on  a  certain  ideal  of  personhood,  which
focuses  on  and  supremely  values  rational  agency)65,  and  that  careful  deployment  of  non-
oppressive  ideals  is  “crucial  in  challenging  false  and  ideological  'idealizations.'”66 Michèle  Le
Doeuff has made a similar point in objecting to a kind of rigour aimed at “pruning everything that
is not acceptable to all at the outset... [which] produces both boredom and illusion at the same
time: no one succeeds in pruning as much as is necessary.”67
It is worth looking more closely at whether and why O'Neill keeps deployment of specific
conceptions and ideals out of the process of applying principles. At the end of her article Justice,
Gender,  and  International  Boundaries,  O'Neill  briefly  illustrates  the  application  of  principles  to
specific cases in a three-page discussion of the lives of poor women in poor economies.68 This
discussion  focuses  on  women's  vulnerability  to  deception  and  economic  coercion,  their
dependence  on  problematic  institutions,  such  as  family  structures  or  potentially  exploitative
financial instruments, and their lack of opportunities to dissent from or challenge their political
situation. She concludes with “The  most significant features of actual situations that must be taken
into account in judgements about justice are the security or vulnerability that allow actual others to
dissent from and to seek change in the arrangements which structure their lives.”69
On  the  one  hand  this  discussion  is  marked  by  an  engaged  examination  of  the  actual
conditions  of  some  women's  lives,  and  the  structures  and  situations  that  promote  their
exploitation. On the other, it does indeed seem to shy away from the deployment of any significant
concepts we might use to understand that situation except those, like deception and dependence,
which are easily derived from her abstract principles, or the basic “circumstances of justice” 70 to
which  all  principles  are  meant  to  apply.  She  certainly  does  not  employ the  kinds  of  strongly
64 O'Neill (1993), p. 305.
65 Schwartzman (2006), p. 84-85.
66 Schwartzman (2006), p. 88-93.
67 Le Doeuff (1991), Hipparchia's Choice, trans. Trista Selous (Columbia University Press: New York), p. 221.
68 O'Neill (1993), p. 319-321.
69 O'Neill (1993), p. 321.
70 See O'Neill (1989), Constructions of Reason (Cambridge University Press: New York), p. 212.
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specific  (though still  abstract)  concepts  like  'patriarchy'  and 'white  supremacy'  advocated and
employed by Mills. She rather attempts to describe the circumstances of poor women in much less
theoretically loaded ways. The worry is that she may be implicitly relying on some kind of idea
that the facts of the situation of poor women can be simply read off of an abstract examination of
their situation, without the need to engage in any significant theoretical work, or to actively find
ways to understand the situation that take us beyond the immediately available or apparent.
Consider  O'Neill's  employment,  in  this  discussion,  of  a  fairly  non-theoretical  term.  Of
course, O'Neill does discuss “women” in her illustration of application; she could hardly consider
'the lives of poor women in poor economies' without doing so. However, how does this sit with her
reluctance to reintroduce particular conceptions of gender? Is this allowed because although she is
talking about women, she is not committing herself to any particular conception of gender, not
“privileging certain views of gender”? Not committing to any particular idea of what women are?
This line of thought may be dangerous. It de facto treats gender as an unproblematic category, as
something that  it  is  okay to  just  talk  about  or  employ as  though we all  know what  is  being
discussed.71 This risks naturalising gender, treating it as an obviously acceptable category, as a thing
that we can all  roughly use without specific understanding because it  roughly describes some
category of things that just are in the world. There are two significant problems with this approach.
Firstly, it ignores and marginalises those on the boundaries of certain gender systems. By
leaving any specific understanding of gender out of our  application of a principle, we produce a
judgement  that  simply  has  nothing  to  say  about  certain  disputed  cases  regarding  who  our
judgement applies to. At best our judgement is indeterminate regarding these people, at worst it
simply fails to apply to them, and in so doing implicitly buys into the systems that excluded them.
Rather than dealing with the problem of how to apply certain principles to certain marginalised
people, O'Neill's approach may risk erasing these people and their problems from her theory.
Of  course,  she  would  have  plenty  of  room  to  perform  some  separate  analysis  of  the
conditions  of  such  people,  who are  liable  to  be  deeply  disadvantaged  by  their  liminal  social
position, but she seems to have lost room to include these people under the same analysis she
applies  to  the  less  contested  population,  even  when  that  analysis  is  directly  relevant.  More
importantly  she  loses  the  ability  to  specifically  examine  how  these  people's  disadvantaged
71 Note retreating to a category such as “biological sex” would not get us very far, as this category is no less of a 
socially constructed idealisation than gender, and is certainly still far from completely unproblematic. See Fausto-
Sterling (2000), Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality (Basic Books: New York).
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situation may be, in perhaps complicated ways, related to the oppression that operates on those
who more straightforwardly clearly fit establishment categories. For example, in western society,
examining  the  condition  of  trans  women as  an  entirely  separate  activity  from examining  the
condition of cisgender women would not only be offensive to trans women, but would also result
in  an  inadequate  analysis,  one  that  struggled  to  take  into  account  the  way  such  women  are
specifically disadvantaged by the forces, such as misogyny, that operate against women in general.
This approach would seem to close off the possibility of any intersectional analysis.72
Secondly, this approach seems to implicitly rule out non-ideal conceptions of gender, those
which  may  see  straightforward employment  of  gender  categories,  in  the  absence  of  a  critical
understanding of those categories, as involving endorsement of, or complicity in, an oppressive
and patriarchal system of categorisation. Further, her abstract and non-committal use of the term
“women” may rule out, from the application of her principles, those situated in radically different,
perhaps non-binary understandings of gender which may even not straightforwardly include any
class of people sufficiently analogous to the theorist's particular category “women,”  even if there
are some people whose  circumstances are sufficiently analogous to warrant their inclusion in this
particular judgement. Perhaps we could try to avoid this situation by simply defining 'women' in
our  judgement  regarding  'the  lives  of  women  in  poor  economies'  as  'those  people  whose
circumstances are sufficiently similar to  x to be relevant to this discussion'; however this would
seem to, in effect, constitute introducing and privileging a new particular notion of 'women'. All of
these  concerns  clearly  echo  Schwartzman's  worry  that  avoiding  privileging  any  specific
conceptions or ideals may be impossible, and that attempting to do so runs the risk of simply
privileging dominant, ideological views.
We may get a better idea of what is going on here if we closely examine why O'Neill may
want  to  keep  specific  conceptions  and  ideals  out  of  the  application  of  abstract  principles.  In
particular, my worry that O'Neill might have an overly simple idea of what it takes to understand
the particulars of a case under judgement, that she might expect us to simply read the facts off a
cursory examination of the situation, is completely at odds with her stated goals. She has written a
great deal about how we must take seriously the difficulties involving in appraising, or describing
a situation under moral consideration, and always insists “Situations do not come handily pre-
classified for subsumption under one and only one ethical rule or principle, which prescribes quite
72 I will be discussing intersectionality later in this chapter.
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determinate  action.”73 Furthermore,  her  insistence  on this  is  partly  tied to  her  concerns  about
ideology, as she claims that “Ways of reasoning that assume that 'the facts' of human situations can
be uncontroversially stated are likely to be dominated by established and often by establishment
views. Without a critical account of the selection of minor premises, ethical reasoning may avoid
formalism only to become hostage to local ideology,”74 and again 
In  contexts  of  action  questions  are  begged  (usually  in  favour  of  received  views)  if  some
'obvious' account of a problem or an area of life is taken for granted. In ethical deliberation, as
elsewhere, it matters who controls the agenda. An adequate account of reasoning that can guide
action  must  include  not  only  principles  of  action  (the  major  premises)  but  an  account  of
judgement which explains why particular situations should be grasped under one rather than
another possible description (the minor premises).75
Though these quotes show agreement with Mills' and Schwartzman's insistence that we must give
careful  thought  to  actual  moral  situations  and  how  we  understand  them,  where  O'Neill
significantly differs is in identifying the antidote to establishment views and local ideology simply
in an account of judgement, or a “critical account of the selection of minor premises," rather than in
any significant abstract theorising about oppression, ideology and social injustice. So, one further
reason that O'Neill does not feel the need to develop and employ, or perhaps even allow, specific
theoretical conceptions along the lines of patriarchy or white supremacy is that she believes the work
done by these concepts, the work of understanding the moral cases before us, understanding, for
example, “the essentials of the situation of women and nonwhites,”76 can be done purely by the
employment of some number of strategies for appraising situations which can be developed out of
an abstract account of practical reasoning, along with our abstract principles.
O'Neill  goes  into  some  small  detail  about  these  strategies  in  her  paper  The  Power  of
Example77,  where she categorises them into two groups. The first are roughly rules of thumb or
maxims for thinking about and challenging our own initial construals of situations, maxims along
the  lines  of  “take  account  of  differences  of  information”  or  “remember  differences  between
intention  and achievement.”78 These  kinds  of  strategies  seem familiar  from mainstream moral
philosophy,  and  I  would  doubt  their  ability  to,  alone,  take  us  far  from  our  own,  perhaps
73 O'Neill (1987), p. 63.
74 O'Neill (1987), p. 65.
75 O'Neill (1986), Faces of Hunger (Allen & Unwin: London), p. 29.
76 Mills (2005), p. 173
77 O'Neill (1986) “The Power of Example” in Philosophy 61, pp. 5-29.
78 O'Neill (1986), p. 26
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ideological, starting points. More interesting are the second kind of strategies, which are strategies
for seeking to share a view with others. These include maxims like “listen to the other's reasons” or
“always to try to expand rather than to narrow one's horizons.”79 They are distinctly strategies that
call for more than reflection, introspection, or careful thinking.80
This focus on communication and finding shared views is a major theme in O'Neill's moral
philosophy,  and  is  supposed  to  do  much  of  the  work  of  getting  us  away  from  established
viewpoints and local ideology. The idea seems to be that through certain deliberative strategies, by
all the people facing a moral issue finding ways to communicate with one another, some shared
way of construing the situation will be found, or, more importantly, constructed. This plurality of
people will include all parties to the issue - the powerful and the weak, oppressed and oppressors,
victims, perpetrators and allies, individual agents and representatives of institutions – each with
their  own  distinct  needs,  interests,  ideologies  and  viewpoints.  Presumably  this  new  shared
construal will not simply keep views as they were, or reiterate establishment ideologies, as some
parties to the communicative process will refuse to accept and share some view that works against
their moral interests, will refuse to be ideologically complicit in their own unjust situation. We
mustn't think O'Neill  has a simplistic view of this process.  It  is not simply a matter of parties
talking until  they find some set of descriptions that they can all agree on. Rather,  this process
“often has to work by means of transformations of consciousness and ideology.”81 Individuals are
changed by the process, they “acquire new ways of seeing the world”82 rather than simply new
terms to describe an unchanged moral picture.
So  the  difference,  here,  between  the  methodologies  of  O'Neill  on  the  one  hand,  and
Schwartzman and Mills on the others, is that while the latter are eager to engage in theoretical
activity designed to uncover and challenge dominant ideologies through the development of less
oppressive, and anti-oppressive concepts, O'Neill thinks this work can be done by employing fairly
abstract and schematic strategies of moral deliberation, based on challenging our own worldviews
through consensus-building critical engagement with the views of others. In fact, she seems to be
deeply opposed to the the former method, convinced that it must lead to endorsement of dominant
ideology.83
79 O'Neill (1986), p. 25-6.
80 More illuminating discussion of these strategies appears in O'Neill (1987), p. 67-69.
81 O'Neill (1986), p. 42.
82 O'Neill (1986), p. 47.
83 The only significant discussion in O'Neill's work, that I've come across, of theories that engage directly with the 
situation of the oppressed is a brief note about Carol Gilligan's work on moral sense theory, a particular theory 
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My  worry  with  regard  to  O'Neill's  methodology  is  that,  though  it  seems  her  general
strategies could indeed be useful for moral thinking, limiting moral philosophy to these general
strategies and abstract principles, against the use of less abstract, more social aware theorising, will
prevent  us,  collectively,  from having the  kinds  of  tools,  concepts,  knowledge and theories  we
would need to bring to her general strategies. The worry is essentially one of false consciousness,
or,  roughly, the idea that agents may be systematically alienated from their own interests. Her
method relies  on the possibility of interested parties  being able to articulate and present their
interests.  However,  she has not  given parties  enough space to discover,  understand,  and align
themselves to their own interests. In a situation where masses of agents are alienated from their
own interests, or ideologically committed to their own oppression, her method simply will not
yield the ideologically challenging results she is after.  
Mere communication and reflection will never be enough unless someone has done the
work of developing the ideas, concepts, and theories they need in order to communicate the best
account  of  their  own situation.  O'Neill's  methodology is  one  that  presumes  that  there  will  be
feminists,  anti-racist  activists,  and  others  around  to  articulate  a  liberatory  viewpoint  of  the
oppressed. Perhaps, we might say, this is not too worrying an assumption; after all, these are such
people,  and  perhaps  there  always  will  be people  who  resist  under  conditions  of  oppression.
However, O'Neill's methodology doesn't seem to give such people the space and tools to develop
their theories, to engage in theorising, moral theorising. At best, it allows such processes to go on,
but  does  not  grant  them  the  title  of  'moral  philosophy.'  This  is  essentially  the  charge  that
Schwartzman eventually raises against liberalism - though not specifically against O'Neill – that
although it is very capable of accommodating feminist critique, it is ill-suited for generating that
critique in the first place.84
SCHWARTZMAN'S ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGY, ESSENTIALISM & INTERSECTIONALITY
Though Schwartzman's main concern is to challenge abstract liberal methodologies in moral and
political  philosophy,  she  occasionally  gives  some  insight  into  what  her  preferred  alternative
methodology  would  look  like.  This  appears  most  clearly  after  an  extensive  discussion  of
which O'Neill correctly notes seems to be committed to a problematic gender essentialism, one that sees certain 
actual differences between men and women in our society as innate or natural. See O'Neill (1993), p. 307. From this
she seems to conclude that, in all non-abstract feminist theorising, “differences are taken seriously only when actual
differences are endorsed.” This ignores the possibility of theory which engages with social differences understood 
to be a result of social oppression. Catharine MacKinnon emphasises this point in MacKinnon (1991), “From 
Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?” in Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 13:4, pp. 13-22.
84 See Schwartzman (2006), chapter 5, p. 95-109
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Nussbaum's  liberal  feminism.  Schwartzman  identifies  Nussbaum's  methodology  with  a
commitment  to  a  problematic  liberal  abstraction,  one  which  abstracts  away  from  details  of
dominance  and hierarchy85,  and with an  individualistic  methodology,  one  which  functions  by
“paying specific attention to each and every individual.”86 In contrast, Schwartzman discusses an
alternative feminist methodology which she identifies in the work of Catharine MacKinnon. This
methodology rejects liberal individualism, and instead proceeds through a focus on the situation
of women living under male domination. That is to say, it focuses on the moral and political harm
done to a political group, women, as members of that group, rather than just a series of individual
women. It is supposed that only through such a group-focus can we come to see the systematic
influences on women's lives in their full,  political detail;  consider, here, the difference between
understanding sexual harassment either as a single unpleasant event, or as a widespread practice
directed specifically at women throughout public spaces in our society.
This methodology is supposed to avoid the worries some liberal feminists have expressed
about a focus on groups, such as family or religious groups - that such focus will only serve to
subsume the interests of individuals (particularly individual women) in such groups, and to rarefy
dominant ideologies about women's place in such groups87 – through emphasis on the idea that the
situation  of  women  is  to  be  understood  as  defined  and  created  by  their  oppression  under
patriarchy. Thus it is hoped we can talk about the differences in situation between men and women
in  our  society,  without  seeking  to  preserve  those  differences,  and  without  seeing  them  as
unproblematic. 
This  methodology  also  rejects  liberal  abstraction,  but  replaces  it  with  its  own  form  of
abstraction. Finally, we see Schwartzman settling on the now familiar claim that the problem is not
with abstraction per se, but rather with certain forms of abstraction. Schwartzman wants to endorse
a  form  of  abstraction  that  does  not  leave  male  bias  intact,  or  render  relations  of  domination
invisible. Her final word on abstraction reads “Because abstraction always involves the bracketing
of certain features and the retention of others, this method is itself not apolitical and can never be
fully impartial  or  neutral.”88 She sees the problem with liberal  attempts at  abstraction in their
failure to take this point seriously, in their attempting to be politically neutral or noncommital, and
so their inevitable support of a male-dominated status quo.
85 Schwartzman (2006), p. 99.
86 Schwartzman (2006), p. 104.
87 See O'Neill (1993), p. 306 and Schwartzman (2006), p. 97-8.
88 Schwartzman (2006, p. 108-9.
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Schwartzman's  own  preferred  method,  following  MacKinnon,  centres  one  particular
abstract category, that of a “women's perspective”89 or “women's point of view.”90 MacKinnon also
talks about “women's consciousness, not as individual or subjective ideas, but as a collective social
being,”91 the “situation of all  women,”92 and “the notion of experience 'as a woman'.”93 This is
obviously an abstract concept, an attempt to pull away from the details of the specific situations
and experiences of  individual  women in order to characterise some more general  situation or
perspective. Of course this concept is similar to and related to those abstract concepts we saw in
Mills' discussion of abstraction, such as patriarchy and white supremacy, but MacKinnon's concept
seems to lend itself to some more specific methodologies, and also has some seriously problematic
features.
For Schwartzman and MacKinnon, the idea of women's perspective, and also its content, is
created  through  processes  of  consciousness  raising.94 As  Schwartzman  describes  this,  through
processes of discussion “individual women become conscious of the fact that they are not the only
ones who have had to endure experiences of abuse; low-paying and sexually exploitative jobs; or
sexual harassment, rape, and other forms of violation. Discussing their concrete experiences with
one another, women see patterns and similarities emerge; problems that formerly seemed to be
rooted in women's “nature” or in their own personal failures become recognizable as products and
manifestations of male dominance and female subordination.”95 
As  we  would  expect,  the  creation  of  an  abstract  concept  looks  very  different  in
Schwartzman's methodology than it does in O'Neill's.  For Schwartzman, rather than attempting to
bracket as many details as possible, holding on to only those that are absolutely necessary, it is
instead important that our abstract concept be built out of all the important, though contingent,
details of individual women's lives. Rather than steadfastly avoiding idealisation, Schwartzman
thinks it important to give careful attention to what we include in our abstract concept, and what
we leave out,  and recognises  these  as  political  decisions.  Of  course  our  concept  of  “women's
situation” must idealise. Not every woman has experienced abuse, sexism in the workplace, or an
unequal division of labour in the home, but these must form part of our understanding of the
89 Schwartzman (2006), p. 107.
90 MacKinnon (1989), Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge), p. 87.
91 MacKinnon (1989), p. 83-4.
92 MacKinnon (1987), Feminism Unmodified, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge), p. 75-6.
93 MacKinnon (1991).
94 See MacKinnon (1989), chapter 5, particularly p. 87.
95 Schwartzman (2006), p. 107.
99
situation of women in our society.96
However Schwartzman notes,  though underplays,  a  massive  problem with the  kind of
approach she advocates. Around the mid 1980s to early 1990s, a number of feminists of colour
began to specifically target  the kinds of  concepts  favoured by Schwartzman and MacKinnon's
methodology,  concepts  of  a  single,  unitary,  abstract  women's  voice,  experience,  situation  or
perspective.  These  feminists  had  observed  how  such  concepts  invariably  functioned  within
feminist spaces to privilege the problems,  experiences, and voices of the most well-off women,
particularly white, middle-class women. This problem is often traced right back to Betty Friedan's
pioneering feminist text The Feminine Mystique in which Friedan “made her plight and the plight of
white women like herself [college-educated, middle or upper class] synonymous with a condition
affecting all American women.”97 It has also been placed even earlier, in the work of Simone de
Beauvoir.98
This problem is often described as gender essentialism, which Angela Harris has usefully
defined as “The notion that a unitary, "essential" women's experience can be isolated and described
independently  of  race,  class,  sexual  orientation,  and  other  realities  of  experience.”99 Harris  is
particularly  aware  of  the  need for  some amount  of  abstraction  in  theory,  acknowledging that
categorization “is necessary both for human communication and political movement,”100 but she
nonetheless  explicitly  argues,  unlike  those  I  have  discussed  previously,  that  we  need  “less
abstraction and not simply a different form of abstraction.”101
Feminists have challenged both the claim lying behind gender essentialism, that there is
some thing we could pick out as the experience of all women, and the effects that a methodology
incorporating essentialism has, and will tend to have, on feminist theory and organisation. On the
first point, Bernice Johnson Reagon suggested that “The women's movement has perpetuated a
myth that there is some common experience that comes just cause you're women,”102 and bell hooks
writes  “The  idea  of  "common  oppression"  was  a  false  and  corrupt  platform  disguising  and
96 We could perhaps avoid this strictly counting as idealisation by speaking, for example, not just of “abuse,” but 
rather “being subject to abuse,” which more plausibly is true of all women in our society. However it's not clear 
what real benefit this change gets us in terms of idealisation.
97 hooks (1984), Feminist Theory from Margin to Center, (South End Press: Boston), p. 2.
98 Elizabeth Spelman devotes a chapter to this claim in Spelman (1988), Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in
Feminist Thought (Beacon: Boston), chapter 3..
99 Harris (1990), “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,” Stanford Law Review 42:3, pp. 581-616, p. 585.
100 Harris (1990), p. 585. See also p. 586.
101 Harris (1990), p. 585. Harris is talking in the context of contemporary legal theory, but I believe her arguments 
would apply equally well to philosophy, or feminist methods at large.
102  Reagon (1983), “Coalition Politics: Turning the Century,” in Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology, ed. Barbara 
Smith, (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick), p. 347. 
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mystifying the true nature of  women's  varied and complex social  reality.”103 The second point
involves a number of issues, all hinging on the impossibility of forming accurate general accounts
of subjects like rape and sexual harassment without paying specific attention to the social position,
including race, class, etc, of those under consideration.
Harris notes “The result of essentialism is to reduce the lives of people who experience
multiple forms of  oppression to  addition problems.”104 If  we believe  that  there is  some single
experience  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  woman,  some  general  account  of  sexism  that  can  be  given
independent of considerations of race, we are led to the view that the experiences of, say, Black
women must be just  those experiences of sexism, plus some further experiences of racism. This
additive model inevitably defines the experiences of those subject to multiple forms of oppression
in terms of the experiences of more dominant groups, for example defining the racism experienced
by Black women in terms of the racism experienced by Black men, or the sexism they experience in
terms of the sexism experienced by white women. This approach proves completely unable to
adequately deal with the ways that sexism and other forms of oppression actually manifest in the
lives of those at the intersection of various marginalised social positions. For example, in the case
of discrimination law, Black women have been harmed by a need to prove cases of discrimination
in terms of either sexual discrimination that effects all women, or racial discrimination that effects
all Black people.105 To give a more theoretical example, feminist and antiracist treatments of rape
have often failed to speak to the distinct experiences of Black women who have been subject to
rape under very different circumstances to white women, while also sharing with Black men a
continuing history wherein laws and customs around rape have formed part of a campaign of
terror against Black communities.106
Relating  to  this  problem,  essentialism  also  perpetuates  focus  and  attention  on  the
experiences of the most privileged women, by treating only their case as a case of unmodified
sexism. Because sexism as experienced by Black women, disabled women, trans women, working
class  women,  etc.,  is  bound  up  with  their  other  experiences  of  oppression,  a  feminist  only
interested in finding the truth of women's situation per se can be led to think that only a focus on
the experiences of women unaffected by these other factors will reveal the unmodified, pure reality
103  hooks (1984), p. 44.
104  Harris (1990), p. 588. Additionally, Spelman goes into some detail about this problem in Spelman (1988), chapter 
5.
105  See Crenshaw (1989), “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” in University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989.
106  See Harris (1990), p. 598-601, and Crenshaw (1989), p. 157-160.
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of  women's  oppression.  MacKinnon  seems  to  explicitly  defend  this  focus  in  her  somewhat
belligerent defence of her own methodology against essentialism, as she writes “How the white
woman is imagined and constructed and treated becomes a particularly sensitive indicator of the
degree to which women, as such, are despised.“107 Relatedly, the myth of essentialism works to
silence more subordinated groups of women by creating the impression that, because sexism is
essentially always the same, any woman can speak for any other on feminist issues. In practice, of
course, this will only privilege the voices most likely to be heard anyway. As Spelman puts it, “no
one has  ever  tried to  say  that  the  situation  of  Hispanas  in  the  southwestern  United States  is
applicable to all women as women; no one has conflated their case with the case of women in
general.”108
Essentialism excludes less privileged women not only from feminist theory, but also from
feminist  practice  and organisation,  by first  defining what  is  in some way essential  to being a
woman without input from the less privileged, and then justifying the continued exclusion of
those  same  people  on  the  grounds  that  they  don't  display  the  features  we  have  taken  to  be
essential  to  women.  Reagon  offers  a  detailed  account  of  how  this  process  has  worked  to
marginalise Black women.109 This same problem has recently become prominent with a different
target as some feminist groups have employed essentialism in order to explicitly exclude trans
women from political organisations and support mechanisms, often by reference to an essentialist
notion of “female socialisation”; though, more broadly, feminist exclusions of trans women has a
history dating to the 1970s.
Schwartzman  underestimates  the  problem  with  essentialism  when  she  dismisses  the
objections to MacKinnon's work as “objections to specific generalizations that [MacKinnon] makes,
not to her desire to come up with some kind of an analysis of the situation of “women.””110 Though
some of the content of MacKinnon's theory may be targeted by specific writers, it is clear that the
focus is on methodology rather than content when Harris claims that the first step to avoiding
silencing the marginalised “is to give up the dream of gender essentialism,”111 and when Reagon
has offered a detailed, procedural account of how essentialism will tend to lead to exclusion. 112
107  MacKinnon (1991). See also Mahoney (1993), “Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to 
Catharine MacKinnon,” in Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 217, particularly p. 245-7.
108  Spelman (1988), p. 4. 
109  Reagon (1983).
110  Schwartzman (2006), p. 108.
111  Harris (1990), p. 585
112  Reagon (1983)
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Consider also Marlee Kline's direct statement that “MacKinnon's work is limited in a number of
important ways by her theoretical focus on subsuming all of the many forms of oppression to
which women are subjected within a central explanation,”113 or Spelman's suggestion that “Those
of us who have engaged in it must give up the hunt for the generic woman – the one who is all and
only woman, who by some miracle of abstraction has no particular identity in terms of race, class,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, language, religion, nationality.”114 The methodology itself, and not just
MacKinnon's conclusions, are at fault. Schwartzman's failure to spot this is somewhat ironic given
that  her  defence  of  MacKinnon  appears  in  the  context  of  a  chapter  arguing  that  it  is  the
methodology of liberalism, rather than its ability to accommodate the critiques of feminist theory,
which  is  most  flawed.  Schwartzman  fails  to  see  how  anti-essentialist  arguments  against
MacKinnon's  feminist  practice  are  parallel  to  her  own  arguments  against  Nussbaum's  liberal
theorising; in both cases it is the methodology, not just the specific content, that is problematic.
It  is  worth mentioning here Mari  Mikkola's  defence of  gender essentialism,  or  “gender
realism,” as she engages with Spelman's arguments against essentialism in some detail. Mikkola
aims to defend the position, against Spelman, that there is, or may be, some feature that women
have in common that makes them women.115 Her defence focuses on the metaphysical question of
whether  there  may  be some  common  feature  despite  Spelman's  arguments.  Her  explicitly
methodological discussion is limited, as she shares with Schwartzman the view that it is primarily
the racially-unaware contents of past attempts at essentialism, rather than these attempts per se,
that have had bad political consequences.116
However, while Mikkola compellingly attempts to make room for the truth of some kind of
metaphysical  gender realism,  her  view of  this  kind of  realism is  ultimately supportive  of  my
rejection of Schwartzman and MacKinnon's methodology, as she acknowledges that exactly  what
women have in common may be so complex as to be unanalysable,117 and she suggests that the
kinds of epistemic problems  in discerning women's commonality, pointed out by Spelman, may
give us reason to avoid making “generalizations of the kind Spelman discusses.”118 Thus, Mikkola
makes room for a realism regarding gender, while leaving the critique of a methodological gender
essentialism mostly untouched.
113  Kline (1989), “Race, Racism and Feminist Legal Theory,” in Harvard Women's Law Journal 12, p. 137-8.
114  Spelman (1988), p. 187.
115  In Mikkola (2006), “Elizabeth Spelman, Gender Realism, and Women,” in Hypatia 21:4.
116  Mikkola (2006), p. 83-4.
117  Mikkola (2006), p. 90-3.
118  Mikkola (2006), p. 93.
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Of course, the failure of essentialist methods still leaves us with the question of how to
proceed in feminist methodology, or of what our attitude towards abstraction in moral philosophy
should be. At this point it may be worth returning the discussion to the terms we started with,
abstraction  and idealisation.  As  O'Neill  would  tell  us,  we  can  see  the  issue  with  the  kind  of
problematic  essentialist  feminist  methodologies  critiqued  by  those  like  Spelman  as  one  of
idealisation. These theories idealise by falsely ascribing to all women certain properties: specific
forms of oppression they do not all suffer, experiences they do not all have, ways of being they do
not all share, and so on. Furthermore this idealisation is theoretically and politically problematic,
insofar as the differences that are being denied are important, insofar as it has led to a theoretically
inadequate understanding of the dynamics of privilege and oppression, and insofar as engaging in
this idealisation has contributed to exclusionary tendencies in feminist spaces, and to a focus on
certain problems and topics within feminism that are primarily relevant to a relatively privileged
minority.
However,  though  I  agree  with  O'Neill's  suggestion  that  essentialist  idealisation  is
problematic, I would not be inclined to support her solution, a call for more pure abstraction, for
the reasons discussed previously. I tend to agree with Schwartzman's contention that idealisation
may be  unavoidable,  or  at  least  need not always  be  problematic.  I  certainly agree  with Mills'
insistence that moral theory needs to deal directly with non-ideal categories, ones that let us talk
about actual situations of injustice and oppression, even though it seems these categories are liable
to be highly susceptible to all kinds of idealisations.
Ultimately I am sympathetic to Harris' suggestion that we engage in less abstraction, and
that  “we make our categories  explicitly  tentative,  relational,  and unstable”.119 Rather  than  just
changing the kinds of abstractions we use, whether by making them more political or less idealised,
I feel we need to change our attitude towards abstraction, relying on it less, being less confident in
the abstractions we make, more eager to seek out and accommodate difference and detail. I see this
attitude as strongly opposed to the methodology of O'Neill and Schwartzman, both of whom aim
to orient their moral theorising around the use of a single central abstraction, “autonomy” for the
former and “women's perspective” for the latter. Such approaches obviously display great reliance
on abstraction, and a single grand abstraction at that, but also must display great confidence in the
accuracy and stability of that abstraction, as it runs throughout, and determines the content of, so
119  Harris (1990), p. 586.
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much of their theory.
I believe that this idea of using abstract concepts tentatively and provisionally appears as a
minor theme in much recent work on intersectionality, though I am wary of merely employing that
term as a feminist buzzword, reading into it whatever I want to find.120 Intersectionality, which has
been frequently discussed and occasionally maligned in recent feminist work, is a concept with a
long history in Black feminist thought, which was named and developed by Kimberle Crenshaw in
the late 1980s, as a response to additive, or “single-axis,” treatments of race and gender in law,
theory,  and politics.121 The  concept  refers  to  the  realities  experienced by  those  situated at  the
intersection of more than one form of oppression, for example the intersection of race oppression
and  gender  oppression,  or  the  intersection  of  oppression  on  the  basis  of  class  and  of  sexual
orientation. The idea of intersectionality stresses that such experiences cannot be understood as a
simple addition of two distinct forms of oppression. Rather, the idea of intersectionality stresses
that sexism, as experienced by someone also subject to racism, may be entirely different to the
sexism experienced by someone who does not occupy this particular intersectional social position,
and vice versa; that different forms of oppression are bound up, and compound one another, in
ways that complicate any effort to separate them. It insists that we must at least potentially treat
intersectional experiences of oppression as distinct from, and not reducible to or derivable from,
the experiences of those who occupy different social positions.
Beyond this basic insight, exactly what intersectionality is is the subject of much debate. As
Davis puts it, “Some suggest intersectionality is a theory, others regard it as a concept or heuristic
device, and still others see it as a reading strategy for doing feminist analysis.”122  Leslie McCall
identifies three different methodologies that have been called intersectionality, distinguished by
their differing attitudes towards complexity and social categories such as “woman” and “Black”;
roughly  whether  they  seek  to  eliminate,  to  interrogate,  or  to  employ such  categories.123 Anna
Carastathis  has  distinguished  between  two  ways  of  thinking  about  intersectionality,  one  that
attempts to combine and merge fairly stable identity groups, and another that reconceptualises
identity groups as potential coalitions, allowing us to emphasise the internal heterogenity of social
groups  without  thereby  dissolving  all  groups  into  collections  of  individuals  with  entirely
120  Kathy Davis discusses the use of “intersectionality” as a buzzword, though ultimately doesn't object to the practice,
in Davis (2008), “Intersectionality as Buzzword” Feminist Theory 9:1.
121  Crenshaw (1989).
122  Davis (2008), p. 68.
123  McCall (2005), “The Complexity of Intersectionality” Signs 30:3.
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idiosyncratic  experiences.124 Distinctions  have  also  been  made  between  'systemic'  and
'constructionist' intersectionality125, and weak and strong intersectionality126.
However,  this  diversity  of  meaning  is  often  not  seen  as  a  bad  thing.  As  Goswami,
O'Donovon & Yount write,  “Generally speaking,  intersectionality  has been characterized as  an
awareness, an approach, an analysis, a tool, a strategy, a method and a theory. For some, the degree
of variation and ambiguity in the term is reason enough for critique: a lack of definitional precision
is equated with a lack of conceptual precision. Others suggest it is more important to understand
what intersectionality does and what it enacts, as a form of praxis, than what its definition ought to
be. Futhermore, there is a deliberate and necessary open-endedness to intersectionality that makes
it  challenging  to  classify."127 Davis  has  discussed  how  the  vagueness  in  the  concept  of
intersectionality has helped it catch on as a feminist buzzword, but argues that it may nonetheless
be  a  good  theory,  insofar  as  it  orients  us  towards  the  important  question  of  exclusion  and
difference,  and “It  encourages  complexity,  stimulates  creativity,  and avoids  premature  closure,
tantalizing feminist scholars to raise new questions and explore uncharted territory.”128 Similarly,
Carastathis suggests “Rather than assume that the celebratory consensus around 'intersectionality'
is based on a stable, positive definition, we should view intersectionality as a provisional concept
that anticipates, rather than arrives at, the normative or theoretical goals often imputed to it.”129
Echoing  this  idea  of  provisionality  in  the  concept  of  intersectionality,  I  believe  that
intersectional methodologies often encourage us to take a more provisional, modest and pluralistic
attitude  towards  our  other  concepts  and  categories  as  well.  Carastathis  asks  “What  if
[intersectionality]  is  meant  to  disorient  'us',  disrupting  our  cardinal  certainty,  as  opposed  to
reifying  the  axes  that  would  secure  it?”130 Of  course  disrupting  our  certainty  in  dominant
categories  is  not  a  new theme in  feminism.  Both  O'Neill  and Schwartzman would agree  that
establishment categories of thinking are not suitable to the task of good moral theory, and they
seek to replace these categories with new abstract categories (autonomy, or women's perspective)
to guide our thinking.  However a  thoroughly intersectional  approach seems to  demand some
124  Carastathis (2013) “Identity Categories as Potential Coalitions” Signs 38:4, pp. 941-965.
125  See Prins (2006), “Narrative Accounts of Origins” European Journal of Women's Studies 13:3.
126  See Waters (2014), “Past as Prologue: Intersectional Analysis from the Nineteenth Century to the Twenty-First” in 
Goswami, O'Donovan & Yount (2014)
127  Goswami, O'Donovon & Yount (2014), Introduction, p. 1-2.
128  Davis (2008), p. 79. This issue of premature closure will also come up in chapter 5 of this these, when I talk about 
Haraway's idea of situated knowledge. 
129  Catastathis (2014), “Reinvigorating Intersectionality as a Provisional Concept,” in Goswami, O'Donovan & Yount 
(2014), p. 59-70.
130  Carastathis (2014), p. 62.
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critical attention to categories themselves, rather than just the provision of new categories. Cho,
Crenshaw & McCall  characterise  as  central  to  intersectional  analysis  a  way of  “conceiving  of
categories not as distinct but as always permeated by other categories, fluid and changing, always
in the process of creating and being created by dynamics of power.”131 Carastathis suggests that
approaches  like  O'Neill's  and  Schwartzman's,  even  if  they  were  to  display  some  weak
intersectionality in the form of attention to those suffering multiple axes of oppression, 132 would
“overlook entirely [intersectionality's] critical (dis)orientation towards categories, and continue[...]
to deploy them as if they were unproblematic.”133 On the contrary, she urges “we might question
the epistemic ideal of arrival at an empirically based conclusive account of 'social totality',”134 and
she emphasises the provisional nature of any knowledge about complex systems.
A  related  view  of  intersectionality  appears  in  Kristie  Dotson's  discussion  of
intersectionality's “demand for open-ended consolidation,” which here “refers to the act of relating
seemingly  unrelated  bits  of  information  to  construct  richer,  fuller  narratives  of  our  social
worlds.”135 In the name of intersectionality, Dotson advocates a practice of seeking new and varied
information, and resisting uncritical judgements of what kind of detail may be relevant, “for the
purpose  of  rendering  visible  experiences  that  have  been  theoretically  erased  by  prevailing
practices of knowledge production concerning oppression.”136 Such an approach would resist an
overly  confident  reliance  on  single  grand  categories  or  concepts.  Though  Dotson  notes  the
importance of systems-based theories, which work in terms of neat, stable concepts of oppression,
she argues that these theories alone “fail[...]  miserably to track the range of jeopardization one
faces given different readable social identities.”137 They are inadequate to deal with the reality of
oppression in all its detail, and this inadequacy has serious theoretical and political consequences.
In the picture I am trying to present, intersectionality as a method resists a steadfast or
uncritical  reliance  on  any  generalisations  of  the  kind  Schwartzman  and  MacKinnon  employ.
Though such abstractions may be employed, an intersectional method demands we never be too
131  Cho, Crenshaw & McCall (2013) “Towards a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis”, 
Signs 38:4, p. 795. They may be thinking here primarily of social categories such as “woman” and “Black,” but it 
seems clear how this attitude should stretch further to other categories and concepts, especially when, as in the work
of feminists such as Schwartzman, our moral insights are supposed to be reached through the employment of those 
social categories.
132  As, indeed, O'Neill does in her focus on women in poor economies, in O'Neill (1993).
133  Carastathis (2014), p. 65.
134  Carastathis (2014), p. 65.
135  Dotson (2014), “Making Sense: The Multistability of Oppression and the Importance of Intersectionality” in 
Goswami, O'Donovan & Yount (2014), p. 43.
136  Dotson (2014), p. 44.
137  Doston (2014), p. 50.
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confident of them, and always be prepared to see how such abstractions may fall apart when more
detailed, intersectional concerns are considered. It is not about denying all use of general terms like
“women,”  or  “white  women,”  or  “disabled  working-class  women,”138 but  rather  about  taking
seriously the idea that anything we say about such generalities is answerable to further, perhaps
unexpected details, and refusing to treat these details as exceptional, marginal, or antithetical to
the overall political project.139 In this way, though it makes room for abstraction, it does demand
less, rather than just a different kind of, abstraction. It demands less confidence in our abstractions,
less reliance on our most abstract categories, more willingness and drive to seek and seriously
accommodate difference and detail.
ABSTRACTION AND THE MORALITY OF MISGENDERING
To conclude this chapter, I would like to look at abstraction through the examination of a particular
moral issue. I've decided to look at the issue of misgendering. For my purposes here, to misgender
someone is to refer to them with language that inaccurately describes their gender; for example to
refer to a woman with pronouns such as “he,” to describe a man as “female” or as “my daughter,”
or to talk about someone of non-binary gender with inappropriately gendered terms.140 Any of us
could acknowledge that misgendering can be a harmful act. For example, we know that a young
boy may attempt to insult another by calling him a girl, and feminist philosophers have discussed
the  way  that  women's  behaviour  can  be  policed  through  withdrawal  of  recognition  of  their
gender;141 in both of these cases,  a  cultural  construction of,  and disdain for,  the feminine is  at
work.142 However, most people are unlikely to focus on misgendering as a particularly pressing or
interesting moral issue, as their encounters with it are likely to be few, and relatively non-serious.
Furthermore, if we start our moral reasoning from a highly abstract position, putting aside such
138  Crenshaw specifically rejects versions of antiessentialism which aim to reject any use of social categories such as 
“Blacks” or “women.” See Crenshaw (1991), “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence against Women of Color” Stanford Law Review 43:6, p. 1296.
139  See Crenshaw (1991), p. 1253-1265, for a discussion of how both feminist and antiracist activists came to see any 
publicity of details relating to rates of domestic violence in black communities to be antithetical to antiracist and 
feminist political goals.
140  One could certainly have a more expansive account of misgendering that included behaviours as well as language, 
but though some of what I say here would be relevant to such misgendering, it would raise additional complications
I will leave aside; for a useful discussion of this in relation to sexual harrassment, see Millbank (2011), “The 
Gender Ternary: Understanding Transmisogyny,” published on A Radical TransFeminist, December 12th , 2011, 
http://radtransfem.wordpress.com/2011/12/12/genderternary-transmisogyny/. Similarly I will not worry about the 
use of pronouns such as “it,” which raises issues of dehumanisation in addition to misgendering.
141  For example, Claudia Card mentions that patriarchy defines a lesbian as a “not-woman”, in Card (1998), 
“Radicalesbianfeminist Theory,” Hypatia 13:1, pp.206-213, p. 209
142  See Serano (2007), Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity (Seal 
Press: Berkeley), in particular chapter 19.
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contingent  details  as  gender  -  attending  only  to  our  essential  nature  as,  for  example,  finite,
interdependent,  interconnected  agents  –  it  looks  like  the  distinct  moral  issues  regarding
misgendering will be unable to come into focus as all. Misgendering is certainly not an issue, like
death, deprivation and domination, that is liable to effect almost any of us because of the very
kinds of creatures that we are. In fact, it is likely to be a serious concern only for a relatively small
number of us.
Of course, among the people for whom misgendering can be a severely important moral
issue are trans people, such as myself.143 Some trans people are misgendered on a daily basis, in
perhaps all their interactions with other people, or all but those with their closest friends. Many
trans  people  have,  in  the  past,  gone  through  a  period  where  this  was  the  case,  and  such
experiences may have left deep scars on us. Some continue to be regularly misgendered by people
they love,  family and friends.  For  this  particular class  of  people,  at  certain times in their life,
misgendering can come to be the most pressing, and most oppressive moral challenge they face in
day-to-day life.
Unsurprisingly, for such a particular moral issue that so distinctly affects such a particular
group of people, even if a purely abstract approach to moral reasoning were able to get the issue
into focus,  it  would be almost useless for providing us with a deep moral  understanding and
evaluation of what it  means for a  trans  person to be misgendered. That is  not to say a purely
abstract moral account of misgendering would be impossible; one could perhaps see misgendering
as an instance of a more general moral harm such as a failure of recognition. But in abstracting
away from the details and experiences of trans lives, we would lose sight of any of the material
necessary for a deep and interesting understanding of the moral issues as they apply to trans
people. In trying to craft a purely abstract account of the moral harm, one that in principle could
apply as well to the misgendering of cis people as to the misgendering of trans people, we are
doomed to create an analysis that is  of little interest to either;  an analysis that cis people will
disregard as of marginal interest, and that trans people will see as totally failing to make sense of
our experiences, and the harm that we can immediately feel. In practice, such an analysis would be
not just uninteresting, but also harmful, insofar as it would diminish the apparent severity of the
moral  issue  by  casting  it  only  in  terms  amenable  to  cis  audiences.144  This  harm  is  not  just
143  I do not want to suggest that trans people are the only people significantly affected by misgendering, but they will 
be my focus in the following.
144  If we must analogise, consider a moral account of sexual harassment which refused to go beyond any analysis of 
that which may also affect men.
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theoretical,  but  actually  manifests  in  the  all  too  common  response,  from  cis  folk  who  are
challenged about acts of misgendering, that “they, personally, would not take such offence if they
had been misgendered.”145
So, in developing a complete understanding of the moral issues surrounding misgendering
we need to attend, from the start, to the experiences of the trans people who are confronted by it.
For this reason, and because trans folk have often been denied the space in mainstream academic
spaces to articulate their own experiences – an issue of epistemic injustice – I will be occasionally
be referring to passages from personal and critical blog posts written by trans people. We can start
with the  immediate affective  impact  of  misgendering;  misgendering can cause a huge deal  of
psychological pain, both immediate and long-term. It often brings up anxiety, anger, misery, self-
consciousness, self-hatred, and dysphoria. It makes us feel fundamentally unseen, destroying our
social  well-being.  It  can  trigger  us,  drawing  our  attention  to  unpleasant  realities  and  painful
histories that we might otherwise be able to keep out of mind. As many trans people have made a
firm and difficult decision to change the way they are perceived, to distance themselves from an
old projected false-self, and to face great personal cost in the struggle to develop and manifest a
genuine personal identity, being misgendered can sometimes shake our confidence in that project,
bringing  us  to  feelings  of  despair  and  hopelessness.  Similarly,  “we’re  not  ignorant  of  the
consequences of being trans...  Our culture fears and hates us, openly and actively.”146 Even for
those of us who can avoid feelings of shame and internalised transphobia, to jarringly have the fact
that we are trans brought to active attention like this can remind us of how the world sees us, with
the pain and fear that may accompany that. 
In addition to (and bound up with) the immediate affective impact, there is the impact of
repeated misgendering. Many trans people live a life in which misgendering is, or at some time
has been, a frequent occurrence. Even if it is a one-off offence from some particular person, it is
likely to have happened many times before, and may happen again many times in the future, for
every  trans  person  who  is  misgendered.  The  pain  caused  by  misgendering  goes  beyond  the
individual event; frequent misgendering creates fear and anxiety over the possibility that it may
occur at  any time,  often without  warning.  This  can lead to  life-disabling avoidance  strategies;
avoiding  our  friends  from  anxiety  about  dealing  with  them,  avoiding  work  because  of  some
145  Char C (2011), “Why Misgendering is Bad,” published on Tranarchism, April 26, 2011, 
http://tranarchism.com/2011/04/26/guest-post-why-misgendering-is-bad. Note also that this kind of response can be
a form of gaslighting.
146  Char C (2011)
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particularly offensive co-worker, or even avoiding being in public from fear of painful or even
violent  interactions  with  strangers.147 Misgendering  destroys  relationships,  both  personal  and
professional, causing massive systematic harm to trans individuals. It can also lead trans women to
attempt to avoid these harmful effects by adopting more stereotypically feminine behaviour; in
this  way,  “the  punishment  of  misgendering”  may  be  employed  as  a  violent  tool  by  which
cispatriarchy enforces trans womens' conformity with oppressive gender norms.148 In addition, it
forces us to face the difficult  question of  how to deal with misgendering, given its frequency.
Should I speak up, thus running the risk of seeming difficult, overly sensitive, or aggressive, and
“making [myself] feel like an outsider every single time it happens”?149 Or should I let it pass,
giving witnesses the impression that misgendering me and others is okay, opening myself up for
future offences, and making myself feel cowardly and self-denying? Obviously, this is a double-
bind; neither option is appealing.
Abstracting  away  from  immediate  affective  impacts,  but  maintaining  a  focus  on  trans
people's experiences, we should also consider what it means to a trans person to be misgendered.
Though to misgender a trans person certainly is an infringement of their autonomy, their freedom
to create their own life and identity, it is also crucially important to note that misgendering is also
inaccurate, it falsely ascribes an incorrect social category. To hold an understanding of misgendering
entirely rooted in the  idea of  autonomy risks  missing this  fact,  risks portraying trans people's
genders as put on, respected as a decision or act of self-creation, rather than respected as the truth
of our social reality, as who we genuinely are.150 Similarly, acts of misgendering work to reinforce,
in the minds of the speakers, witnesses, and trans people themselves, a cisnormative standard, one
which casts the gender of trans people as less genuine than the gender of cis people. This is a norm
that destroys the lives of trans people, often fatally. “Our genders and identities are constantly up
for debate and misgendering a trans* person is a reminder of that. Misgendering us is a reminder
147  See Ellis, McNeil & Bailey (2014), “Gender, Stage of Transition and Situational Avoidance: A UK study of trans 
people's experiences,” Sexual and Relationship Therapy 29:3.
148  See see Millbank (2012), "Sex Educations: Gendering and Regendering Women," published on A Radical 
TransFeminist, February 3rd, 2012, http://radtransfem.wordpress.com/2012/02/03/sex-educations-gendering-and-
regendering-women/.
149  Kopas (2014), “Here is what it's like to be a trans woman,” published on A Dire Faun, June 15, 2014, 
http://pinebark.tumblr.com/post/88906170162/here-is-what-its-like-to-be-a-trans-woman-you
150  Note this view may be in conflict with Talia Bettcher's plausible suggestion that “When someone engages in the 
political act of category-claiming, the question whether she made a true statement isn't germane.” However, she 
would agree that a trans person's assertion of their gender concerns “who one is, really,” and that such claims can be
true or false, depending on the individual's self-understanding. Bettcher (2009), “Trans Identities and First-Person 
Authority,” in You've Changed: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity, ed. Laurie Shrage (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford), p. 110-2. Note also, in this paper Bettcher does link misgendering to violations of autonomy.
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that our identities are considered fragile, something to be bent and broken to the will of the cis
people who wish to abuse us.”151 It is also a norm that has often been disastrously internalised by
trans people, in ways analogous to internalised sexism and racism, and that some trans people
struggle with long after transition.  Further,  it  is  important to note that  this  cisnormativity can
function even in contexts in which the very idea of gender is in question: those who assert the
artificiality or socially constructed nature of gender may nonetheless reinforce cisnormativity by
misgendering  trans  folks  while  correctly  gendering  cis  people.  This  demonstrates  an  attitude
wherein even if all genders are, to some extent, not genuine, nonetheless trans people's genders are
somehow seen as even less genuine than those of cis people.
Again we can abstract away from the impact of misgendering on individuals, and come to
see how misgendering someone is not just harmful to a single victim, but can also be an attack on
an entire community. In reinforcing a cisnormative standard, one does not just deny the identity of
a  single  person,  but  rather  challenges  the  identity  of  all  trans  people.  In  particular,  acts  of
misgendering performed out of frustration or anger communicate to all trans people experiencing
or witnessing them 'my respect for your identity is contingent on you behaving the way I wish.'
Our genders can be held hostage in ways that the genders of cis people never will be, and we are
all too aware of the damage this conditionality does to our identity even when we feel personally
safe from particular  acts  of  misgendering.  And the  community impact  of  misgendering is  not
limited to denial of our identity: “It is not uncommon in media to degender and misgender openly
trans* people,  especially when attempting to portray them in a negative light.  This intentional
misgendering serves to show trans* people in the light of liars and deceivers; as mentally ill people
who are not to be trusted. It is meant to attack the person on a fundamental level that is still very
acceptable in today’s society.”152
Now I hope to have provided an analysis of the harm of misgendering on a number of
levels  of  abstraction,  considering  both  individuals  and  communities,  and  both  personal
experiences and abstract theories of cisnormativity. What I would not now want to do is proceed to
a higher level of abstraction by abstracting away from victims' trans status, and considering the
impact of misgendering on people in general. I would argue that such a move could add nothing
to our analysis. Whatever harm we may understand misgendering to entail when separated from
151  Clark (2014), “Misgendering is Violence,” published on Gender Terror, January 30, 2014, 
http://genderterror.com/2014/01/30/misgendering-is-violence/
152  Clark (2014).
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the  particular  experiences  and   interests  discussed  above,  that  harm  would  seem  to  be  very
different,  or  at  least  much  less  severe,  than  the  harm  that  trans  people  in  particular  face.
Importantly,  it  is  implausible  that  any analysis  on such a  level  of  abstraction could somehow
include or generate an analysis of the harm discussed in terms of trans people in particular.
Still, though I have offered some analysis of the harm of misgendering, we must recall our
earlier discussion of intersectionality. It would be overly confident for me to claim this as anything
like the analysis of misgendering. I write as a relatively privileged trans woman, in particular one
who is white and middle class. Much of what I wrote may not apply, or may need to be modified,
for  those  occupying  other  social  positions.  For  example,  I  wrote  that  for  trans  people
“misgendering can come to be the most pressing, and most oppressive moral challenge they face in
day-to-day life.” Though I suspect there are few trans people for whom misgendering is never an
issue,  nonetheless  what  I  have  written  here  comes  from  the  standpoint  of  someone  whose
particular privileges tend to shield her from harms such as incarceration, homelessness, poverty
and physical violence, all of which are serious issues in trans and queer communities, affecting
particularly trans women of colour, and too often ignored or even co-opted by the more privileged
members of these communities. Similarly, much of my analysis comes from the perspectives of
binary trans folks. It's important to note that experiences of misgendering can be very different for
those outside the gender binary, who may only very rarely be correctly gendered, and may more
frequently have their gender disregarded even by other queer and trans people.153
So, to sum up my conclusions on abstraction and idealisation from this chapter, I would
ultimately argue that moral philosophy needs less abstraction, rather than just a different kind of
abstraction. I agree with Mills that it is vitally important that we do not abstract away from the
social realities of oppression, and further argue that attending to the specific details of moral life,
in all their intersectional complexity, is important. I have argued that our abstractions should be
built from, and answerable to these complexities, and suggested that this may require a different
way of treating abstract concepts, as provisional and unstable. On the issue of idealisation, I have
agreed  with  Schwartzman  that,  while  idealisation  can  be  problematic,  it  is  also  probably
unavoidable when we abstract, and so we must pay careful attention to the political implications
and assumptions contained in our idealisations.
153  C.N. Lester makes this point in Lester (2013), “On misgendering and authenticity,” published on A Gentleman and 
a Scholar, September 26, 2013, http://cnlester.wordpress.com/2013/09/26/on-misgendering-and-authenticity/
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CHAPTER 5 - EPISTEMOLOGY, IGNORANCE AND THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS
In this chapter, I employ some insights from epistemologies developed by feminist and anti-racist
theorists in order to critique a fairly dominant methodological tendency in moral philosophy, the
tendency to attempt to understand or evaluate moral situations and actions primarily through
what might be called universalistic first-personal methods. By this I mean methods that essentially
rely only on the judgements or understandings that a single individual, the lone philosopher, can
bring to bear under their own steam, as it were, rather than employing any engagement with the
wider world, other perspectives, or even private understandings that the philosopher knows to be
not widely shared. 
A dominant example of such methods, and one which I will discuss in some depth, is the
use of thought experiments. Though the construction of such experiments may be informed by
external knowledge of moral situations, though they will often be presented to us by some other
philosopher, and though they may explicitly attempt to form an analogy between a hypothetical
situation and a real-life case, nonetheless I see thought experiments as essentially first-personal,
insofar as they are designed to function by stripping away any need for us to deal with resources
beyond the thought experimental set-up and our own judgement. They allow a philosopher to
examine only this closely described hypothetical case, a case which that philosopher could have, in
principle if not in practice, come up with purely on their own, and then, relying on no resources
beyond their  personal  judgement  and intuition,  deliver  a  verdict  which is  supposed to  reveal
something deep about the moral truth. It is a methodology perfectly crafted to be such that any
philosopher could, in principle, employ it on their own. It is also a methodology that must assume,
if it is to get at a singular moral truth when employed by any philosopher, that all thinkers are
essentially  the  same  in  their  judgements,  or  that  the  methodology  itself  can  strip  away  their
relevant differences.  The methodology is  first-personal,  insofar as  it  relies  only on the private
resources of the philosopher, but universalistic, insofar as it assumes that those private resources
are common to all thinkers.
We  can  see  how  such  methodological  tendencies  may  be  embedded  in  the  decision
procedures of some moral theories. For example, take a simplified reading of how to employ the
first formulation of Kant's categorical imperative: in performing an action, we formulate a maxim
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that can describe our action. This is presumably a matter of understanding the action on its own
terms, in some sense, and in terms of our motivations. We then check whether this maxim can be
universalised without contradiction, and whether we can will the universalisation of the maxim.
Again this seems to be a purely internal rational process, one that needs no input from others, or
the real world. The categorical imperative was crafted as a procedure that any agent can reliably
perform on their own. Kant is explicit that “what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone,”1 and that a
hypothetical universalisation test for morality can be performed without experience “with regard
to the course of the world.”2 Of course, this is not to say that all Kantian moral understanding must
display this  methodological  tendency;  for example,  once we have discovered that  we have an
imperfect  duty  to  benefit  others,  we  may  see  that  we  need  to  understand  others  and  their
situations in order to discharge this duty. Nonetheless, on this reading, a strong streak of first-
personal  authority  lies  at  the  heart  of  Kant's  system,  certainly  in  his  first  formulation  of  the
categorical imperative. The need for outside-world input seems to be purposefully put to the side.
It's worth noting here that when I speak of first-personal methods, this is not to be equated
with what Susan J. Brison calls speaking in a “personal voice.” As she notes, many philosophers
have written in the first-person singular, but did so “as part of an argumentative strategy to be
employed  by  any  reader  to  establish,  ultimately,  the  same  universal  truths.”3 Speaking  in  a
personal voice is the deeply opposed strategy of bringing to bear, in our philosophical practice,
personal experiences and situated knowledge, knowledge that we know not to be shared by all, or
perhaps any other philosophers, in order to deepen our understanding of the subject at hand.
Though such personal writing will often be grammatically first-personal, it engages with more
than just the private resources of a singular (presumed to be universal) mind, including as well the
philosopher's  experiences  with  the  outside,  physical  and  social  world,  and  often  also  the
experiences of other, similarly situated subjects. As Brison puts it, “Feminists and trauma theorists
writing of their own experiences do not claim, as did Descartes, that any rational person carrying
out the same line of abstract reasoning will reach the same impersonal conclusions. Rather, we are
suggesting that anyone in these particular circumstances, with this kind of socialization, with these
1 Kant (2015), Critique of Practical Reason: Revised Edition, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge), 5:36.
2 Kant (2012), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor & Jens Timmermann (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge), 4:403.
3 Brison (2002), Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of the Self, (Princeton University Press: Princeton), p. 24. The
rest of her chapter 2, "On the Personal as Political," is deeply relevant to this point.
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options and limitations may (may, not must) view the world in this way.”4
The  appropriateness  of  the  universalistic  first-personal  methodological  tendency  is
challenged  by  epistemologies  that  have  been  developed  in  recent  feminist  and  critical  race
philosophy.  In  particular,  I  want  to  look  at  standpoint  epistemology,  and  the  discussion
surrounding epistemologies of ignorance. These closely related areas of philosophical interest both
develop the idea that there is something about the standpoint or psychology of those occupying
certain positions in society – in particular, socially privileged positions – which will tend to make it
harder for them to get at important truths, including moral truths, about their own world. Though
these problems of  ignorance,  and my discussion,  will  certainly not  be  limited to the  kinds  of
universalistic  first-personal  methods  I  have  introduced  above,  these  epistemologies  seem  to
present a particularly strong challenge to any philosophical methods that do not attempt to take a
socially privileged thinker beyond their own experiences and judgements.
LIBERAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY
Before looking at standpoint epistemology, it will help to briefly establish some understanding of
the epistemological picture that feminist standpoint epistemologists have been reacting against.
Allison  Jaggar  identities  a  tradition  of  Cartesian  epistemology  which  has  been  “associated
historically  and  conceptually  with  liberalism.”5 It  is  perhaps  the  dominant  tradition  of
epistemology  in  philosophy,  particularly  in  the  analytic  tradition,  and  encompasses  both
rationalist and empiricist tendencies. It rests on a radically individualistic conception of human
nature, and “views the attainment of knowledge as a project for each individual on her or his
own” and “as essentially a solitary occupation that has no necessary social preconditions.”6 In this,
we can clearly see how an epistemological preference for what I've called first-personal methods
would dominate.
This liberal epistemology aims for objectivity, and sees this objectivity as provided by an
absence of bias. We can see how this follows from its radical individualism; if all thinkers are to
individually ideally arrive at the same set of conclusions, the (single) truth, it must be supposed
that this truth can be reached despite differences in the particular positions of individual thinkers.
Thus these differences, such as the distinct experiences, emotions, and interests that derive from
particular contingent social positions, are cast only as something to be overcome or put aside, in
4 Brison (2002), p. 29.
5 Jaggar (1983), Feminist Politics and Human Nature, (The Harvester Press: Sussex), p. 355.
6 Jaggar (1983), p. 355.
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the quest for a kind of impartiality that allows thinkers to see the truth unhindered. And so “the
good moral or political philosopher of the contemporary liberal tradition [...  is]  able to detach
herself or himself from such 'contingent' properties as race, class or sex.”7
This is what we might call a “view from nowhere” epistemology, one that requires thinkers
to  approximate  the  idealised  epistemological  position  of  the  hypothetical  thinker  who has  no
position, no attachments or particularities. We can see this vision of epistemology in Nagel's taking
it to be definitional that “to reason is to think systematically in ways that anyone looking over my
shoulder ought to be able to recognise as correct.”8 It manifests also in Sidgwick's requirement to
see goodness “from the point of view of the Universe,”9 and in Rawls' requirement that thinkers in
the original position are ignorant of the particularities of their social position. 10 It is a pervasive
view in moral,  philosophical and political thought,  shared even by many feminists,  those who
identify the problem with traditional, sexist theorising and morality as simply a problem of male
bias, a problem of male thinkers failing to live up to the standards of liberal epistemology; “liberal
feminists assume that the validity of their theory will be evident to all who set aside their own
special  interests.”11 It  is  also a powerfully influential  way of  thinking outside of  philosophical
contexts, manifest whenever it is suggested that someone cannot understand or have a valid view
of some injustice because they are 'too close to it.' For a particularly striking example, consider this
transaction between Malcolm X and a journalist, Jim Hurlbut, broadcast on U.S. television in 1963:
Jim Hurlbut: You were born in Omaha, is that right?
Malcolm X: Yes sir.
Hurlbut: And your family left Omaha when you were, what? One year old?
Malcolm X: I imagine about a year old.
Hurlbut: Now, why did they leave Omaha?
Malcolm X: Well, to my understanding… the Ku Klux Klan burned down one of 
their homes in Omaha.
Hurlbut: This made your family feel very unhappy I'm sure?
Malcolm X: Well insecure if not unhappy.
Hurlbut: So you must have a somewhat prejudiced point of view — a personally 
prejudiced point of view. In other words, you cannot look at this in a broad, 
academic sort of way, really, can you?
Malcolm X: I think that’s incorrect, because despite the fact that that happened in 
Omaha and then when moved to Lansing, Michigan our home was burned down 
again — in fact, my father was killed by the Ku Klux Klan, and despite all of that, 
no one was more thoroughly integrated with whites than I. No one has lived more 
7 Jaggar (1983), p. 357.
8 Nagel (1997), The Last Word (Oxford University Press: Oxford), p. 5.
9 Sidgwick (1930), p. 382
10 Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press: Cambridge), p. 260-263.
11 Jaggar (1983), p. 357-8.
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so in the society of whites than I.12
In this transaction, Hurlbut expresses the view that because of Malcolm X's personal involvement
with  racism,  his  involvement  as  one  who  has  suffered  egregious  racism,  and  his  resulting
emotional response (being “very unhappy”), he is therefore put in an epistemically worse position
with regard to understanding it. His experiences, his emotions and his particular point of view –
that of a Black man in a racist society – are cast as something that gets in the way of the kind of
detachment and abstraction – taking a “broad, academic” view – that is required by the kind of
liberal  epistemology  discussed  above.  As  we  see  in  this  case,  this  is  an  epistemology  that  is
perfectly formed to cast the most socially privileged as the only people that can truly understand
society,  and to discount  the  experiences and theories  of  those  who suffer  marginalisation and
systematic harm at the hands of that society; that is, so long as the epistemology is accompanied by
certain  assumptions  about  socially  privileged  individuals  being  above,  or  uninvolved  in  the
oppressions they benefit  from. We can see liberal  feminist  epistemologies  as  challenging these
assumptions - insisting that men are involve, and prone to a male bias - while leaving the basic
epistemological  structure  intact.  However,  more  radical  feminist  epistemologies  challenge that
basic structure, and reject the idea that a situated standpoint, a view from somewhere, must be an
epistemic burden.
One such feminist epistemology is standpoint epistemology, a view developed by Sandra
Harding  and  Nancy  Hartsock,  among  others.  Standpoint  epistemology  has  its  origins  in  the
Marxist position that prevailing worldviews tend to reflect the interests and values of dominant
classes, and that the proletariat are, because of their social marginality, along with their central
position in structures of capitalist production, best placed to understand capitalism, and so possess
a certain kind of epistemic privilege.13 Standpoint epistemologists have attempted to develop these
views,  separating  the  idea  of  centrality  from  the  justification  of  epistemic  privilege,  and
broadening the  view to  attribute  epistemic  privilege  to  other  socially  marginalised groups.  In
particular, seeing that patriarchal power structures in our society will tend to distort the processes
and results  of  research,  feminist  standpoint  epistemologists  have argued for  variations  on the
12 This interview can be found at Godvia (2012), "Malcolm X: Inquisition Chicago's City Desk,"  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yq-Q-omi3U8, accessed 20th May 2015.
13 See Bar On (1993) "Marginality and Epistemic Privilege," in Feminist Epistemologies, eds. Alcoff and Potter 
(Routledge: London), p. 86. Harding has more recently pointed out that, aside from this academic history, 
something like the claims of standpoint theory have arisen again and again in the context of new social justice 
movements, see Harding (2015), "After Mr. Nowhere: What Kind of Proper Self for a Scientist," Feminist 
Philosophical Quarterly 1:1, Article 2, p. 5.
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claim that “a primary condition for the adequacy of a feminist theory, indeed for the adequacy of
any theory, is that it should represent the world from the standpoint of women.”14 As Harding
points out, these theories have been presented by various authors “as a philosophy of both natural
and social sciences, an epistemology, a methodology... and a political strategy,”15 but my focus here
will be on standpoint theory as a methodology, and an epistemology.
What exactly is the standpoint of women? Women's standpoint is something we develop
by,  first,  looking  at  women's  lives  and  listening  to  women's  voices.  “The  distinctive  social
experience of women generates insights that are incompatible with men's interpretations of reality
and  these  insights  provide  clues  to  how  reality  might  be  interpreted  from  the  standpoint  of
women. The validity of these insights, however, must be tested in political struggle and developed
into a systematic representation of reality that is not distorted in ways that promote the interests of
men above those of women.”16
This  standpoint  is  not  meant  to  be  simply  a  cluster  of  experiences,  or  everything  that
women  might  say.  After  all,  Harding  points  out,  women  say  all  kinds  of  thing  that  may  be
incoherent,  misleading,  based  on  incomplete  understandings,  sexist,  racist  or  heterosexist.17
Women are, like men, prone to believing dominant world views, buying into prevailing ideology,
even to their own detriment. So, “it is not the experience or the speech [of women] that provides
the grounds for feminist claims; it is rather the subsequently articulated observations of and theory
about the rest of nature and social relations – observations and theory that start out from, that look
at the world from the perspective of, women's lives.”18 Standpoint epistemologists, then, make a
distinction  between  'women's/feminist  standpoint'  and  'women's  perspective.'  A standpoint  is
engaged, rather than a matter of simply looking at the world in a disinterested way.19 It is also an
achievement,  theoretically,  politically,  and,  as  I  will  discuss  in  the  next  chapter,  personally.  A
standpoint is “achieved rather than obvious, a mediated rather than immediate understanding.”20
Similarly, women's standpoint is created through political struggle: “we can come to understand
hidden aspects  of  social  relations  between the genders and the  institutions  that  support  these
14 Jaggar (1983), p. 370. Jaggar refers to those advocating feminist standpoint epistemologies as "socialist feminists," 
to be contrasted (though not always sharply) with liberal, Marxist, and radical feminists.
15 Harding (2004) "Introduction: Standpoint Theory as a Site of Political, Philosophic, and Scientific Debate," in The 
Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader, ed. Harding, (Routledge: London), p. 2.
16 Jaggar (1983), p. 371.
17 Harding (1991), Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (Open University Press: Milton Keynes), p. 123.
18 Harding (1991), p. 124.
19 Hartsock (1983), "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical 
Materialism," in Discovering Reality, eds. Harding and Hintikka (D. Reidel Publishing Company: London), p. 285.
20 Hartsock (1983), p. 288.
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relations only through struggles to change them [...] In a socially stratified society the objectivity of
the results of research is increased by political activism by and on behalf of oppressed, exploited,
and dominated groups.”21 Political struggle is a necessary part of standpoint methodologies insofar
as it  helps the marginalised achieve the means to produce knowledge (training, jobs,  funding,
publication),  insofar  as  it  creates  the  collective  group  consciousness  that  feminist  researchers
employ, and insofar as “political struggle itself produced insight.”22 Hartsock also claims that “a
standpoint  by  definition  carries  a  liberatory  potential,”23 and for  this  reason speaks  only  of  a
'feminist standpoint' rather than 'women's standpoint.'
Different  feminist  standpoint  theorists  have  offered  different  justifications  for  why
women's lives provide an epistemically privileged vantage point; though these are related and
often compatible justifications. Hartsock uses psychoanalysis to justify this position, claiming that
“girls, because of female parenting, are less differentiated from others than boys, more continuous
with and related to  the  external  object  world.”24 She  claims this  leads  women to  develop the
beginnings of a feminist standpoint, where boys learn to identify with an abstract masculinity, and
that both tendencies are reinforced by the sexual division of labour. Jaggar offers a justification for
the epistemic privilege of the oppressed in terms of interests and suffering:
Because their class position insulates them from the suffering of the oppressed, many members
of the ruling class are likely to be convinced by their own ideology; either they fail to perceive
the suffering of the oppressed or they believe that it is freely chosen, deserved or inevitable.
They experience the current organization of society as basically satisfactory and so they accept
the interpretation of reality that justifies that system of organization. They encounter little in
their daily lives that conflicts with that interpretation. Oppressed groups, by contrast, suffer
directly  from  the  system  that  oppresses  them.  Sometimes  the  ruling  ideology  succeeds  in
duping  them  into  a  partial  denial  of  their  pain  or  into  accepting  it  temporarily  but  the
pervasiveness, intensity and relentlessness of their suffering constantly push oppressed groups
towards  a  realization  that  something  is  wrong  with  the  prevailing  social  order.  Their  pain
provides  them  with  a  motivation  for  finding  out  what  is  wrong,  for  criticizing  accepted
interpretations of reality and for developing new and less distorted ways of understanding the
world.  These  new  systems  of  conceptualization  will  reflect  the  interests  and values  of  the
oppressed  groups  and  so  constitute  a  representation  of  reality  from  an  alternative  to  the
21 Harding (1991), p. 127.
22 Harding (2004) p. 6.
23 Hartsock (1983), p. 289.
24 Hartsock (1983), p. 295. I will later discuss idealisation in Hartsock's theory.
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dominant standpoint.25
Sandra Harding offers eight different grounds for the claim that women's standpoint provides less
partial and distorted knowledge.26 These grounds are based on the ways that women are alienated
from social power, thus providing a resistant, rarely-heard, outsider's voice.27 She also, like Jaggar,
notes the importance of interests, observing that women have “fewer interests in ignorance about
the social order and fewer reasons to invest in maintaining or justifying the status quo than do
dominant groups.”28 Additionally, like Hartsock, she notes the importance of the sexual division of
labour, suggesting that the kind of work women are expected to do, taking care of bodies and
physical spaces, keeps them connected to realities of the world that are made invisible to men, who
are 'freed' for abstract thought. She argues that the social role of men in ruling groups “shapes
these men's  concepts  of  the world into those appropriate for  administrative work”29 which,  as
Dorothy  Smith  puts  it,  “transform[s]  subjects  into  the  objects  of  study  [and  makes]  use  of
conceptual  devices  for  eliminating  the  active  presence  of  subjects.30”  Such  ways  of  thinking
“sustain an ethos of  dominance and mastery,  where a dislocated knower-as-spectator  seeks to
predict, manipulate, and control the behavior of the material world and of other "less enlightened"
people.”31
Because women engage with parts of the world that men tend to be disconnected from, but
are also forced to live in the world created and structured by men, their standpoint includes more
than can be seen from the position of men. “Whereas the condition of the oppressed groups is
visible only dimly to the ruling class, the oppressed are able to see more clearly the ruled as well as
the rulers and the relation between them. Thus, the standpoint of the oppressed includes and is
able to explain the standpoint of the ruling class.”32 Mills expresses a similar thought in relation to
race:  “Often  for  their  very  survival,  blacks  have  been  forced  to  become  lay  anthropologists,
studying the strange culture, customs, and mind-set of the “white tribe” that has such frightening
25 Jaggar (1983), p. 370.
26 Harding (1991), p. 121-133.
27 See also Collins (1986) "Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist 
Thought," Social Problems 33:6, pp. S14-S32.
28 Harding (1991), p. 126.
29 Harding (1991), p. 128-9.
30 Smith (1988), The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Open University Press: Milton Keynes), 
p.105. See also p. 108-9.
31 Code (2006), Ecological Thinking, (Oxford University Press: New York), p. 8.
32 Jaggar (1983), p. 371. Of course, by Hartsock's definition, the ruling class' viewpoint could not count as a 
standpoint.
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power over them, that in certain times periods can even determine their life or death on a whim.”33
It's worth looking at how this notion of epistemic privilege is supposed to operate. Exactly
what domains of knowledge are a feminist standpoint supposed to be epistemically privileged to
reveal? Most of the justifications offered above suggest that a feminist standpoint will be most
helpful when thinking about issues relating to our male dominated society, or about domains from
which men are alienated. This scope is suggested by Harding, as when she writes “Starting off
research from women's lives will generate less partial and distorted accounts not only of women's
lives but also of men's lives and of the whole social order.”34 However a broader scope is also
sometimes suggested, such as in the claim that “all knowledge attempts are socially situated and
that some of these objective social locations are better than others as starting points for knowledge
projects.”35 In  characterising  standpoint  epistemologies  against  the  weaker  view  of  “general
situatedness  as  knowers,”36 Linda  Alcoff  suggests  that  “what  follows  most  significantly  from
Harding's approach is that epistemic advantages and disadvantages accrue to social and group
identities per se rather than identities only in relation to a given context of inquiry [...]  the pattern
of  epistemic  positionality  created  by  some  identities  has  the  potential  for  relevance  in  broad
domains of inquiry, perhaps in any inquiry.”37
The  justification  for  this  broader  scope  can  be  seen  when  we  look  more  broadly  at
Harding's critique of conventional scientific practice. In particular, factors which make women's
lives a privileged starting point for research into the social order will clearly also be relevant for
research into broader scientific topics once we understand that the sciences, their goals, methods
and results – including those of the natural sciences -  can themselves be understood to be part of
that social order, rather than somehow separated from society. Harding argues, in some depth, that
“the  natural  sciences  should  be  considered  to  be  embedded  in  the  social  sciences  because
everything scientists do or think is part of the social world.”38 She notes that “culturewide (or
nearly culturewide) beliefs function as evidence at every stage in scientific inquiry: in the selection
33 Mills (2007), p. 17-8. See also Narayan (2004), "The Project of Feminist Epistemology: Perspectives from a 
Nonwestern Feminist," in The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader, ed. Harding, (Routledge: London), p. 213-224, 
which emphasises that other responses are available to those forced to live in two worlds, such as dichotomizing 
their lives, or attempting to utterly reject the practices of the non-dominant group. 
34 Harding (1993) "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is "Strong Objectivity"?" in Feminist Epistemologies, 
eds. Alcoff and Potter (Routledge: London), p. 56.
35 Harding (1993), p. 56.
36 Alcoff (2007), "Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types" in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, eds. Sullivan 
and Tuana (State University of New York Press: Albany), p. 40.
37 Alcoff (2007), p. 47.
38 Harding (1991), p. 99, and more generally chapter 4.
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of problems, the formation of hypotheses, the design of research (including the organization of
research communities),  the collection of  data,  the  interpretation and sorting of  data,  decisions
about when to stop research, the way results of research are reported, and so on.”39 So here we see
that the methodological implications of Harding's standpoint theory are meant to be quite broad,
touching on many areas of scientific and academic practice. For Harding, starting thought from
women's lives is not merely a matter of, once deciding on a research project, focusing on the lives
of women in our gathering of data and construction of theories. Rather, perhaps primarily, she
argues  “the  experience  and  lives  of  marginalized  peoples,  as  they  understand  them,  provide
particularly significant  problems to be explained or research agendas.”40 The relevance of feminist
standpoint to research begins well before we are searching for data and solutions, touching also on
questions of what projects to pursue, how, and why.41
The scope of our background, culturewide beliefs' influence on scientific inquiry is what
justifies, for Harding, the importance of “strong reflexivity,” the requirement to place the subject of
knowledge, the knower or researcher (which may be an entire community), on the same critical
and causal plane as the objects of knowledge, what is  explicitly being researched. That is,  her
version of standpoint epistemology demands that we become theoretically aware of our own social
and historical position, that the awareness and the study of this position gets included as part of
the subject matter of any research project, rather than rendered invisible or outside the scope of
inquiry. She argues that this,  rather than any process attempting to eliminate bias by  excluding
consideration  of  our  values  and  background  beliefs  from  the  research  project,  is  essential  to
maximising the objectivity of our research, for achieving “strong objectivity.”42
At  this  point,  having  hopefully  gotten  a  handle  on  the  basic  claims  of  standpoint
epistemology, we need to reintroduce some of the issues we discussed in the previous chapter, of
idealisation  and  essentialism.  In  some  ways,  the  methods  for  feminist  research  suggested  by
standpoint  epistemology  may  look  a  lot  like  the  method  advocated  by  MacKinnon  and
Schwartzman.43 Both tell us to take seriously the experiences of women in order to create some
kind of representation of reality free from the distortions created by male interest.  They differ
slightly  in  that  while  MacKinnon's  method  aims  at  the  articulation  of  some unitary  women's
39 Harding (1993), p. 69.
40 Harding (1993), p. 54.
41 Recall my discussions in chapter 3 of this thesis, regarding how "philosophers' choices to look at particular cases 
rather than others is, itself, a methodological issue."
42 See her discussion of strong objectivity in Harding (1993), p. 69- 72.
43 See chapter 4 of this thesis.
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experience,  situation,  or  perspective44,  the  standpoint  method  aims  at  the  creation  of  feminist
standpoint, a theoretical accomplishment beyond the mere articulation of an existing situation.45
Nonetheless,  standpoint  epistemologies  can look rather  problematically  idealised;  some
versions moreso than others. Hartsock's version of feminist standpoint epistemology is an example
of a particularly idealised – and perhaps essentialist – standpoint theory. She is certainly aware of
the danger of essentialising. After announcing her intention to abstract away from some details of
women's lives in order to craft a single theory of women's exploitation, she writes “I adopt this
strategy with some reluctance, since it contains the danger of making invisible the experience of
lesbians or women of color. At the same time, I recognize that the effort to uncover a feminist
standpoint  assumes that  there  are some things  common to  all  women's  lives  in Western class
societies.”46 Though she is aware of the possibility of essentialising, she doesn't explicitly address
the possibility very well in this essay, instead just noting it and pressing on.47  
Hartsock's version of feminist standpoint epistemology is problematically idealised right
from the start.  She begins her analysis with the claim that “Whether or not all  of us do both,
women as a sex are institutionally responsible for producing both goods and human beings and all
women  are  forced  to  become  the  kinds  of  people  who  can  do  both.”48 The  idealisation  in  a
statement like this is complex. The opening clause is clearly meant to guard against idealisation,
emphasising that not all women have the kinds of experiences she will go on to discuss. The part
about women's institutional role is perhaps just abstract enough to be accurate. However, the claim
that “all women are forced to become the kinds of people who can do both” moves us towards
massively  problematic  territory.  Much  is  being  idealised,  pushed  aside,  made  invisible  by  a
statement like this. Most obviously, we have to wonder what exactly it might be for a congenitally
44 Note however that MacKinnon is sensitive to the problem of false consciousness. See MacKinnon (1983) 
"Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Towards Feminist Jurisprudence," Signs 8:4, pp. 635-658 p. 637, fn. 
5.
45 Though it is sometimes unclear, MacKinnon's view may be closer to the standpoint view than I am suggesting here. 
Consider her claim in MacKinnon (1989), p. 87 that women's point of view is created by consciousness raising, 
rather than existing prior to the process. However it does seem clear that for MacKinnon this point of view is 
created merely through the open discussion of women's common experiences, rather than any additional theoretical 
activity. For more on this, see Jaggar's discussion of the difference between radical feminist epistemology and 
socialist feminist (standpoint) epistemology, in Jaggar (1983), chapter 11. MacKinnon seems to move between 
these two epistemological tendencies.
46 Hartsock (1983), p. 290.
47 We can already see a problem arising in just this quote. Hartsock seems to imply that a feminist standpoint must be 
developed out of only what is common to the lives of women in Western societies, ignoring the global scope of 
feminist struggle. Note I don't mean to suggest that the problem is her reluctance to attempt to craft a single 
feminist theory to cover all women globally; this caution is probably admirable. The problem is with her perhaps 
accidental assertion that the very possibility of a feminist standpoint rests entirely in the lives of Western women.
48 Hartsock (1983), p. 291.
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infertile woman to become the “kind of person” who can produce human beings. The cissexism of
such a statement will also be obvious to some readers.49 Later in her analysis the “kind of person”
element takes a backseat, as she focuses on the profound effects of actually experiencing pregnancy,
and the epistemological relevance of experiences like “Menstruation, coitus, pregnancy, childbirth,
lactation”50; events that are not shared even among all cisgender women, and certainly not always
experienced or  interpreted in the same ways.  As Le  Doeuff  reminds us,  “Even those physical
events assumed to be most  similar in all  women, biologically speaking,  can be experienced in
extremely  different  ways.”51 Of  course,  this  is  not  to  doubt  that  such  events  may  have  great
epistemological  relevance  in  the  lives  of  women  who  do experience  them.  However,  it  is
problematically  idealising  to  give  these  experiences  such  an  essentially  central  role  in  the
development of a common women's perspective, able to ground a unitary feminist standpoint.
More subtly, a huge amount of difference is being elided in Hartsock's apparently abstract
discussion of the sexual division of labour, which actually focuses on the experiences of particular
sets of women. For example, much of her analysis centres around the idea that women's lives are
institutionally defined by their work in “the home,”52 and the deeper connection with the material
world  this  affords  them.  In  this  analysis,  Hartsock  completely  glosses  over  deep  structural
differences in the nature of this work done by different groups of women. In particular, she ignores
the widespread presence of women of colour working in the homes of middle- and upper-class
white families, working for white women, freeing white women from the material work of cleaning
and childrearing, just as so many women have freed men from that work. Though she wants to
find what is common to all women's lives in Western societies, like the radical feminists discussed
in the previous chapter, she fails to see both “one, that in a capitalist, racist, imperialist state there
is no one social status women share as a collective group; and second, that the social status of
white women in American has never been like that of black women or men.” 53 As a result, she
writes as though whatever it is that specifically explains and theorises the nature of black women's
work in homes owned by white men and women, it is not the feminist standpoint.54
49 Though, again, this is complex: it could well be true to claim that society attempts to force trans women into these 
institutionalised gender roles as a part of a process of legitimising their gender, but it would involve problematic 
idealisation to suggest that this process always succeeds, or to claim that all trans women transition, and so are 
subjected to that process. 
50 Hartsock (1983), p. 294. Note she insists she is talkng about "motherhood as an institution rather than experience," 
but her discussion does not seem to be limited in this way.
51 Le Doeuff (1991), p. 227.
52 See Hartsock (1983), p. 291-293.
53 hooks (1982), Ain't I A Woman (Pluto: London), p. 136.
54 Hartsock later addressed the common accusation that this essay was essentialist in Hartsock (1998) "The Feminist 
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Though  there  are  other,  less  essentialising  motivations  for  standpoint  epistemologies,
mentioned above, nonetheless this tendency towards idealisation does not seem to be accidental,
extraneous to the standpoint project, but rather rooted in the need to draw something coherent and
unitary from deeply diverse groups. Bat-Ami Bar On suggests that whenever epistemic privilege is
grounded in the valourisation of a social group's identity and practices, some idealisation must
occur. “The kind of idealization that is entailed by valorization is problematic because rather than
working from a conception of practices as heterogeneous, it includes some while excluding others,
presupposing that there are practices that in one way or another are more authentically expressive
of something about the oppressed group.”55 The logic of standpoint theory drives us towards this
kind of essentialising idealisation, and Hartsock in particular makes no great effort to resist it.
In  addition,  idealisation  in  standpoint  epistemology can  result  from the  overwhelming
focus on one particular standpoint, presented as complete and unitary, the feminist standpoint;
especially  when this  standpoint  is  claimed to  provide  us  with  a  position  from which  a  true,
undistorted view of the social world is uniquely available. It should not take much to realise that
many of  the  justifications  for  a  feminist  standpoint  must  also  suggest  the  possibility  of  other
standpoints  based  in  other  marginalised  social  positions  –  an  anti-racist  standpoint,  a  queer
standpoint, etc. – and that to suggest that any standpoint derived only from what is common to all
women, including relatively privileged white women, could provide us with the kind of insights
into society that these other standpoints must provide is certainly not viable, unless one holds the
implausible radical feminist view that women's oppression is somehow more basic or fundamental
than all  other  oppression.  Furthermore,  concerns about essentialism and intersectionality must
tend  to  undermine  the  idea  that  any  single standpoint  could  be  identified  for  any  broadly
considered  form  of  marginalisation,  given  the  diversity  of  experiences  within  broad  social
categories.
Nonetheless,  despite  these  problems,  I  believe  that  a  less  idealised  form of  standpoint
epistemology is possible. Sandra Harding goes some way towards developing such a position. She
takes the problem of essentialism somewhat more seriously than Hartsock, arguing that “the logic
Standpoint Revisited," in The Feminist Standpoint Revisited and Other Essays (Westview Press: Oxford). Here she 
grants that her original analysis contained some problematic and essentialising simplifications, but also argues that 
many criticisms along these lines have failed to appreciate the Marxist roots of her work, and the importance of 
understanding a standpoint as something achieved through political struggle, rather than somehow biological or 
innate. Of particular relevance to my discussion, she suggests that "standpoint theory does not require feminine 
essentialism but rather analyzes the essentialism that androcentrism attributes to women," p. 233.
55 Bar On (1993), p. 92.
126
of the standpoint approaches contains within it both an essentializing tendency and also resources
to combat such a tendency.”56  Ultimately,  she advocates that we identify the contradictions in
feminist standpoint theory, and theoretically articulate them, using them to improve our theories.57
She identifies the resistant tendency against essentialism in standpoint epistemology's insistence
on “strong objectivity,” a commitment to placing the observer “in the same critical plane as the
subject matters to be observed”58; that is, to making researchers aware of themselves not just as
disembodied, disconnected thinkers engaging with some subject matter at arms length, but rather
including themselves, their background beliefs, and social position, as part of the research project,
part of what is to be studied, understood, and accounted for. This commitment, which underlies
our understanding of women's standpoint as being epistemically privileged in a male-dominated
society, commits women engaged in research to becoming aware of their own privileges, and the
ways that these will tend to distort their research in ways analogous to the distortion of research
done without attention to the position of women. So, “It should be clear that if it is beneficial to
start research, scholarship, and theory in white women's situations, then we should be able to learn
even more about the social and natural orders if we start from the situations of women in devalued
and oppressed races,  classes,  and cultures.”59 That  said,  all  of  this  is  more  a  statement  of  the
problem, rather than any real resolution of essentialising logic at the heart of standpoint theory.
Though Harding's discussion is an improvement on Hartsock's, and her instance on the
existence of multiple privileged standpoints is important, it's still unclear how these are meant to
fit into the logic of the theory. I think the prospect of a less idealised standpoint epistemology
becomes  somewhat  clearer  when  we  turn  to  the  work  of  Donna  Haraway.  Like  the  other
standpoint epistemologists, Haraway is working with the idea that “Feminist objectivity means
quite  simply  situated  knowledges,”60 and  that  objectivity  is  about  “particular  and  specific
embodiment and definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and
responsibility,”61 which she calls the “god trick.” She too endorses the idea that there are “grounds
for trusting especially the vantage points of the subjugated,”62 but is more sensitive to the “serious
56 Harding (1991), p. 180.
57 She spells this out more explicitly in relation to the contradictions between Enlightenment and Postmodernist 
feminist theories, Harding (1991), p. 181-184
58 Harding (1991), p. 178.
59 Harding (1991), p. 179-180.
60 Haraway (1988), "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective," Feminist Studies 14:3, pp. 578-599, p. 581.
61 Haraway (1988), p. 582.
62 Haraway (1988), p. 583.
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danger of romanticizing and/or appropriating the vision of the less powerful while claiming to see
from their positions.”63
Haraway's potential to resist the problems of idealisation discussed above stem from her
conception of split and contradictory selves as the subjects of knowledge. “The knowing self is
partial in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed
and stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together without
claiming to be another.”64 As she rejects the unitary and singular subject, so too she rejects the idea
of a unitary, single privileged standpoint, even as a combination of revealing positions: “There is
no way to “be” simultaneously in all, or wholly in any, of the privileged (i.e. subjugated) positions
structured by gender, race, nation, and class. And that is a short list of critical positions.” 65 What
this means practically is that “location is about vulnerability; location resists the politics of closure,
finality, ... feminist objectivity resists 'simplification in the last instance.' That is because feminist
embodiment resists fixation and is insatiably curious about the webs of differential positioning.
There is no single feminist standpoint because our maps require too many dimensions for that
metaphor to  ground our  visions.”66 It  should  be  no  surprise  that  this  rejection of  closure  and
theoretical finality resembles my discussion of intersectionality as provisionality, near the end of
the previous chapter.
Though Haraway shares, with other standpoint epistemologists, the vision of coming to
better accounts of the world through thinking from the position of subjugated peoples, she also
draws  out  the  more  radical  shifts  in  research  methodology  that  are  called  for  when  we
acknowledge idealisation and essentialism, and drop the myth of a single, unified, coherent body
of oppressed people.  Her vision of  science and rational  knowledge is  one of  “power-sensitive
conversation,” communication, “translations and solidarities,” never closed and final, but always
contestable, practised not by isolated individuals, but by communities, and aiming not at a view
from nowhere, but rather for “the joining of partial views and halting voices,” and “views from
somewhere.”67 With this vision of an alternative epistemology comes a different way of seeing the
world that is to be accounted for. Haraway insists on seeing the world not as a passive ground or
resource to be discovered, but rather as an active, even resistant entity, which we must learn to join
63 Haraway (1988), p. 583-4.
64 Haraway (1988), p. 586, emphasis hers.
65 Haraway (1988), p. 586.
66 Haraway (1988), p. 590.
67 Haraway (1988), p. 590. C.f. the discussion about intersectionality and provisionality in the previous chapter of this 
thesis. Consider also the role of communication in O'Neill's account of practical reasoning.
128
in conversation. “The Coyote or Trickster, as embodied in Southwest native American accounts,
suggests the situation we are in when we give up mastery but keep searching for fidelity, knowing
all the while that we will be hoodwinked … Feminist objectivity makes room for surprises and
ironies at the heart of all knowledge production; we are not in charge of the world.”68
Though less wholeheartedly than Haraway, Harding takes up some of these themes in her
later essay  Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology. She agrees that “the subjects/agents of knowledge
for feminist standpoint theory are multiple, heterogeneous, and contradictory or incoherent,”69 and
that “the logic of the directive to “start thought from women's lives” requires that one start one's
thought from multiple lives that are in many ways in conflict with each other, each of which itself
has multiple and contradictory commitments.”70  She accepts that this is a challenge, but does not
here  give much guidance  as  to what  such thinking might  look like,  only suggesting that  this
practice is already familiar to most of us from everyday contexts of negotiating conflicting interests
or perspectives. She also notes the need, arising from the multiplicity of subjects, for feminists to
engage with every other liberatory knowledge project (anti-racist, Marxist, etc.), and vice versa.
One new problem that  arises  when we move away from idealised theories  of  a  single
feminist (women's) standpoint, and towards the reality of multiple, interlocking standpoints, is
that we are faced with the need to adjudicate which particular social positions may give rise to a
revelatory standpoint, and which (in our current society) will not. The simple answer is that just
those  social  positions marked by oppression can give rise  to a revelatory standpoint,  but  this
answer is complicated by the rise of right-wing political movements, representing the interests of
groups  usually  conceived  as  dominant,  which  nonetheless  articulate  their  claims  in  terms  of
oppression. Often these groups form as a kind of backlash, and claim to be oppressed by precisely
those measures designed to rectify or mitigate the oppression of others. Some examples include
white supremacists arguing white people are oppressed by affirmative action laws, Men's Rights
Activists (MRAs) arguing men are oppressed by rape prosecutions, or fundamentalist Christian
groups arguing Christians are oppressed by marriage equality.  Of course we can look at these
claims and simply note that no one is oppressed on the basis of being white, male, or (in western
countries) Christian, but this begs the question against these reactionary movements.
Fortunately,  in  heeding  a  call  for  increased  epistemic  humility,  and  a  resistance  to
68 Haraway (1988), p. 593-4.
69 Harding (1993), p. 65
70 Harding (1993), p. 66.
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simplification, we need not abandon all our familiar critical and epistemic practices. That is, we
can simply look at the MRA's claim that men are oppressed, and see that it is poorly supported.
Remember that standpoint epistemologists have offered particular arguments for the claim that
women, as an oppressed group, have access to less partial and distorted knowledge. For example,
Harding argued this on the basis of women's status as outsiders,  alienated from social power.
Given the  representation  of  men in  politics,  business  and the  media,  it  would  simply  not  be
plausible to argue that men are, as a class, alienated from social power. More broadly, though we
must be wary of relying on statistics to provide evidence of oppression,71 they can be useful in
more obvious cases;  figures such as  the gender pay gap for  many oppressed groups,  rates  of
incarceration for people of colour, and rates of homelessness among queer people provide clear
evidence of these being oppressed groups, where such figures overwhelmingly present men as
being relatively privileged.
Even more directly, though we should be humble about our ability to evaluate arguments
presented from a standpoint we do not occupy, nonetheless many of the arguments presented by
these reactionary groups are, however generously and provisionally they are interpreted, simply
and obviously bad or reprehensible. For example, cartoonist and MRA Scott Adams has argued
that America is a female-dominated society on the basis of the fact that, regardless of what a man
does on a heterosexual date, “access to sex is strictly controlled by the woman.” 72 Even leaving
aside the obvious way the claim of domination flies in the face of all available data about men and
women's relative wealth and power, there seems to be no way of reading this argument that does
not amount to “men are being dominated unless they have sexual access to women who would
deny them sexual access; that is, to non-consenting women,” i.e. rape apologism. Besides being
reprehensible  from  any moral  perspective,  the  argument  is  also  nonsensical;  so  characterised,
access  to  sex  is  also strictly  controlled  by  men.  A similar  problem also  exists  in  the  common
argument from the Religious Right that equal marriage violates their freedom of religion; it seems
impossible to see this as anything other than special pleading for their particular form of religious
practice, as a similar argument could be used to argue that equal marriage laws are essential for the
religious freedom of those religious groups who celebrate same-sex marriages. Though these are
71 See Delgado & Stefancic (1992), "Pornography and Harm to Women: 'No Empirical Evidence?'" Ohio State Law 
Journal 53, pp. 1037-1055.
72 Reported by Futrelle (2015), "Scott Adams: We live in a matriarchy because men have to get permission for sex," 
We Hunted The Mammoth, November 21, 2015, http://www.wehuntedthemammoth.com/2015/11/21/scott-adams-
we-live-in-a-matriarchy-because-men-have-to-get-permission-for-sex/
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just a few particular bad arguments, it seems quite generally accurate that arguments from these
reactionary  groups  are  characterised  by  bad  faith,  special  pleading,  false  equivalences  and
harassment.
Rather than these reactionary groups, some more interesting and potentially difficult cases
relating  to  where  we  can  identify  a  liberatory  standpoint  can  seen  in  the  rise  of  new  social
movements from recently unfamiliar social groups, which do not identify themselves in opposition
to an existing social struggle. Two fairly clear cases are the autism self-advocacy movement, the
asexuality  movement.  In  both  cases  there  is  fairly  clear  evidence  of  widespread,  systematic
mistreatment and marginalisation: in the first case from institutionalisation, abuse and torture,73
and in the second from a society structured around compulsory sexuality. Both groups are making
very challenging claims, employing unstable and unfamiliar concepts, but also have the advantage
of forming connections with existing disability and queer movements respectively. Of course, this
resembles the position transgender activists were in just two decades ago.
A  significantly  less  clear  case  is  that  of  people  who  understand  themselves  to  be
“transracial”; that is, as somehow belonging to a race other than that which society would usually
class them as, on the basis of features such as ancestry. This claim seems baffling to most of us, and
flies in the face of both the dominant understanding of race, and the alternative understandings
presented by many critical race theorists. The few self-articulations of such “transracial” people
that come to popular light are often steeped in obvious racism and apparent racial appropriation,
and their arguments often inappropriately mimic the arguments of trans activists. Indeed, even the
term “transracial” is appropriated from the language of people of colour who were adopted and
raised  by  white  families.  However,  Rebecca  Kukla  has  argued  that  much  discussion  of  this
purported way of being has been “surprisingly historically short-sighted and lacking in epistemic
humility.”74 After pointing out the similarity between arguments against the self-understanding of
“transracial” and transgender people, she writes “I just don’t have the confidence that would allow
me to proclaim immediately that this time the critique fits, that there is no real phenomenon here,
no human need or way of being that requires understanding and a reconfiguration of my settled
concepts.”75 Ultimately, she does not suggest we abandon our critical faculties here, but just that
73 For some context, see Ne'eman (2016), "The errors – and revelations – in two major new books about autism" Vox, 
http://www.vox.com/2016/1/21/10801846/autism-in-a-different-key




we “learn from the past and proceed a little more slowly,”76 rather than dismissing these claims out
of hand. Personally, though I strongly suspect that this “tranracial” identity rests in racism and
essentialism, and I would insist that racist and appropriative claims and actions must never be
pardoned in these cases, I agree with Kukla that epistemic humility calls for a more careful and
forbearing approach to this phenomena than has been seen so far. However, in working out what
we should think of an emerging position like this, we need to heed in particular the voices of those
best placed to understand the relevant social issues, whether through expertise or position: that is,
in this case, critical race theorists and people of colour.
STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ABORTION
It  is  not  difficult  to  see  how taking  seriously  the  position  of  standpoint  epistemology would
challenge  any  strong  reliance  on  simple,  universalistic  first-personal  methods  in  practical
reasoning.  The  directive  to  start  our  thinking  from the  standpoint  of  women,  or  the  broader
directive to start our thinking from the standpoint of marginalised groups more widely, cannot be
met by a solitary thinker engaging, even imaginatively, with their own private mental resources.
Standpoint epistemologies challenge this vision of moral philosophical research on many points.
They insist that undistorted research must be collective, taking place in the context of a community
and of political struggle,  rather than pursued by lone,  disengaged thinkers.  They insist on the
importance of representing the world from some liberatory standpoint, where the creation of that
standpoint necessarily involves (though goes beyond) listening to women, and members of other
marginalised groups, and looking at their lives. They tell us not to simply rely on our background
assumptions and intuitions, but rather to practice strong reflexivity, making our assumptions and
their genesis part of the object to be researched, and studying them in ways that must take us
beyond  mere  introspection  (and,  incidentally,  beyond  the  usual  methods  of  experimental
philosophy),77 towards awareness of the wider social and historical context.
I will briefly consider how some of these requirements may play out by looking at three
different papers on the morality of abortion, though none of them explicitly claim to employ a
standpoint  methodology.  The  first  is  Michael  Tooley's  influential  1972  paper  “Abortion  and
Infanticide,”78 still  widely read and often included on practical ethics reading lists.  This paper
76 Kukla (2015).
77 See Schwartzman (2012).
78 Tooley (1972), "Abortion and Infanticide," Philosophy & Public Affairs 2:1.
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argues that there is no morally significant difference between abortion and infanticide, and argues
for the moral permissibility of both, by claiming that in both cases the fetus or infant lacks the self-
consciousness that grounds a right to life. The argument proceeds in detachment from the actual
conditions or circumstances of pregnancy, and considers only the intrinsic features of fetuses and
infants, the conceptual contours of the relevant moral terms - such as sentience, self-awareness,
and personhood – and the conditions that may grant a right to life. It is striking that in a 29 page
paper on abortion, the word “woman” appears only five times. Any concern for what is at stake for
women in securing a right to abortion is limited to a brief mention of how pregnancy may limit
action and impair health, and a vague idea of the “burden of carrying a parasite to term.”79
I take it that even as this influential paper partly argues for what is an important feminist
demand (the legal permissibility of abortion)80, its approach is nonetheless deeply inimical to the
methodology suggested by standpoint epistemologists. There may be a very loose sense in which it
starts  research  from  women's  lives,  insofar  as  it  considers  something  that  overwhelmingly
concerns  women.81 However,  the  research proceeds without  any attention to women,  women's
lives, women's experiences, or anything resembling a feminist standpoint. In fact it comes across as
a  surprisingly  clear  example  of  thinking  that  is  structured  so  as  to  be  appropriate  for  an
administrator,82 where what is to be administrated is women's bodies and the “parasites”83 they
carry.
A very  different,  feminist  approach  to  abortion  and infanticide  appears  in  Mary  Anne
Warren's paper “The Moral Significance of Birth.”84 Warren aims to defend a moral distinction
between abortion and infanticide, and more broadly to challenge the common philosophical views
that rights must be based on intrinsic (rather than social) features, and always on a single feature.
To this end she argues against the focus past philosophers, such as Tooley, have placed on singular
intrinsic features such as sentience and self-awareness. Though she evaluates arguments around
these features much on their own terms, when it comes to providing her own account of what
79 Tooley (1972), p. 53
80 Of course, in a sense it does not argue for a feminist position, but rather an extension of a classically liberal position
on abortion.
81 It is important to note that not only women become pregnant - though this point is acknowledged by none of the 
papers I discuss here - and that not all women can or will. Often in the following discussion, and my later 
discussion of Judith Jarvis Thomson's work, I will simply be talking about 'women,' but I hope that much of the 
time, with suitable adjustments and some further analysis, what I say may also apply to trans men and non-binary 
folk who may bear children. I hope this simplification can be justified partly on the grounds that my primary 
concern is not with abortion per se, but rather with the methodology employed by the papers I discuss.
82 See Harding (1991), p. 128-9
83 To use a term Tooley seems to delight in. See Tooley (1972), p. 52.
84 Warren (1989), "The Moral Significance of Birth," Hypatia 4:3.
133
grounds a right to life,  and applying this  account to infanticide,  her discussion is much more
rooted in social reality and historical specificity. She argues that “Human persons - and perhaps all
persons - normally come into existence only in and through social relationships,”85 and refuses to
abstract from this fact, as she argues for an account of personhood partly grounded in a child's
being accepted as a member of a community. She engages in some historical analysis of the role of
infanticide in various times and places,  noting both that it  is  often “at  least  to some degree a
function  of  patriarchal  power,”86 and  that  it  is  sometimes  legitimately  employed  in  tragic
circumstances  where  sexual  and  political  oppression  have  eliminated  alternative  options  for
women.87 Her discussion of the harm that results from granting a strong right to life to fetuses is
rooted in our social and political reality, as she cites examples of forced surgical procedures, and
other  severe  restrictions  on  women's  autonomy  that  currently  take  place  in  the  name  of  the
protection of fetuses.88 Her eventual conclusion that infanticide is usually not justified is explicitly
related to the circumstances of  our society, which has “both the ability and the desire to protect
infants”89.
Though  it  perhaps  does  not  go  as  far  as  it  could  in  terms  of  strong  reflexivity  (and
limitations of space may be relevant here), I think this paper demonstrates the kind of historical
and social situatedness that must be so important to any moral philosophy that takes seriously the
concerns of standpoint epistemology. Warren rejects the dominant trend in moral philosophy of
defining central  moral  concepts  like “personhood” and “rights” purely in  terms of  some neat
atomic features, entirely in abstraction from the social reality where these concepts develop and
are employed. She doesn't pretend that a moral issue like abortion can be considered entirely apart
from political issues, and instead often grounds her discussion in consideration of the law, current
medical  practices,  and  gender  inequality.  She  does  not  consider  moral  norms  completely
ahistorically, but rather notes the role that abortion and infanticide norms have had in supporting
patriarchy. All this is consistent with the standpoint epistemologists' recommendation to keep our
research and our background beliefs socially and historically situated, rather than pretending our
thoughts can float free as a view from nowhere. Warren's approach is deeply incompatible with an
approach  to  moral  philosophy  that  only  involves  a  philosopher  consulting  their  own  mental
85 Warren (1989), p. 55.
86 Warren (1989), p. 54.
87 Warren (1989), p. 58.
88 Warren (1989), p. 59-61.
89 Warren (1989), p. 62.
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resources, thinking through an issue in isolation from others' interests and from the real, messy
world. Though Warren rightly critiques Tooley's assumption that an account of personhood can be
given purely in terms of a single, intrinsic feature, it seems unlikely that Tooley could possibly
come up with a more nuanced account using only the kinds of methods he employs, of comparing
different  abstract  concepts  and  principles,  crafting  counterexamples,  consulting  intuitions  and
running thought experiments; implicitly, her argument against this assumption also constitutes an
argument against his socially detached methodology.
Margaret  Olivia  Little's  paper  “Abortion,  Intimacy,  and  the  Duty  to  Gestate”90 more
strongly exemplifies the standpoint epistemologists' directive to start research from women's lives.
She  begins  by  noting  that  “There  is  something  about  abortion  that  is  not  captured  however
carefully we parse counterexamples or track down the implications of traditional classifications”91
and  that  “The  central  figures  in  the  abortion  drama  –  fetus,  gestating  woman,  and  their
relationship – are left out of the conceptual paradigm.”92 In particular, her paper aims to highlight
the importance, to considerations of abortion, of “the fact that gestation occurs inside of someone's
body.”93 She discusses the intimacy and deep intertwinement implicated in gestation, and how
consent  must  take  on  a  central  importance  in  such  situations,  as  its  presence  or  absence  can
entirely change the character of how pregnancy is experienced and understood. She is eager to
discuss the ethics of abortion in relation to the ethics of parenthood, intimacy, and relationships,
focusing on the question of what a pregnant person's relationship and responsibilities to the fetus
might be, rather than what abstract rights-granting features they or the fetus might possess. She
ultimately suggests that this approach lets us make sense of what others take to be a paradoxical
moral sentiment, among some women seeking abortions, who feel that “they do not have room in
their life just then to be a mother, but they know if they continue the pregnancy they will not be
able to give up the child.”94 In this way her paper can be seen as taking something from women's
lives - the difficulty of squaring this attitude with standard moral theories - as a problem to be
explained, and then finding a solution through engagement with women's lived reality.
Little's paper comes across as a strong example of thinking from women's lives, in a way
that, as the standpoint epistemologists suggested, avoids some of the distortions pervasive in the
90 Little (1999), "Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty to Gestate," Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2.
91 Little (1999), p. 295.
92 Little (1999), p. 296.
93 Little (1999), p. 297.
94 Little (1999), p. 312.
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more detached mainstream abortion debate. She maintains a sharp focus on the lived reality of
women in relation to pregnancy, and directly confronts the personal and embodied aspects of this
reality  –  gestation  as  intertwinement,  as  potentially  intimate  relationship,  as  the  physical
occupation of one body by another – that most other philosophers gloss over. She demands a more
honest understanding of the risks and pains involved in pregnancy, noting “the neutral language
of an obstetrics text hardly captures the lived reality.”95 She often draws us to consider directly the
concerns  of  those  most  involved in  pregnancy,  as  she  notes  that,  in  talking  to  women facing
unwanted pregnancy, they are usually less concerned with the medical risks and the social costs,
and more  with “the  distinct  meanings  of  gestation and motherhood [...]  what  it  means  to  be
pregnant.”96
It  is  also  striking  that  she  resists  the  urge  to  idealise  and  essentialise  experiences  of
pregnancy and motherhood: she notes that “Just as women differ in their conception of the fetus's
status, they differ in how they conceptualize the relationship they are in with that fetus.”97 This
difference manifests both across, and within individual women.98 She adds "For a woman ... who
conceives of herself as already intertwined as mother, and the fetus as her child, it would take
reasons approaching life and death to decline gestating; for one who conceives of herself as in a
biological relationship with burgeoning life, lesser reasons will suffice." So, though her ethics of
abortion centres the relationship between fetus and woman, as experienced by women, she refuses
to idealise, to elevate one kind of relationship to the status of the  right kind of relationship; she
does not want to give us the one, single women's standpoint on pregnancy, the unitary way that
women do and must relate to any fetus they may carry.
EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE
The study of epistemologies of ignorance has developed fairly recently within social epistemology,
though it has roots in older traditions of anti-racist thought and literature. It may be seen as a
epistemically negative project against standpoint epistemology's positive project; where standpoint
epistemology focuses on the issue of  how it  may be that  marginalised groups have a kind of
privileged access to the truth, the study of epistemologies of ignorance focuses instead on the issue
of how and why the socially privileged are so often unable to understand, or see the truth about
95 Little (1999), p. 300.
96 Little (1999), p. 301.
97 Little (1999), p. 310.
98 And, although she doesn't address this, will likely be very different again for pregnant people of other genders.
136
the world they occupy. In particular, it takes us beyond the standpoint epistemologists' relatively
quick references to epistemic perversion and distortion, and towards attempts to understand “the
specific knowing  practices  inculcated  in  a  socially  dominant  group.  Where  [standpoint
epistemologies] argued that men, for example, have less interest in raising critical questions about
male dominance, [epistemologies of ignorance argue] that whites have a positive interest in 'seeing
the world wrongly' to paraphrase Mills.”99
Charles Mills coined the phrase “epistemologies of ignorance” in his influential 1997 book
The Racial Contract.100 The idea here is that the racist code by which white people have agreed to
live, and to regulate their relationship to non-white groups - the Racial Contract - prescribes an
“officially  sanctioned reality  … divergent from actual  reality.”101 This  reality will  contain such
things  as  bogus  justifications  for  colonialism  and  marginalisation,  and  false  beliefs  about  the
situation and worth of people of colour. In order to maintain belief in this officially sanctioned
reality, white people must learn to, and agree to misinterpret the world. Thus they take on “an
inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global
cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional)”.102 This epistemology
“precludes self-transparency and genuine understanding of social realities.”103 Thus, as Alcoff puts
it, “ignorance is not primarily understood as a lack – a lack of motivation or experience as the result
of  social  location  –  but  as  a  substantive  epistemic  practice  that  differentiates  the  dominant
group.”104 Mills is explicit in arguing that epistemologies of ignorance have implications for moral
epistemology, as it causes white people to “experience genuine cognitive difficulties in recognizing
certain behavior patterns as racist, so that quite apart from questions of motivation and bad faith
they will be morally handicapped simply from the conceptual point of view in seeing and doing
the right thing.”105
Mills provides a number of examples of how ignorance can be maintained by dominant
epistemic  practices,  as  part  of  the  particular  epistemology  of  ignorance  that  he  calls  White
Ignorance: through the development and proliferation of concepts and ways of seeing, such as the
99 Alcoff (2007), p. 47. I differ from Alcoff in that she considers standpoint epistemology to be a type of epistemology
of ignorance, and uses "the structural argument" to refer more specifically to what I call "the study of 
epistemologies of ignorance," or more simply "epistemologies of ignorance."
100 Mills (1997), p. 18.
101 Mills (1997), p. 18.
102 Mills (1997), p. 18. Italics removed.
103 Mills (1997), p. 18. This point regarding the preclusion of transparency echoes standpoint epistemology's 
requirement of strong reflexivity.
104 Alcoff (2007), p. 27.
105 Mills (1997), p. 93.
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concept of the “savage,” and the widely used but massively distorted Mercator projection world
map, that tend to lead us towards certain racist conclusions, and suppress the development of
alternatives106;  through a collective amnesia regarding the history of  racial  oppression, enabled
through  such  things  as  education  systems,  publications,  monuments,  and  a  'colour  blind'
ideology107; through testimonial injustice and the silencing of non-white voices via racial terror108;
through  economic  and  social  barriers  against  non-white  access  to  cultural  resources  such  as
presses and academia109; and through cognitive distortions and motivated irrationality, rooted in
whites' group interest.110  
More  generally,  the  study of  epistemologies  of  ignorance  aims to  reveal  the  ways  that
knowledge is systematically shaped and suppressed in a society marked by social domination.
That is,  the focus is  not  exclusively (or even primarily)  on how (for example)  explicitly racist
individuals maintain their ignorant racist beliefs, but more broadly on what gets to be researched,
accepted, promulgated and known in such societies, including among those who work to avoid
attitudes such as racism, and sometimes among members of marginalised groups. As Mills puts it,
“a nonracist cognizer […] may form mistaken beliefs […] because of the social suppression of the
pertinent knowledge, though without prejudice himself.”111 Some projects exploring this kind of
ignorance include Shannon Sullivan's investigation into the ignorance held by most U.S. citizens
regarding Puerto Rico,112 and Nancy Tuana's exploration of how ignorance regarding women's
sexual pleasure is constructed and maintained in both scientific and non-scientific contexts. 113 Of
course similar projects have also existed before the term “epistemologies of ignorance” was coined;
consider, for example, Michèle Le Doeuff's discussion of how knowledge regarding contraception
has been suppressed in France, via both formal and informal mechanisms.114
For my purposes, the significant insight from the literature on epistemologies of ignorance
is that ignorance is not accidental or marginal. That is, we can't just see the kinds of ignorance that
may appear in moral theories as mere mistakes, surprising lapses of knowledge hidden within a
landscape of basically sound moral beliefs,  to be rectified  simply by more careful argument, or
106 Mills (2007), p. 23-27.
107 Mills (2007), p. 28-31.
108 Mills (2007), p. 31-33.
109 Mills (2007), p. 33-34.
110 Mills (2007), p. 34-35.
111 Mills (2007), p. 21.
112 Sullivan (2007), "White Ignorance and Colonial Oppression: Or, Why I Know So Little about Puerto Rico," in 
Sullivan and Tuana (2007).
113 Tuana (2004), "Coming to Understand: Orgasm and the Epistemology of Ignorance," Hypatia 19:1.
114 Le Doeuff (1991), p. 264-275.
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more accurate evidence. Instead we must understand our patterns of ignorance to be very often
highly systematic, rather than random, and as an essential, problematic part of our entire system of
moral  beliefs.  As Lorraine Code puts  it,  “Social,  sexual,  racial  contracts  require,  construct  and
condone an epistemology, sustained by and sustaining an  ecology of ignorance that comes to be
essential to their survival”.115 
This view of systematic ignorance presents a strong challenge to ordinary, non-politically
aware methods in moral philosophy. In particular it will tend to undermine first-personal methods,
especially as performed by privileged individuals, in relation to topics to which their privilege is
relevant.  For  example,  consider  a  philosopher  thinking  through  issues  of  hate  speech  while
occupying a social position which ensures that hate speech can never be (effectively) levelled at
them. Most obviously such a philosopher would lack their own experiences from which to draw
an understanding of the impact of hate speech. They would also likely be operating with concepts
crafted and propagated by those with social and cultural power which tend to undermine more
radical understandings and conclusions; consider for example how the term “hate speech” seems
to  identify  the  problem  in  individual  attitudes  and  emotions,  eliding  the  important  role  of
asymmetrical  power  relations  in  actual  instances  of  hate  speech.  If  restricted  to  first-personal
methods they would lack the resources to develop alternative conceptualisations. They would also
be operating in an intellectual climate where voices and perspectives from those who suffer from
hate speech have been systematically silenced and suppressed, while theories used to defend a
perhaps opposed notion of “free speech” have had centuries to freely develop. They would face a
motivational pull towards underestimating the significance of hate speech or the suffering that it
causes, in order to defend their group interest in something like “the right to offend.”
Furthermore, these problems are compounded by the fact that a thinker labouring under
systematic ignorance may also be ignorant of the relevance of social position to the topic they are
considering, and so to their own ignorance of that social position. In the case of race, this meta-
ignorance is  encouraged by a 'colour-blind' ideology, which posits an equality, both moral and
material, between people of all races “on terms that negate the need for measures to repair the
inequities of the past.”116 This widespread ideology enables the systematic denial of the importance
of race. So, for example, a philosopher considering moral and legal theories regarding punishment
may fail to see the importance of the vastly unequal way that incarceration is used against white
115 Code (2007), "The Power of Ignorance," in Sullivan and Tuana (2007), p. 214.
116 Mills (2007), p. 28.
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and  non-white  populations,  or  may  simply  suppose  that  this  issue  can  simply  be  stipulated
aside.117
Some of  these  conclusions  look  stronger  than what  is  provided by the  challenge from
standpoint epistemologies, though these approaches are clearly related, and this may be a matter
of emphasis. Many standpoint epistemologists emphasise the ability of the privileged to engage
with the standpoint of the oppressed, the idea that anyone can, in principle, begin research from
women's lives.118 On the other hand, epistemologies of ignorance tend to emphasise the immense
difficulty  of  doing  this,  by  noting  that,  for  example,  white  ignorance  is  more  than  just  a
perspective, or a collective of interests, but rather a systematic and deeply socialised way of seeing
the world, an entire way of thinking rooted in racism, which has become a central part of what it is
to  be  white.119 This  makes  it  clear  that  more  intense  and  long  term  personal  and  political
engagement is necessary to combat this form of ignorance.
Precisely how to combat epistemologies of ignorance has not yet been so widely discussed
in this relatively new literature. Some way into this question may be found in Adale Sholock's
paper “Methodology of the Privileged,” which looks at how a number of white feminists have
attempted to resist racist indoctrination, to find and develop non-oppressive ways of relating to
those  over  whom  they  are  racially  privileged  by  white  supremacy.120 Sholock  is  especially
concerned  with  how  ignorance,  and  counterproductive  ways  of  dealing  with  ignorance,  can
hamper these efforts. She looks at two methods in particular, and concludes by proposing her own.
The first method she considers, and attributes to Adrienne Rich and Minnie Bruce Pratt, is
'self-reflexivity,' a practice of intense self-scrutiny by which those of us who are white may attempt
to make whiteness visible in our own lives, to work out what it means to us to be white, and how
our lives and identities are marked by white privilege.121 This is understood as a deeply personal
method, consciously using experiential knowledge, but proceeding through self-reflection. One
influential example of this kind of process (though not one Sholock cites) appears as the essay
“White  Privilege:  Unpacking  the  Invisible  Knapsack,”  by  Peggy  McIntosh.122 In  this  paper,
McIntosh conceptualises white privilege as a collection of special provisions that she can count on
117 As I discuss in chapter 3.
118 Harding (1991), p. 277-288. See also Scheman (2011), Shifting Ground: Knowledge and Reality, Transgression and
Trustworthiness (Oxford University Press: Oxford), p. 108. 
119 Though, as we will see, Harding seems to share this insight in her development of standpoint epistemology
120 Sholock (2012), "Methodology of the Privileged: White Anti-Racist Feminism, Systematic Ignorance, and 
Epistemic Uncertainty," Hypatia 27:4.
121 Sholock (2012), p. 704-705.
122 McIntosh (1989), "White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack," Peace & Freedom July/August.
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to  help  her  through  life,  and  she  attempts  to  individuate  and  enumerate  these  benefits.  She
acknowledges the force of  epistemologies  of ignorance,  as she notes  that “whites  are carefully
taught not to recognize white privilege,” and that “the pressure to avoid [the subject] is great, for
in facing it I must give up believing in democracy.”123
Unfortunately, as Sholock concludes, although this methodology is in some sense designed
to combat ignorance, it is also severely limited by ignorance. In being a primarily self-reflective
activity, this kind of procedure can help reveal, or make visible that which the white feminists
practising it have some kind of lurking awareness of but refuse to face, those things which we
worry might be true but want to believe are false.124 However it alone is unable to take us further,
to reveal those things that we neither know nor suspect, to reveal what has been hidden from us,
suppressed,  more  completely  silenced  by  the  forces  that  operate  within  epistemologies  of
ignorance. Often it will be able to reveal that we are ignorant of something we should know, but
not be able to provide the content that we are lacking.
Furthermore, Sholock worries that - though something like this practice may be an essential
part  of  any 'methodology of  the privileged'  -  without a concomitant shift  in the attitudes that
privileged thinkers tend to have towards ignorance and uncertainty, this intense self-scrutiny will
often lead to a counterproductive form of  self-doubt,  “protracted navel-gazing and stagnating
emotional turmoil,”125 as white feminists continue to ferret out new ways that we are ignorant, but
never find a clear end to that ignorance, or a stable foundation of confidence.
The second method Sholock considers, and attributes to Marilyn Frye and Sandra Harding,
is  one of 'racial  sedition'  or 'racial  disaffiliation;'  essentially,  rather than seeking to understand
whiteness, instead attempting to cease being white.126 This method rests in the observation that
whiteness is a political, rather than biological concept, and that to be white involves patterns of
behaviour and privilege that could be, in principle, resisted or renounced. Indeed, Mills identifies
subscription to an epistemology of ignorance as “part of what it requires to achieve Whiteness,
successfully to become a white person,”127 and partly dedicates  The Racial Contract to “the white
renegades and race traitors who have refused [the Racial Contract].”128 Harding advocates that we
123 McIntosh (1989). See also Spelman (2007) "Managing Ignorance," in Sullivan and Tuana (2007) for discussion of 
how not wanting to know certain facts plays a role in sustaining ignorance about those facts.
124 See Spelman (2007), p. 120.
125 Sholock (2012), p. 705.
126 Sholock (2012), p. 706-9.
127 Mills (1997), p. 18.
128 Mills (1997), dedication. See also his p. 107-9, and p. 126-7
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“learn to think and act not out of the 'spontaneous consciousness' of the social locations that history
has bestowed upon us but out of the traitorous ones we choose with the assistance of critical social
theories generated by the emancipatory movements.”129 This is in keeping with the idea that, as
part of a standpoint epistemology, we can learn to 'think from' standpoints other than those given
to us; that, for example, men can contribute to feminist knowledge projects by learning to start
research from women's lives.
This methodology seems to have significant risks. In particular, it may tend to promote a
misguided 'opt-out'  concept of  privilege,  one that  ignores the realities  of  social  power,  a  view
where one's privilege can be renounced simply by changing one's attitudes and actions – not 'being
racist' – without heed to the ways that privilege can be utterly out of our control, manifest in how
we are perceived, in how we are treated, in our history, and in deeply rooted parts of our self-
conception. Harding acknowledges this point as she notes “Those of us in the overly privileged
groups cannot succeed in giving up the privilege that the social order insists on awarding us.” 130
Linda Alcoff particularly worries that “some 'treasonous' whites, with white privilege still largely
in  place,  might  then  feel  entitled  to  disengage  with  whiteness  without  feeling  any  link  of
responsibility for white racist atrocities of the past; or they might consider a declaration that they
are 'not white' as a sufficient solution to racism without the trouble of organizing or collective
action.”131
Furthermore this  methodology is  again complicated by systematic  ignorance,  as  “racial
disaffiliation seems to rely on the ability of whites to accurately identify and confidently combat
white  behaviours.”132 Though  this  method  is  welcoming  of  non-self-reflective  sources  of
knowledge  about  what  constitutes  whiteness  –  and  as  we've  seen  Harding's  epistemology
emphasises actual engagement with those from marginalised social positions – Sholock argues it
may “rest  upon white people's  overconfident belief  in their ability  to reject  systematic  racism,
including whiteness and its privileges.”133
Nonetheless Sholock draws an important insight from a methodology of racial sedition in
the idea that  this  overconfidence may itself  be an essential  part  of whiteness that needs to be
challenged. She notes “even while whites are socialized through an epistemology of ignorance, we
129 Harding (1991), p. 295.
130 Harding (1991), p. 295.
131 Alcoff (1998), "What Should White People Do?" Hypatia  13:3, p. 17.
132 Sholock (2012), p. 707.
133 Sholock (2012), p. 707. Harding also acknowledges this overconfidence, Harding (1991), p. 277.
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are also expected to behave as authoritative agents of knowledge.”134 This leads her to consider a
third methodology for privileged thinkers engaged in feminist projects, one which requires us to
change our attitude towards ignorance and uncertainty.  Ultimately she argues “a methodology of
the privileged should not resolve the self-doubt of white anti-racists but rather strategically deploy
epistemic  uncertainty  as  a  treasonous  act  against  the  cognitive  privileges  that  support  white
Western hegemonies. In other words, we might more productively view epistemic uncertainty as a
viable  method rather  than as  a  negative  by-product  of  knowing ignorance.”135 Of  course,  this
resembles the recommendation from standpoint epistemologists that we, in the language of Donna
Haraway, give up the dream of the “god trick,” the hope of epistemic mastery, of always being able
to know everything.
Such a methodology would require people (such as myself) to admit that there are some
things that we do not know, that we cannot simply work out, and that we may even not be able to
know. It would require learning how to be wrong, to treat error and challenge not as a personal
tragedy or a call to dig one's feet in, but rather as an opportunity to listen and to learn. Sholock
suggests that this is harder than it sounds, and that such work would rarely be comfortable.136
However, were such changes achieved, both in personal attitudes and in the culture of academic
and political work, it would have a number of benefits. It would help the relatively privileged to
deal productively with the cognitive anxieties and fear of error that can accompany our awareness
of the possibility of ignorance and self-deception, which could help to make coalitional work more
successful.  It  would  also  necessitate  greater  attention  to  and  engagement  with  the  work  and
analyses  of  marginalised  thinkers,  as  finding ourselves  in  positions  of  acknowledged ignorance
forces us to reach beyond our own position, to hear the voices of those who may know. This kind
of change of attitude would go some way towards combating the epistemic injustices suffered by
those who have been marginalised within feminist and philosophical communities.
This last point gestures towards the importance, for countering systematic ignorance, of
listening,  and  of  centring  victims  and  survivors  of  moral  harm  in  our  moral  philosophical
projects.137 Brison identifies  listening to stories  from victims as  a fundamental  characteristic  of
feminist  theory  and  ethics.  Feminist  theory  “takes  women's  experiences  seriously.  Likewise,
134 Sholock (2012), p. 708.
135 Sholock (2012), p. 709.
136 Sholock (2012), p. 710.
137 Claudia Card discusses her decision to centre victims and their suffering in her understanding of evil, in Card 
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trauma theory takes survivors' experiences seriously. And we cannot know what these are a priori.
We need to tell our stories, making sure to listen to those of others, especially when they're at odds
with ours.”138  She draws upon her own painful experiences to argue against the possibility of
understanding a moral harm from the armchair, noting that “imagining what it is like to be a rape
victim is no simple matter, since much of what a victim goes through is unimaginable."139 All the
while, she issues harsh criticism of the institution of academic philosophy, which, after her trauma,
“was of no use in making [her] feel at home in the world,”140 and which made her acutely aware of
the professional risks involved in presenting her own narrative of victimization, risks of not being
taken seriously, or not being taken philosophically.141 
This theme of listening is also taken up by Lorraine Code. She notes that “A set of - usually
unstated  -  assumptions  informs  much  prefeminist  moral  philosophy,  to  the  effect  that  moral
deliberation, as a matter of course, is adequately informed in its knowing of situations, actions, and
states of affairs that require moral judgment."142 She argues these assumptions falsely suggest that
all moral agents and thinkers can readily puts themselves in each others' shoes, always know the
same things and start from the same point in moral deliberation. This kind of picture “allows the
often-unarticulated commonsensical knowings that inform moral deliberation to claim a degree of
plausibility in consequence of which, it seems, no negotiation is required to establish the knowledge
base from which it works”.143
Following Brison,  Code advocates  instead an  empathy rooted in  listening  to  stories  of
victimization. She is particularly sensitive to the dangers posed by attempts at empathy that fail to
get  at  the  others' position,  that  involve  us  imagining  ourselves in  another's  place,  rather  than
genuinely hearing what they think, from their own position,144 assimilating difference, rather than
understanding  it.  To  avoid  this,  her  methodology  “requires  work,  careful  work,  research,
consultation,  negotiation,  interpretation...  it  requires  constant  checking  for  confirmation  or
misreading: it demands a certain epistemic humility prompted by wariness of premature closure
and further complicated by a recognition that "we" cannot always know the truths of our own
138 Brison (2002), p. 28. See also Foss & Foss (1994), "Personal Experience as Evidence in Feminist Scholarship," 
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lives.”145
Again,  we see the risks of  employing an admirable feminist  methodology – listening -
without an accompanying change in our attitudes towards certainty and epistemic confidence.
When we listen to others while supremely confident in our own ability to hear them, to correctly
interpret them, to understand them, and to incorporate them into our theories, we run the risk of
building a wall around our pre-existing world view, maintaining systematic misinterpretation and
ignorance in order to preserve our way of seeing things – and our privileged positions - all while
appropriating the experiences of those more marginalised than ourselves, and benefiting from the
claim that we really understand them.
I  hope this  discussion has  shown how any methodology capable  of  responding to  the
challenges  presented  by  standpoint  epistemologies  and  the  existence  of  epistemologies  of
ignorance would require a deep change in how philosophy is practised and taught. In philosophy
we learn how to advance our view, and certain ways of understanding others, but not when and
how to  change our  mind.  We learn how to  think an issue through and engage with thought
experiments,  but  rarely  how  to  ask  others  for  help,  and  to  engage  with  the  positions  and
experiences of others, rather than the formal arguments of philosophers. We learn how to stipulate
and define, but are rarely encouraged to look closely at the lived reality of the issues we discuss.
We learn how to refine a view, cutting off all possible objections through clarifications, stipulations,
and bizarre counterexamples, but never when to let things stand, when to allow for ambiguity,
when to acknowledge our epistemic limitations. We learn how to bite bullets, holding on to our
position dogmatically and minimising the importance of counter-arguments, but rarely how to
acknowledge that our theory might have errors, to take responsibility for the consequences of our
positions and to truly understand the full force and motivation of others' objections. 
THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS
To conclude this chapter I'll use some of the insights generated in the previous discussions to look
at a specific methodology widely employed by moral philosophers, thought experiments. In doing
so I will put forward a particular conception of how thought experiments may function in moral
philosophy, without meaning to suggest that this picture is complete, or covers everything that
thought experiments may do; my attention will be focused on how thought experiments may look
like they could be a useful tool for avoiding problems of systematic biases or ignorance. Similarly,
145 Code (2006), p. 206-7.
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my focus will be on particular types of thought experiments: those used in moral philosophy to
help us understand and develop a judgement about particular practical ethical questions - such as
euthanasia or torture – rather than those used to develop or critique an entire moral theory, such as
Rawls'  original  position,  or  Nozick's  experience  machine.  Of  course,  this  distinction  is  not
completely sharp.
I take thought experiments in moral philosophy to be a tool designed to help us form a
judgement about some moral issue by constructing an imaginative case which is analogous to the
actual moral issue - in the sense of sharing all of the morally significant factors – while eliminating,
abstracting away from, or replacing many other, morally insignificant features which may get in the
way of our judging the original case. Once this imaginative case is constructed, any philosopher
from any background is supposed to be able to imaginatively engage with the case, and form a
judgement about it. Then, if the analogy is successful – if the imaginative case really has recreated
all the morally significant features of the original case, without introducing anything else of moral
significance,  without  retaining  any  of  the  distorting  features  we  were  trying  to  remove,  and
without introducing new distractions – we can argue that an analogous judgement must be made
of the original case. So in short, my interest in thought experiments is in how they aim to help us,
or anyone, understand a particular moral situation, by isolating its morally significant features, and
removing any insignificant  features  that  we  may suppose  will  get  in  the  way of  us  correctly
understanding of  the original  case.  Though my interest is  in moral  thought experiments more
generally, I will guide this discussion by focusing on two particular thought experiments: Peter
Singer's drowning child case,146 and Judith Jarvis Thomson's violinist case.147
Let's start with Singer's case, which I take to be an example of a not particularly successful
thought experiment;  we will  turn to Thomson's rather more successful  case soon. Peter Singer
famously  employs  a  simple  thought  experiment  in  the  course  of  arguing  that  those  living  in
affluence have an obligation to take action, usually assumed to be cash donations,  in order to
improve the situation of those around the world living in poverty or facing crisis.148 Although he
begins his paper with a description of an actual crisis that faced people in East Bengal as his paper
was written, he doesn't argue directly from this case. Rather this case, or the issue of international
aid  more  generally,  can  be  seen  as  his  target  moral  issue,  and  he  goes  on  to  attempt  the
146 Singer (1972) "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy & Public Affairs 1:3.
147 Thomson (1971) "A Defense of Abortion," Philosophy & Public Affairs 1:1.
148 Singer (1972).
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construction  of  a  thought  experiment  analogous  to  this  case,  in  order  to  help  us  morally
understand  and  form  a  judgement  about  international  aid.149 He  introduces  the  thought
experiment thus: “if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to
wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant,
while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.”150 
This  thought  experiment  recreates  a  few significant  features  of  international  aid  cases:
someone is in danger, I am able to assist and the cost to me would be minimal. It eliminates a huge
number of the features of actual international aid cases, such as the distances involved, the number
of people positioned to help, the complexity involved in rendering assistance, including political
and logistical complexities, the number of people in danger, the precariousness of the situation
faced by those in danger which may persist after assistance is rendered, the history of colonial
injustice suffered by those in danger, and the historical and continuing complicity of many of us in
affluent societies for the situation faced by those in danger. Any thought experiment which wanted
to  focus  on  some of  these features  as  most  morally  significant  would  look very  different,  for
example: “I am walking past a shallow pond. I then push some nearby people into the pond and
steal their money. I spend a while guarding the edge of the pond, pushing people back in as they
try to climb out. What now are my obligations towards them?”
Singer acknowledges some of these eliminated features - the first three – and so tries to
argue that  these  features  are  not  morally  significant,  and so not enough to make his  thought
experiment  relevantly  disanalogous  to  the  case  of  international  aid.  He  suggests  the  moral
insignificance of distance follows from “any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality, or
whatever."151 The  matter  of  complexity  is  said  to  be  irrelevant  because  "Expert  observers  and
supervisors" can effectively direct our aid;152 that is to say there is essentially no missing feature
here, in both cases rendering assistance is a simple matter. He addresses the number of people
positioned to help by slightly modifying his thought experiment – specifying that other people are
149 To be precise, Singer does not initially introduce this thought experiment in order to lead us to a judgement, but 
rather as an illustration of a principle that he believes is doing all the argumentative work. However he does later 
employ this same thought experiment in order to defend the principle, and he is concerned with arguing that the 
morally significant features of this case make it analogous to the case of international aid.
150 Singer (1972), p. 231.
151 Singer (1972), p. 232.
152 Singer (1972), p. 232. I cannot pass up noting how the term "observers" seems to identify these people as among 
'us,' observing the danger, rather than 'them,' involved in it. Presumably there is another adult standing at the side of
the pool, telling you exactly how to wade in to save the child. Consider how Singer's argument here relies on us 
taking what Harding identifies as the positon of the administrator, Harding (1991), p. 128-9.
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also  walking  past  the  lake  –  and  by  briefly  arguing  against  the  force  of  collective  action
problems.153
I  think  Singer's  thought  experiment  is  not  particularly  good  precisely  because  these
arguments are rather unconvincing, and we are left  with the suspicion that  his case is  deeply
disanalogous,  in  morally  significant  ways,  to  the  realities  of  international  aid.  Singer  has  not
helped us to understand the moral issue under consideration, to see what is  really going on, or
really at stake in these situations. Rather he has massively simplified the moral issues, in a way
that leaves us with a firm judgement, but a lingering feeling that this judgement is surely irrelevant
to the moral reality.
I  would  like  to  suggest  that  besides  being  unconvincing,  this  simplification  is  also
dangerous. Consider in particular some of the disanalogous features that Singer didn't discuss; the
background of  injustice and collective responsibility.  In short,  in this  paper,  Singer completely
erases the history and continuing reality of colonialism and imperialism that  must be present in
any full understanding of the morality of international aid. In doing this he produces something
like what Mills and other anti-racist thinkers have identified as a 'colour-blind'154 understanding, a
view that race and oppression are simply not relevant as moral factors. Singer could argue that
adding these features to his thought experiment would only strengthen his argument: if someone
is under an obligation to help simply in virtue of our ability to help, the additional fact that they
bear  some  responsibility  for  the  harm,  or  that  the  harm  is  unjust,  could  only  support  that
obligation, not counter it. 
Unfortunately  this  argument  ignores  the  deeper  ways  that  Singer's  particular  idealised
presentation of the moral issue frames his entire discussion. By presenting a thought experiment
that eliminates the collective and political aspects of the target moral issue, Singer frames the issue
of  global  inequality  as  highly  individualistic,  a  matter  of  an  individual's  obligations  to  other
individuals.  This  sidelines  collective  actions  in  favour  of  his  own  prefered  solution,  financial
transfers.155 These eliminations also hamper any true understanding of the moral issues, directly
promoting western ignorance towards other parts of the world, casting non-western nations as
helpless children, and promoting a view of the global south as mysteriously deprived or simply
153 Singer (1972), p. 232-4.
154 Mills (2007), p. 28-31.
155 He does briefly and positively discuss more political actions, Singer (1972), p. 240, but this discussion has been 
unsurprisingly overwhelmed by the huge body of literature following this paper focused entirely on individual 
action, and by Singer's own long history of  public campaigning for increased individual donations as a remedy for 
global inequality.
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less  fortunate  than 'us,'  rather  than unjustly  dominated,  occupied,  and exploited.  Contrary  to
Singer's optimistic faith in expert observers and supervisors, this kind of western ignorance has
significantly hampered many well-funded western-led attempts to improve conditions overseas.
Furthermore,  Singer's  argument  obviously  supports  a  particular  reason to  help,  a  broadly
utilitarianism reason:  the fact  that  we are in a position to  help at  little  cost  to  ourselves.  The
additional  details  regarding  injustice  and  collective  responsibility,  even  if  they  were to  point
towards the same solution (narrowly concieved), could nonetheless suggest an understanding of
morality quite different to Singer's, one that could radically change an agent's understanding of
what they were doing, why, and to what end, as well of how they should feel; there is a very great
difference between redressing a wrong and helping those in need.
Let's turn instead to a more successful thought experiment, Thomson's violinist case. This
case is a useful example as it is well-known, influential, and seems to be a particularly good use of a
thought  experiment,  at  least  on the  terms that  interest  me.  Of particular  note  is  that  this  is  a
thought experiment that pushes towards an important feminist conclusion – the moral right for
women to procure an abortion in at least  some cases – and, in contrast to what we saw with
Tooley's paper, it does so by developing a specifically feminist concern: a woman's right to “decide
what happens in and to her body”.156 If we can take this as an exemplary case of a successful, near-
best-possible use of thought experiments, then hopefully by showing the limitations of even this
use of thought experiments, I can reveal some general issues regarding their widespread use in
moral philosophy.
This thought experiment is rather more complex and detailed than Singer's drowning child
case. It asks you to imagine that one morning you find yourself to have been kidnapped, put in a
bed, and medically attached to a famous violinist, who will die unless you stay there, attached, for
nine months. You are physically free to unattach yourself, causing the violinist to die, but have
been told that this would be immoral, as it would violate his right to life.157 Thomson suggests we
would rightly regard this claim as absurd, and should judge instead that in such a case it would be
permissible for you to disconnect yourself, causing the violinist to die. Though Thomson's paper is
concerned with defending the permissibility of abortion in a wide range of cases, her aim with this
particular thought experiment is more limited: she simply wants to establish that even if we grant
that a fetus a right to life, that right will not trump all considerations, but rather there are at least
156 Thomson (1971), p. 48.
157 Thomson (1971), p. 48-9.
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some cases in which a woman's right to control what happens to her body can outweigh the fetus'
supposed right to life.
Of course, this thought experiment does not recreate all of the morally significant features
of cases where abortion is being considered. Though it most closely recreates the moral landscape
of  cases  involving  rape  -  for  example  in  the  detail  that  the  attached  person  has  voluntarily
undertaken no action that they would expect could get them attached to a violinist - it doesn't even
do this particularly well.  For one thing, note that Thomson herself  does not believe that early
fetuses have a right to life,158 but is rather assuming this in order to meet her opponents on their
own ground. If she is right about this, as I believe she is, we must see that in this way the thought
experiment does not recreate the morally significant features of the case under consideration; in the
violinist case, the violinist has a right to life, whereas in the real life moral case the analogous
being, the fetus, does not have this right. And of course there are many other missing features that
look to be morally significant, such as the particular physical experiences and risks of pregnancy,
the emotional connection to a child after birth, and the particular violations involved during and in
the aftermath of sexual assault.
Of course, these are features which not every philosopher, however situated, could be led
to  imagine  purely  through  thought  experimental  techniques  -  not  withstanding  one  male
philosopher's  shocking suggestion that  “there is  no problem imagining what it  is  like to be a
victim” of rape.159 More importantly, under the methodological logic of thought experiments these
exclusions, and the disanalogous inclusion of a fetal right to life, can be justified by Thomson's goal
of meeting her opponents on their own ground, and her rather limited goal; insofar as she is only
concerned to show that there are some cases where a right to life is defeated by considerations of
autonomy, she doesn't  need to include these details to make her point.  Her argument is  made
stronger by excluding them, as, if included, they would challenged by her opponents as being the
kinds of distorting features or new distractions that thought experiments are designed to avoid.
It is worth noting that this same kind of defence cannot be applied to the exclusions in
Singer's thought experiment. His drowning child case is employed to support a rather stronger
principle,  and  set  of  moral  judgements,  than  Thomson's  violinist  case.  Furthermore,  far  from
meeting his  opponents  on their own ground, some of  the details  he excludes,  of  distance and
complexity,  are  precisely  among  the  features  his  opponents  will  argue  are  important  for
158 Thomson (1971), p. 66.
159 Discussed in Brison (2002), p. 4.
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understanding and judging cases related to international aid.
There is one other exclusion in Thomson's thought experiment that it is worth discussing in
more detail. It is significant that in the violinist case the moral subject is described simply as “you,”
with no reference to their gender, whereas in the analogous real world cases the subject will very
often be a woman, and always someone capable of bearing children. Among the features Thomson
has chosen to remove in constructing her thought experiment are women, women's bodies, and
any reference to the physical, institutional or cultural facts of reproduction.160 Of course these are
the features that were central to the illuminating analyses by Warren and Little, discussed above.
At the risk of reading too much into it, we could take this exclusion as an attempt to avoid
the  distorting influence of  male  bias,  which might  make some readers  judge it  permissible  to
restrict  freedom for  women in  a  case  where  they  would not  restrict  freedom for  men,  or  for
themselves. Similarly, the case avoids any potential influence from certain kinds of ideology of
reproduction. Thomson herself raises the possibility that a gendered double standard might be
operating in relation to attitudes towards abortion when she notes “in no state in this country is
any man compelled by law to be even a Minimally Decent Samaritan to any person... By contrast,
in most states in this country women are compelled by law to be not merely Minimally Decent
Samaritans, but Good Samaritans to unborn persons inside them.”161 This reading of what is going
on would fit  Brownlee & Stemplowska's  idea of  how to construct  a thought  experiment:  “the
possibility of bias is not a reason to abandon theorizing that might be subject to it. It is a reason to
guard against it within the parameters of the case."162 So, we guard against the influence of any
possible  implicit  bias  against  women by removing them from the  case.  Note  how neatly  this
approach fits with a liberal epistemology, which aims to avoid and set aside bias, rather than a
standpoint  epistemology,  which  aims to  face  biases  head on,  accounting  for  them and taking
responsibility for them. I would like to suggest that this attitude towards bias is deeply implicated
in the use of thought experiments, even central to the justification for their use.
However, let's look more closely at whether this approach is successful in this particular
case. The violinist case removes women from the description of the case we are to judge, removing
the immediate possibility of gender bias operating on our judgements. Anecdotally, there seems to
160 Except for a few: the violinist case takes place in a medicalised context, and lasts nine months. Also, these features 
reemerge, in sometimes unusual forms, in Thomson's subsequent thought experiments in the same paper.
161 Thomson (1971), p. 63.
162 Brownlee & Stemplowska (2016), "Trapped in an Experience Machine with a Famous Violinist," in Research 
Methods in Analytical Political Theory, ed. Blau (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge)
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be widespread agreement with the judgment Thomson wants us to make, moreso than with her
following cases, where women and babies are reintroduced. But complications will arise when we
try to  move by analogy to  real  life  cases.  Here  women will  have to  be  reintroduced.  We can
imagine someone who reacts to this in a straightforwardly bigoted way: “ah, now women are
involved,  I  no longer agree.  Certainly I  may ethically unplug myself  from the violinist,  but a
woman could not.” Of course such a person is unlikely to appear in philosophy; such barefaced
double standards just wouldn't fly. But then even outside philosophy, patriarchal ideology is rarely
so blatant. Instead, other reasons will be found to object to the analogy, reasons rooted in cultural
attitudes towards women, reproduction, and rape. People will argue that, unlike in the violinist
case,  women could always  avoid  pregnancy,  that  women have often invited the  possibility  of
pregnancy, that there is some relevant special relationship between the woman and the fetus she
bears, which we lack with the violinist. Of course, these are exactly the kinds of reasons Thomson
tries to head off through the rest of her paper, often through the construction of further thought
experiments.  But what exactly is  going on here? We sideline the central issues in debates over
abortion, the issue of women's right to control over their body and reproduction, presumably so
we can keep working such opponents into a position where they finally have to say “I have no
philosophically  respectable  reply  to  your  claims,  and  am  unwilling  to  admit,  or  to  face  the
possibility  that  my objection to  abortion  is  really based on  ideology and group interests,  so  I
suppose I better agree that abortion is permissible.” We successfully lead our opponents to agree
with our position, but leave the entire misogynistic complex of background beliefs and attitudes,
which led to their initial position, completely untouched, and unmentioned. As Little has said of
the philosophical debate on abortion, “even careful and clear-headed application of the usual tools
seems to yield analyses that feel orthogonal to the subject.”163
Ultimately I don't want to dispute that, on their own terms, thought experiments can be
successful; perhaps Thomson's violinist case is a successful thought experiment, one that can lead
readers to think "this event which could happen to a man is obviously a matter of autonomy, so
this other analogous event must also be a matter of autonomy, even if overwhelmingly happens
only to women." But note it is only necessary to make this argument on these terms because of
certain attitudes common among the privileged, and thus common within philosophy to the point
of being philosophical method: philosophers do not take seriously the testimony and experiences of
163 Little (1999), p. 295.
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victims of injustice when determining the moral landscape. If  these experiences and testimony
were  taken  seriously,  those  who  experienced  or  were  subject  to  pregnancy  could  simply  tell
philosophers something along the lines of "in my case, unwanted pregnancy is a deeply affecting
and harmful compromise of my bodily integrity, and I understand any restriction over the control
of my body in such circumstances to be a severe restriction of my personal autonomy." My point is
not that this would completely end the debate and put moral  philosophers out of a job; there
would still be a lot to discuss regarding pregnancy, including its connection to wider issues of
social control of women's bodies, and the role of that control in Patriarchy. But it would allow us to
establish the moral  landscape, the relevant factors  in further moral  debate,  without relying on
complicated, contentious, obfuscating and sometimes unreliable thought experiments to determine
the basic fact of  whether  women, and others who may get pregnant, are right to see abortion the
way they do.
The problem here seems to rest in a philosophical methodology which tells philosophers
that  they  must  be  able  to,  in  principle,  do  all  the  work  of  moral  discovery  themselves;  the
insistence on what I've called universal first-personal methods. The violinist case lets cisgender
male philosophers think about the morality of abortion without ever thinking of anyone other than
themselves.  It  saves  them  from  the  necessity  of  empathising  with  women  by  letting  them
empathise  instead  just  with  a  hypothetical  version  of  themselves,  accessible  through  pure
imagination. The thought experiment is such that it could've been crafted entirely by a cisgender
male philosopher, though of course in the real world it is no mere coincidence that a woman came
up with it. This is reasoning that 'anyone,' suitably restricted, could follow along with; indeed, it
goes further than that in appearing to be reasoning that anyone could come up with, given just a
small amount of abstract information about the subject.
Unfortunately relying on a thought experiment like this rather than taking seriously direct
testimony of personal experiences has costs. The violinist case relies on a reader taking the analogy
seriously, and on a prior commitment to the idea that what must not be done to men must also not
be done to women. It not only puts to the side, but completely hides from discussion broader
feminist issues regarding abortion, such as the connection to wider issues of bodily autonomy, and
patriarchal  interest  in  control  over  women's  bodies.  It  works  to  depoliticise  the  debate  over
abortion, which obscures the nature of what are really political objections to the arguments.  It
promotes and perpetuates an attitude, within philosophy and the wider culture, of not taking the
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experiences of the marginalised as important, reliable or relevant, of only understanding moral
issues through their relation to the privileged. And perhaps most importantly, though this thought
experiment may often make its point, this methodology potentially leaves us unable to deal with
so many other cases for which similar analogies could not be constructed. When we commit to the
methodology of doing moral philosophy through thought experiment and intuition rather than
experience and testimony, we close off the possibility of truly understanding, in a philosophical
context, a huge variety of moral pictures that may not be able to be recreated through analogy.
Consider the experience of a young woman who hates her own body in the knowledge that
it will never fit social beauty norms that are simply not meant to accommodate people like her.
Consider  the  neurodivergent,  living  in  a  hostile,  misunderstanding  and  arbitrarily  belligerent
world. Consider those whose lives are severely constrained, facing a society which refuses to take
seriously, or even consider, their mobility needs. Consider being constantly and relentlessly faced
with  questions  and  scepticism  about  the  most  basic  details  of  one's  social  identity.  Consider
microaggressions,  marginalisation,  desperate  hopelessness.  Will  we  be  able  to  craft  neat,
compelling analogies to help us understand these experiences? Will you get a full picture of these
injustices  by just  thinking really hard about them, in isolation from testimony,  experience and
empathy?  So  long  as  we  continue  to  privilege  a  methodology  which  avoids  or  marginalises
engagement with the experiences of victims of injustice, we not only make certain moral issues
impossible to understand, but we inevitably exclude them from the practice of moral philosophers.
In the course of this chapter, I hope to have made a case against such a socially detached,
universalistic first-personal methodology in moral philosophy. I have attempted this by drawing
upon the resources of standpoint epistemologies and epistemologies of ignorance, which show
how our social privileges can systematically distort our thinking. These distortions can only be
rectified  through  processes  designed  to  acknowledge  and  take  responsibility  for  our  social
position, rather than setting it aside it. Such processes include reflexivity – by which we situate
ourselves  within  our  research  projects,  highlighting  our  biases  and  ignorances  -  and  deep,
empathic, politically engaged attention to the voices and arguments of those who suffer injustice.
Such methods are deeply unfamiliar within mainstream moral philosophy, and are often in conflict
with  the  usual  methods,  such  as  thought  experiments,  which  centre  the  perspectives  and




CHAPTER 6 - PERSONAL TRANSFORMATION AS MORAL PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
In this chapter, I discuss the possibility of changes to the methods of moral philosophy – what
philosophers do when they take themselves to be doing moral philosophy – which are somewhat
more radical than that discussed in the previous two chapters. The directives to be wary of the use
of  abstraction  in  moral  theory,  and  to  consider  the  limitations  of  universalistic  first-personal
methods, are important, but limited insofar as they may leave untouched the basic picture of a
philosopher writing essays, engaging with a variety of sources, attending conferences and talks,
teaching  students,  and  so  forth.  Here  I  will  discuss  the  challenge  that  arises  from  personal
transformations in moral philosophy, and how their importance may lead us to see active, political
engagement with the world as an indispensable method for philosophers to improve their moral
views, individually and collectively.
Talking  about  the  experience  of  having  a  child,  L.  A.  Paul  writes  “A  personally
transformative experience radically changes what it is like to be you, perhaps by replacing your
core preferences with very different ones." Also "it may change your personal phenomenology in
deep and far-reaching ways."1 Though such transformations may be triggered in an instant, by a
single event, they may also be rather protracted experiences, taking place over a length of time.
They may involve  changes  to  personality  traits,  such as  the  development  of  self-assurance  or
integrity,2 and the abandonment of self-negation or self-hatred.3 They can involve a shift in social
identity.  They  can  also  radically  change  the  way  we  see  the  world.  So,  they  are  personally
transformative, epistemically transformative – changing what one is inclined to believe, or in a
position  to  know  -  and  behaviourally  transformative.  An  important  case  of  personal
transformation is the process of coming to feminist consciousness, or 'feminist awakening,' which
involves "changes in behavior [that] go hand in hand with changes in consciousness: to become a
feminist  is  to  develop  a  radically  altered  consciousness  of  oneself,  of  others,  and  of...  'social
reality.'"4 I will return to the specific features of feminist awakening later, but will begin by looking
more generally  at  the  place  that  such transformations  may have in  moral  philosophy as  it  is
1 Paul (2015) "What You Can't Expect When You're Expecting," Res Philosophica 92:2, p. 8.
2 See Babbitt (1996), Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination (Westview Press: Oxford), p.
39.
3 See Bartky (1990), Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Epistemology of Oppression (Routledge: New York),
p. 21.
4 Bartky (1990), p. 12.
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currently practiced.
REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND RADICAL REVISIONS OF BELIEF
A useful place to start is with DePaul's discussion of "discontinuous revisions of belief" – radical
shifts  in  moral  positions  –  within the  context  of  reflective  equilibrium.5 DePaul  contrasts  two
distinct conceptions of reflective equilibrium; a conservative conception of the method, and a more
radical conception. Both agree on a basic outline: very roughly, a person begins with their moral
beliefs, eliminates the ones that are obviously epistemically sub-par, then forms principles that
explicate  the  remaining  judgements,  revising  both  judgement  and  theory  in  order  to  resolve
conflicts,  and similarly brings the resulting theory into coherence with their other background
views, including the challenge from possible alternative moral theories.6
Where these conceptions differ is in the role given to discontinuous revisions of belief. The
conservative method licences revisions of belief only when those revisions “are those  required to
make the  initial  system of  moral  beliefs  cohere,”7 with one another  and with all  background
beliefs. Thus, other kinds of moral belief revision, ones not deriving from prior beliefs, are ruled
out, perhaps as irrational, but at least as not part of the methodology of reflective equilibrium,
which is the method by which, it is supposed, we are to do moral philosophy. So “This version of
the method can be seen as aiming at making a person's moral convictions at a given time explicit
and precise.”8 DePaul suggests that this method “suppose[s] that when we begin moral enquiry
we already possess as much of the truth about morality as we ever will. The harvest is over and
moral  enquiry  amounts  to  no  more  than  separating  the  chaff  from  the  grain."9 It  should  be
obvious, particularly in the light of my discussion of ignorance in the previous chapter, why this
strikes me as an inadequate methodology.
By  contrast,  “The  radical  conception  of  reflective  equilibrium  allows  for,  and  indeed
expects,  revisions of  beliefs and degrees of belief  that  go beyond what is  necessary to resolve
conflicts in favour of more strongly held beliefs.”10 He gives the example of moral conversions,
such as may occur to a person who reads Marx or Nietzsche for the first time and has their entire
moral worldview shift, not in order to better systematise their prior moral beliefs, or to resolve
5 DePaul (1987), p. 469.
6 See DePaul (1987), p. 464-5. This account follows that of Daniels (1979), "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and 
Theory Acceptance in Ethics," The Journal of Philosophy 76:5.
7 DePaul (1987), p. 467, emphasis mine.
8 DePaul (1987), p. 467.
9 DePaul (1987), p. 470.
10 DePaul (1987), p. 468.
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newly-spotted conflicts – we may even suppose their prior moral worldview was totally coherent –
but simply because this new worldview, in its totality, appears utterly compelling. “The person
simply  abandons  at  least  some  of  her  old  considered  moral  judgements  or  background
philosophical  commitments  and adopts  a  new set  of  commitments."11 DePaul  argues  that  the
conservative conception of reflective equilibrium cannot account for such an experience, or include
such changes of belief within its recommended methodology.12
Further,  though  reading  Marx  or  Nietzsche  will  obviously  count  as  a  legitimate
philosophical activity, DePaul also wants to make room for similar discontinuous belief changes
occuring on the basis of all kinds of other experiences - such as engaging with art, meeting new
people,  facing a moral  choice,  or  a mystical  or  spiritual  encounter  -  and to suggest  that  such
changes may be rational when they are somehow appropriate to the experience. He calls such
events  "formative experiences,"13 a  notion which presumably includes,  but is  broader than the
specifically transformative experiences I will discuss later in the chapter, which involve a deeper
change  in  self.  There  is  an  important  point  to  note  here:  even  a  defender  of  a  conservative
conception of reflective equilbrium, such as Norman Daniels, would accept that sometimes our
moral beliefs have been formed, and continue to change, on the basis of experiences like these. 14
The  difference  is  that  while  the  conservative  conception  sees  such  changes  as  part  of  the
background,  the  starting  point  we  bring  to  the  method  of  reflective  equilibrium,  the  radical
conception explicitly aims to include such experiences as potentially rational parts of philosophical
method, as part of what we do, and must do, in our philosophical pursuit of justified moral belief.
The radical conception does not just make room for the changes in belief brought about by
these experiences, it also encourages us to seek them out, highlighting how our moral beliefs may
be irrational when formed on the basis of a lack of exposure to the kinds of experience which
might lead us to  abandon those beliefs  (as,  for  example,  exposure to  nature  may lead one to
abandon anti-environmental attitudes).15 Thus, for DePaul, some non-purely-reflective acts, acts of
seeking out actual challenging experiences in the world, must be part of any sound method of
reflective equilibrium, and part of our philosophical methodology.
11 DePaul (1987), p. 469.
12 DePaul suggests that this failure may be attributed to an attitude that "the experience of any ordinary adult will do," 
which I take to be a manifestation of the universalistic first-personal approach in ethics. DePaul (1988), "Naivete 
and Corruption in Moral Inquiry," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:4, p. 619.
13 DePaul (1988), p. 620-623.
14 See Daniels (1979), though he talks only occasionally and briefly about how we come about our starting point.
15 DePaul (1987), p. 474-5.
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This  point  can be  generalised beyond DePaul's  criticism of  conservative  conceptions  of
reflective equilibrium: though different  mainstream moral  theories  and methodologies  grant  a
variety of epistemic roles to experience, experience rarely moves beyond the background of such
theories. For example, Sidgwick reflects upon his own experiences of pleasure and pain in order to
establish the hedonism at the heart of his Utilitarian theory,16 and some theories may include some
experience  of  moral  education  among  the  preconditions  for  being  able  to  make  right  moral
judgements. However, seeking and appreciating challenging experiences is rarely recommended
as part of method by which we (philosophers) are to improve our moral beliefs. Consideration of
such experiences rarely forms part of philosophical practice. Though students of philosophy are
directly encouraged to, evaluated and accepted on their ability to, engage with a certain style of
reasoning  activities  –  the  construction  of  arguments,  consideration  of  counterexamples,
interpretation of texts, etc – they are rarely encouraged to engage with the kinds of experiences
that might shake their worldview in less structured, argumentative ways, such as through direct
engagement with a political struggle, or through non-argumentative conversation with someone
affected by some moral issue.17 Similarly, we rarely see practicing philosophers including some
engagement  with  life-changing  experiences  in  their  philosophical  work,  as,  in  an  uncommon
counter-example, Brison discusses in depth her experience of violent sexual assault, and the deep
impact this event, and its aftermath, had on her philosophical and moral understanding.18
Still, we cannot simply recommend that philosophers seek our every experience that might
cause changes to their moral views, as not every discontinuous change of belief is an epistemic
improvement. DePaul explores this point in terms of naivete and corruption19: though it seems that
we must seek out experiences which destroy our naivete, we must also avoid, or at least cannot
recommend,  ones  that  would be  corrupting.  We could  take  corrupting  experiences  to  include
brainwashing or indoctrination, but DePaul also offers a much more interesting example:
Suppose that  Janet  is  a  person who has been brought up to value pre-marital  chastity and
marital fidelity very highly. Janet has not simply accepted her childhood teaching on blind faith,
but has thought long and hard about the morality of sexual relations outside of marriage and
considered what the proponents of such relations have to say in their behalf. She has identified
what she considers to be the weak spots in the arguments offered by the proponents of liberal
16 See Sidgwick (1901), Book ii, Chapters ii and iii.





sexual morals and constructed arguments for her view from premises that she finds deeply
compelling even after long critical reflection. In short, suppose that Janet has attained a point of
wide  reflective  equilibrium  in  which  she  holds  sexual  relations  outside  of  marriage  to  be
immoral. It seems to me that Janet might well correctly judge that there are experiences that
would lead her to alter this point of view, for example, reading erotica and romance novels with
an open mind,  watching (well  made)  pornographic  films,  and having sexual  relations with
numerous (sensitive and experienced) partners.  But the natural  thing for  Janet  would be to
avoid these experiences on the grounds that they would corrupt both her character and more
importantly, at least in the present context, her moral judgment.20
DePaul's  question,  then,  is  how do we  sort  the  cases  in  which  naivete  needs  to  be  dispelled
through  experience  from  those  in  which  experience  would  tend  to  corrupt  people's  moral
attitudes. He suggests two approaches to this question: a liberal approach, which directs people to
use their own epistemic standards to judge what kind of experience would be corrupting, and
what  he  calls  an “Aristotelian” approach,  which brings  independent  standards  to  identify  the
experiences that an agent needs to have.21 DePaul has concerns with both approaches, as he argues
that the liberal approach will not do enough to challenge deeply entrenched naivete,22 while the
Aristotelian approach fails to account for his intuition, in the case of Janet, that she is epistemically
right  to  avoid  those  experiences,  as  corrupting,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  they  are  in  fact
corrupting.
Obviously  I  have  no  interest  in  the  liberal  approach,  and  its  commitment  to  a  liberal
neutrality which requires us to take a person's epistemic standards as sacrosanct; my intention in
the  previous  chapter  of  this  thesis  has  been  to  argue  that  the  actual  pre-existing  epistemic
standards that most of us operate with are deeply problematic, distorted by privilege and systemic
ignorance.  However, there is also something not right with the so-called Aristotelian approach
DePaul outlines,  which he also calls “conservative,” as he suggests  it  relies  on our employing
particular moral conceptions.
DePaul is worried about this method on the grounds that it involves “entirely abandoning
the ideal of a moral methodology that is neutral between substantive moral theories.”23 In a sense
20 DePaul (1988), p. 630.
21 See DePaul (1988), p. 631-635.
22 Later DePaul settled on a very slightly modified version of the liberal approach, see DePaul (1993), Balance and 
Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry, (Rouledge: London), p. 169-183. This choice was 
influenced by his goal "to answer a question [about rationality] that is raised from an egocentric point of view," (p. 
179), a goal which I don't share for reasons that should be clear from my previous chapter.
23 DePaul (1988), p. 634.
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this is an ideal I have already abandoned, as I agreed with Schwartzman, in chapter 4 of this thesis,
that attempts to be politically (or morally) neutral in our methodology will tend to lend support to
an implicit male-dominated status quo. But DePaul's worry here, signalled by his understanding
of this methodology as conservative, and his concern about “abandoning coherentism,”24 seems to
be slightly stronger: that, in giving up the liberal approach, we would have to start with particular
substantive, foundational moral conclusions, and craft a methodology which simply leads one to
those (already chosen) conclusions.
We can look closer at the Janet example to see whether this must be the case.  Much is
hidden, and perhaps idealised in DePaul's  construction of this case.  For example,  it  is  unclear
exactly what the content of Janet's sexual morality is: does she judge that chastity and fidelity are
noble, valuable, or simply right-for-her, and so aim to respect these values in her own life, or does
she also judge and harass others for failing to live by these standards, object to her tax money
being spent on sexual health clinics, and publicly campaign for abstinence-only sex education? I
think we would clearly be inclined to judge her naivete much more harshly if the latter were the
case.
More generally, we are not shown the connections between this element of her morality and
her wider moral worldview. A radical feminist may argue that a conservative sexual morality is a
violent sexual morality, one that aims to keep women in subjugation to men and in competition
with each other, one that limits women's freedom to live in ways that are not oriented around men,
play a wider role in the social and political world, and develop an understanding of their own
sexuality. This is presumably the kind of argument that DePaul must think Janet has considered
and rejected, but we would need to know exactly how she rejected it, and what she thinks about
these issues, before we can really judge this case; if Janet rejects these arguments simply because
she believes that it is right and proper for men to occupy and dominate a public sphere while
women are restricted to a private sphere,  again we would be more inclined to judge that her
naivete needs to be challenged. Furthermore,  by ignoring the interconnections between Janet's
sexual morality and her wider moral worldview, DePaul ignores the ways her sexual morality may
be challenged indirectly, even through experiences that have nothing to do with sexuality.
In others ways too, DePaul severely limits the kinds of experiences Janet might pursue to
challenge her moral  views.  He mentions she may read pornography or  erotica,  or  have some
24 DePaul (1988), p. 635.
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diverse sexual experiences. These are plausibly experiences that are morally ruled out by Janet's
existing sexual  morality,  and though DePaul  wants  this  example  “to  call  upon epistemic,  not
moral, intuitions,”25 it is likely that this problem is driving our judgement. But we should consider
other ways that Janet's views might be challenged, even ways that focus directly on the issue of
sexual morality. For example, Janet may befriend a polyamorous person,26 follow a sex worker on
Twitter, volunteer at a sexual health clinic, join a reading group that discusses issues of sexuality,
watch a non-pornographic film concerned with sexual liberation, read about the history (rather
than just the arguments) of second-wave feminism, etc. Certainly some of these experiences may
be very  challenging for  Janet,  but  they look unlikely to  be  morally  ruled out  by her  existing
morality  (and  again,  if  they  are,  then  that  existing  morality  starts  to  look  a  whole  lot  more
problematic). Might they nonetheless be morally corrupting?
For DePaul the picture looks like this: If we follow the liberal model, we can say that these
experiences are corrupting because Janet deems them to be corrupting, insofar as she judges that
they would mislead her - perhaps the friend would be tempting, the group would be browbeating,
and the film would be emotionally manipulative – and this judgement is justified by her existing
epistemic standards. If we follow the Aristotelian model, we could say these experiences are not
corrupting,  but  we  only  say  that  in  virtue  of  our judgement  that  these  are  just  the  kinds  of
experiences Janet needs to have to combat her naivete, which seems to rest on a prior judgement
that there is something wrong with Janet's sexual morality, and that she would be right to modify
or abandon it.
However, something seems to go wrong in this elaboration of the so-called Aristotlelian
model. What particular substantive moral theory would we assume by suggesting that, despite
Janet's  judgement,  these  experiences  would  not  be  corrupting?  Let's  focus  on  the  kind  of
experiences where Janet communicates with or listens to people with a different relationship to
sexuality than her own: such experiences may help combat Janet's  naivete by exposing her to
ideas,  worldviews,  attitudes  and  interests  that  she  may  otherwise  remain  ignorant  of.  This
judgement  alone  does  not  require us  to  believe  that  Janet  was  wrong  in  her  original  moral
worldview; one could hold the right kind of beliefs,  but do so naively.27 This  judgement does
require  something  like  the  belief  that  there  is  something  to  be  gained  by  attending  to  the
25 DePaul (1988), p.634.
26 Preferably in a way that does not involve saying "Hello, please be a means to help me improve my moral views."
27 Cf. DePaul (1988), p. 625-626.
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experiences and testimony (broadly speaking)  of  those unlike ourselves,  with worldviews and
situations unlike our own. We could see some particular moral beliefs underlying this: we would
have to recognise these other people as having kind of reason or real interests behind what they
do. If Janet saw these others as sub-human, mindless, or simply evil, then she may see no reason to
think anything valuable could be gained by listening to them, but at this point I think we should
be  fairly  comfortable  with  rejecting  the  liberal  approach,  and  simply  saying  that  Janet  is
disastrously wrong in her judgement here.28 Similarly, in order to not think such contact would be
corrupting, we would have to believe that these people would not irresistibly mislead, confound,
or manipulate Janet. That is, we would have to be not completely in the grip of testimonial injustice
(seeing  them  as  liars),  hermeneutical  injustice  (seeing  them  as  speaking  nonsense)  or  an
epistemology of ignorance. Perhaps further conditions would need to be in place as well, but my
point here is just that the kind of assumptions we would have to make in order to see this kind of
activity as not corrupting, though they may constitute particular moral beliefs, will fall way short
of being a complete, particular moral theory, or even the belief that Janet is wrong and some other
particular, opposed moral view is totally right.
DePaul would probably think this is a fairly minor point. For him, the important distinction
seems to be that his preferred “liberal approach to moral inquiry is committed to the idea that an
adequate  method  of  moral  inquiry  must  be  neutral  between  substantive  moral  conceptions.
Conversely, a conservative approach will hold either that there is no such neutral method of moral
inquiry or that no neutral method can be adequate.”29 For reasons already given, I embrace the
second  approach,  so  characterised,  though  I  would  prefer  to  think  such  an  approach  may
sometimes be better described as radical,  rather than conservative, insofar as it is based in the
kinds of radical political critiques coming from feminist and anti-racist theory.
It  may  be  worth  considering  this  in  terms  of  my  discussion  of  methodological
conservativeness in the first chapter of this thesis. As I discussed there, DePaul's radical reflective
equilibrium  is  less  methodologically  conservative  than  his  alternative,  conservative  reflective
equilibrium, insofar as it undermines the privileged position of some particular moral conceptions
by directing us to seek experiences that will  challenge the naivete they are built on. However,
under his  liberal  development of  radical  reflective equilibrium, this direction is guided by the
individual's  pre-existing  (though  subject  to  change)  epistemological  standards,  which,  as  is
28 Cf. Flikschuh (2014), p. 4
29 DePaul (1988), p. 171.
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suggested by my discussion in the previous chapter, must also be understood as partly political
and moral. On the alternative view of moral inquiry I want to present, this conservative element,
the privileging of the particular moral/epistemological standards the agent brings to moral inquiry,
is  not  present.  However  there  is  something  else  that  DePaul  would  want  to  characterise  as
conservative: the role of my moral/epistemological standards, not as the person undergoing moral
inquiry, but as the person recommending, perhaps to another, a methodology for moral inquiry. I
do not believe that this need be conservative in the sense DePaul is worried about, insofar as the
methodology is not designed to simply transmit  a particular moral  view that  I,  as  the person
recommending the methodology, have already worked out, nor does it rely on some teacher with a
firm moral view simply transmitting that view to others.30 Note in particular that the substantive
moral/epistemological views that may underlie the recommendation of the methodology – such as
taking epistemic injustice and epistemologies of ignorance seriously – are not simply those that the
methodology is supposed to bring us to hold.
Ultimately, there is a limit to how fruitful discussion of DePaul's methodology can be here,
insofar as I am not concerned with constructing a coherentist approach to moral methodology, not
primarily  concerned with the  issue  of  first-personal  rationality,  and not  inclined to  orient  my
discussion of methodology around the basic structure of reflective equilibrium. This framing of the
discussion  limits  him  in  a  number  of  ways;  for  example,  the  picture  he  presents  of  seeking
experiences that may lead to radical revisions in our moral views is rather limited, imagining a
person who is naïve about something, conceives a few possible experiences that could challenge
that naivete, and considers whether those experiences would be corrupting. This excludes some
interesting, perhaps more common, but more difficult cases, such as the agent who is not simply
naïve,  but  rather  in  the  grip  of  distorting  ideological  commitments,  that  lead  them  to
fundamentally misconceive moral reality. It also seems to exclude the possibility that the necessary
transformative experiences may not be simply identifiable, or even conceivable, ahead of time. 
For example, someone who held traditional ideas about the appropriate organisation of
family life may have these ideas challenged by some experience of communal living. However,
this person may have no idea of what exactly “communal living” could look like – indeed it might
not determinately look like anything in particular before they try to create it - and they may not
even  be  aware  that  any  genuine  alternatives  to  traditional  family  life  exist.  This  shows  that,
30 These are the possible conservative elements DePaul seems to be worried about, see DePaul (1988), p.634.
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contrary to DePaul's framing of the issues surrounding formative experiences, such experiences
may shift people's moral views not just by filling in absences of knowledge, but also by working
on  their  concepts,  challenging  entrenched  or  problematic  ways  of  understanding  the  moral
landscape.  Again, DePaul fails to account for the way that individual moral beliefs are entrenched
in a wider moral worldview, that may need to be challenged as a whole, rather than piecemeal.
Despite these limitations, I hope this discussion has helped establish, firstly, that contrary to
the conservative forms of reflective equilibrium that DePaul criticises, which are perhaps dominant
in moral philosophical practice, we need to make room for transformative experiences in moral
inquiry,  and,  secondly,  that  we  also  need  to  discuss  the  question  of  exactly  what  kinds  of
experiences these may need to be, rather than simply leaving that question to the standards of
individual moral theorists.31 It is to this latter question that I turn for the remainder of this chapter.
MCKINNON AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TRANS AWAKENING
Rachel  McKinnon's  paper  “Trans*formative  Experiences”  provides  a  useful  discussion  of  the
epistemological  benefits  of  one  particular  transformative  experience,  as  she  writes  about  the
insights and improved moral consciousness that may come about due to trans awakening - the
process by which a person comes to understand themself as trans, and as being other than the
gender they were assigned at birth -  and the related process of gender transition.32 McKinnon
argues that as a trans woman's particular social situatedness changes during the process of gender
transition, she will gain some of the epistemic privilege which standpoint epistemologies attribute
to marginalised social locations; she will gain privileged access to the standpoint of women. In
particular, though a trans woman, before trans awakening or gender transition, may be aware of
the  existence  of  sexism  and  gender  oppression,  she  will  afterwards  additionally  gain  some
experience of “what it's like” to experience these harms. “Sexism stands out in a way it didn't
before: being forced to struggle against implicit bias, stereotype threat, attributional ambiguity,
harassment,  and  all  the  social  ills  disproportionately  visited  upon  women  has  changed  my
epistemic  access  to  how  things  are  in  the  world.”33 She  argues  that  these  new  experiences  -
particularly in combination with a previous awareness of what it is like to not be subject to these
harms – will often lead to a feminist awakening for trans women.
31 Ultimately me and DePaul may be agreeing on both points here, as he may concur that moral philosophy needs to 
include this discussion, while emphasising that philosophers will individualistically employ their existing epistemic 
standards to judge what to take from that discussion.
32 McKinnon (2015), "Trans*formative Experiences," Res Philosophica 92:2.
33 McKinnon (2015), p. 20.
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Broadly speaking, I completely agree with McKinnon and her conclusions; trans awakening
is a great example of a transformative experience, involving a change in situatedness, that can
radically change the moral attitudes, and access to moral facts, for trans women who undergo it.
However there are a number of small details I think it may be worthwhile to spell out, and to
explore. Most of these relate to the question of how exactly we can understand the idea of a change
in  social  situatedness.  A  puzzle  derives  from  the  fact,  commonly  (though  not  universally)
expressed by trans women, and of some importance to transfeminism, that (at least some) trans
women were women or girls34 before transition, and  before trans awakening.35 That is, most trans
women understand their transition not as a process of ceasing to be one gender and becoming
another,  but rather  of  attempting to shift  the  social  perception and acknowledgement of  their
gender  to  match  what  it  actually is.36 This  claim  can  be  important  for  making  sense  of  our
experiences, for understanding how social forces have acted differently on us than on cis men,37
and for helping explain the imperative to transition. The question, then, is how do we understand
the change of social situatedness, and its relation to the standpoint epistemologies that McKinnon
calls upon, given that in some sense membership in the relevant social category, 'woman,' has not
changed.
Though McKinnon does not explicitly discuss this issue, or what exactly she understands a
change  in  situatedness  to  be,  she  gives  us  the  resources  to  deal  with  it.  In  particular,  when
introducing the notion of situatedness, she writes “Each person has a complicated intersectional
identity, composed of various socially and biologically constructed factors. These factors include
race,  gender and gender identity,  sexual  orientation, socioeconomic status,  education, religious
affiliation, nationality, and so on. These also include perceived versions of these statuses.”38 This
34 Many discussions of trans experience speak only of "women" and "men," as though trans people never got to be 
children, and as though all trans people transition as adults. This seems particularly jarring in the face of the 
desperately problematic and bizarre "born a man" trope, which naturalises and essentialises the genders trans people
were assigned at birth. That said, always speaking of "women or girls" does get tiresome, so, having highlighted 
this, I will also speak about "trans women," with this often being shorthand for "trans women or girls."
35 See Brighe (2014), "Please Stop Saying That Trans Women Were "Born Boys"", published on Autostraddle, 
September 29th, 2014, http://www.autostraddle.com/let-it-go-for-the-last-time-trans-women-were-not-born-boys-
255055/
36 It is important to note that this claim is seperable from the decreasingly common claim that trans women have 
always known that they are women or girls, which McKinnon rightly suggests we reject as a standard trans 
narrative, McKinnon (2015), p. 12, fn. 18. Also note that by speaking of what someone's gender "actually" is I am 
not rejecting any kind of social constructionist account of gender.
37 On this point, see Millbank (2012), and Dentata (2014), "Nothing to Lose: Trans Women and Male Privilege," 
published at amydentata.com, February 18th, 2014, http://amydentata.com/2014/02/18/nothing-to-lose-trans-
women-and-male-privilege/
38 McKinnon (2015), p. 15.
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gives us room to identify three roughly distinct possible stages of a trans woman's identity: 39 1)
before  trans  awakening,  being  a  woman  who  is  not  perceived  as  a  woman,  2)  after  trans
awakening,  being  a  woman  who  is  correctly  perceived  by  herself to  be  a  woman,  and  3)
through/after transition40, being a woman who may be (when/if not being misgendered) correctly
perceived  by  others to  be  a  woman.41 Each  of  these  stages  will  involve  distinct  experiences,
phenomenology, and epistemic effects.
Some of the examples McKinnon discusses, cases where she has experienced what it is like
to suffer sexism, must be understood relative to the third stage. She gives the example of being
repeatedly misunderstood by a speaker at a conference until her comment is repeated by a man.42
This is an experience of being denied, due to sexism, a privilege that she had previously been
provisionally afforded: the privilege of being granted the general assumption that what one says
makes sense. So described, this is an experience that could only happen on the basis of her being
perceived  by the speaker to be a woman; or, at least, as other than a man. Similarly, she gives an
example of being suddenly ignored and excluded from a conversation with two men 43,  which
looks to be a denial of the privilege of being granted the general assumption that what one says is
important. Again, as McKinnon acknowledges, what triggered this event was not simply her being
a woman, but also her being perceived by others to be a woman. Another example she discusses
can be understood relative to the second stage: she talks about how her social location as a trans
woman, and her attendant experiences with social and medical systems, put her in a position to
notice  that  the  language used by a  particular  cisgender male  physician was  oppressive.44 The
epistemic  effect  she  discusses  here  came  from  her  awareness  of  herself  as  trans,  and  the
knowledge, experiences, and understanding that awareness gave her, as someone who struggles
with cissexism. This effect did not rely on her being perceived by others to be a woman. Of course,
this is an example of witnessing and understanding cissexism, rather than misogyny.
It may help to think through these issues by looking at another example, of an event that
can be experienced, by a trans woman, in any of these stages, but will be experienced differently,
39 We need not understand these stages as experienced linearly, or experienced and understood by every trans person 
in the same way; the distinctions I am making here are vast oversimplifications.
40 I am not entirely comfortable speaking of a time "after transition," as transition is a vague process with vague 
boundaries; in particular, being regularly gendered correctly should not be considered an endpoint or fundamental 
goal of transition for all trans women.
41 Not all trans woman will regularly or reliably experience this. 
42 McKinnon (2015), p. 19.
43 McKinnon (2015), p. 27-8.
44 McKinnon (2015), p. 17.
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with different epistemic effects, in each case. The example I have in mind is one very familiar to
many women educated in academic philosophy - and one which McKinnon alludes to in her first
example – the experience of being the only woman in the room. This is something that I have
experienced  at  every  stage  of  my  participation  in  philosophy,  though  more  frequently  since
becoming a graduate student. That is to say, I experienced this before trans awakening, after trans
awakening, while still presenting a male facade, and after commencing transition, that is,  after
making some conscious effort to bring other people's perception of my gender in line with my
actual gender. At each of these stages, the effects on me of those instances where I was the only
woman in the room was different.
Before trans awakening I had experiences of being the only woman in the room, but would
understand these experiences, when I noticed them, as being ones where “there are no women in
this room.” Such experiences did give me, and would give others in similar circumstances, some
awareness of something of the form what it is like to be the only woman in the room. In particular, they
gave me awareness of this as experienced by a woman with a particular intersectional identity: that
of a trans woman, or more specifically a trans woman who lacked a certain self-understanding.
The effects on me of these experiences were oppressive, and in ways that implicate sexism: for
example,  they  led  me  to  (more  deeply)  internalise  such  ideas  as  that  philosophy  is  not  an
appropriate or felicitous activity for women and that women don't belong in these spaces, and they
facilitated my self-denial  as  a trans woman through the idea that  my progress  and continued
presence in such a clearly masculine space was incompatible with my being other than a man.
Despite this, my epistemic position in relation to these experiences was extremely weak; though I
had something like an awareness of what it is like to be the only woman in the room, I was clearly not
in any kind of position to do much with this awareness, not in a position to turn it into any kind of
useful or liberatory knowledge.
After trans awakening, my experience of what was in some significant sense the same type of
event, being the only woman in the room, changed. At this point I could understand my experience
in precisely those terms, and I acutely felt certain negative effects, in particular a sense of isolation
and loneliness, and feelings of being an imposter within philosophy, as it was implicitly presenting
itself as a masculine space. I also felt a heightened awareness of my own gender, and its mismatch
with the culture expressed by others in the room as well as my own presentation, and had to
contend with anxieties around the possibility of transition while remaining in such a space. At this
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point I was better able to understand, as McKinnon puts it, “what it felt like to inhabit a world of
structural oppression.”45 For example, though I could guess before that experiencing oneself as
being the only woman in a philosophical room might make one feel uncomfortable and like an
outsider,  only  after  trans  awakening,  and  experiencing  these  feelings  while  in  a  position  to
understand them, did I start to see how these facts could help create a philosophical climate which
would tend to drive women away from the discipline, perpetuating the problem. That is, only then
did I start to understand the problem as structural and political, rather than merely unfortunate. It
is not that this kind of understanding was in principle barred from me beforehand, but simply that
I did not have the same kind of motivations and vantage-point to develop this understanding
myself.
And again, my experiences were different after commencing transition, after making some
effort to have my gender correctly recognised by others. Though I have avoided the kind of direct,
obvious epistemic injustices that McKinnon talks about (mostly though not saying much at all), I
again experienced a heightened sense of difference and unbelonging46; sometimes an attitude of
assertive belligerence was needed to enter and remain in such spaces, as both openly trans and a
woman. I felt aware of myself as a kind of singular representative of womanhood in such spaces,
which triggered the stress and anxiety that comes with stereotype threat.47 Similarly, I experienced
an anxiety about how I occupied that space as a woman – how I dressed, how I behaved, etc – in a
context where there were few other exemplars to relate to, and in the position of an openly trans
woman, whose very womanhood is subject to question by cisnormative understandings of gender.
On those occasions when I was one of two women in the room, I would wonder whether my
feelings of solidarity with her were reciprocated.
The point of working through this extended example is to suggest that there is something
missing if we understand the epistemic advantage that is gained through gender transition simply
in terms of gaining what it's like experiences. There is some sense in which a trans woman's social
location,  as  a  trans  woman,  is  unchanged through transition,  and in  this  sense  she  will  have
experiences of what it's like to be a woman even well before trans awakening. Certainly the content
of these experiences will change radically after awakening, but this is consistent with the fact that
45 McKinnon (2015), p. 20.
46 The BPA/SWIP report on women in philosophy in the UK occasionally discusses the effect of being the only 
woman in a roomful of men, noting how it contributes to feelings of isolating, being an outsider, and shyness. 
Beebee & Saul (2011), "Women in Philosophy in the UK," p. 16.
47 See Beebee & Saul (2011), p. 13. McKinnon has also discussed the particular influence of stereotype threat on trans
women, McKinnon (2014), "Stereotype Threat and Attributional Ambiguity for Trans Women," Hypatia 29:4.
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what  it's  like  to  be  a  woman is  different  for  different  women in  different  circumstances  and,
particularly, with different intersectional social locations, such as that of being both a woman and
trans. To reiterate, that a trans woman's distinctive experience may be shared by no cis women
makes it no less an experience of what it is like to be a woman; this judgement goes along with our
rejection of essentialism. Of course, we could point out that before transition, most trans women
have (probably) not had the particular  what it's like experiences of suffering professional sexual
harassment or sexist implicit bias, and so such women would be in a worse position to understand
these particular wrongs. But while it is true, this answer fails to address the particular question of
why, despite having had some what it's like experiences of being a woman before trans awakening,
nonetheless  before  awakening  a  trans  woman  is  in  a  much worse  position  for  being  able  to
understand and make sense of even these experiences. So, we need to ask, what in particular about
trans awakening or transition brings about not just new experiences, but also new potential for
understanding those experiences.
McKinnon takes us some way towards an answer as she talks about “struggle.” Her claim
is that “being forced to struggle against implicit bias, stereotype threat, attributional ambiguity,
harassment,  and  all  the  social  ills  disproportionately  visited  upon  women  has  changed  my
epistemic access to how things are in the world.”48 She specifically notes that, while knowledge
that  these  things  happen is  available  to  cis  men,  it  is  struggling with these  things  that  brings
epistemic advantage. However, there is an ambiguity in the word “struggle.” On the one hand it
may simply refer to suffering, experiencing something while being harmed by it. Suffering may be
an important concept for feminist epistemology49, but it doesn't get us quite what we need here.
Though,  before  trans awakening,  a  trans woman may not have suffered from these particular
social ills - implicit bias, stereotype threat, etc – she nonetheless will have experienced, and in one
way or another suffered from, and struggled with, a number of social ills which characteristically
effect women, such as the internalisation of oppressive sex roles, or restrictive beauty norms.50 This
(passive) form of struggle is manifestly not sufficient to bring about improved understanding.
On  the  other  hand,  we  may  understand  struggle  in  a  more  active  sense,  perhaps  as
48 McKinnon (2015), p. 20.
49 See Jaggar (1983), p. 370.
50 To head off misunderstanding, I am not suggesting that male sex roles are oppressive, but rather that a trans girl is 
liable to internalise female sex roles as applying to herself, if only in some inchoate way, and suffer from these in a 
similar way to cis girls. For more on how sex roles may be internalised by trans girls and women, see Millbank 
(2012).
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struggling against rather than struggling with.51 As I discussed in the previous chapter, standpoint
epistemologists have highlighted the importance of  political struggle for creating the standpoint
from which an undistorted view of the world can be achieved. This point was particularly pressed
by Hartsock, who insists that a standpoint must be “interested in the sense of being engaged,” 52
but also by Jaggar, who, acknowledging the importance of suffering for standpoint epistemology,
also noted that we must go beyond, and perhaps redescribe women's experience, and that this is
accomplished  through  “scientific  and  political  struggle.”53 Including  some  amount  of  active
engagement among what is  required to achieve the epistemic advantage one might gain from
occupying a particular social location is important precisely for showing why mere  what it's like
experience is not sufficient to bring about greater knowledge.
This also helps to explain why after trans awakening, a trans woman is in a better position
to derive some epistemic advantage from the  what it's like experiences that she has had, and the
new experiences that she will go on to have. Even if she was previously aware of feminist concepts,
only after  coming to understand herself  as  a woman is  she is  a  position to understand those
experiences she has had as the experiences of a woman under patriarchy. This also puts her in a
position  to,  in  some  sense,  challenge  or  rail  against  those  experiences.  Some  process  of
reinterpreting past events in light of a new self-understanding is a fairly common aspect of trans
experience, often taking place soon after, or perhaps as part of the process of, trans awakening.
This  phenomena  is  not  entirely  distinct  from  a  process  undergone  by  cis  women  coming  to
feminism, as Hartsock notes: “We came to understand our experiences, our past, in a way that
transformed our experience and ourselves.”54
This is  a process which social and political forces, most obviously the gatekeepers who
govern access to medical care for many trans people, have attempted to control. 55 Though this
practice is thankfully dying down, it continues, to some degree, to be expected of trans women
that they construct a personal narrative, a new life history in terms that do not challenge either
traditional gender ideology, or cisnormativity. Refusal to express an anti-feminist interpretation of
51 McKinnon uses both of these locutions at different points. She specifically mentions the non-passive element of 
struggle at McKinnon (2015), p. 18.
52 Hartsock (1983), p. 285.
53 Jaggar (1983), p. 384
54 Hartsock (1979) "Feminist Theory and the Development of Revolutionary Strategy," in Capitalist Patriarchy and 
the Case for Socialist Feminism ed. Eisenstein (Monthly Review Press: New York), p. 59.
55 See Stone (1987) "The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto," available at 
http://sandystone.com/empire-strikes-back.pdf, p. 12-13. For a lot more on gatekeeping, see Serano (2007), 
particularly chapter 7.
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one's own history can result in treatment being withheld.56 Even outside the medical context, we
can understand how the  need to  make our genders  understood and respected by family and
friends, who may be in the grip of sexist and cisnormative ideas, will exert an influence against the
adoption of  anything that  may be considered a liberatory feminist  or trans standpoint.  In this
context, we can see how the need to develop an interpretation of our histories in a way that does
not do violence to our experiences can be understood as a political struggle; even while much of
the act of reinterpretation goes on in our heads, a kind of private battle against the influence of
ideology,  it  manifests  externally  as  we  work  to  be  understood  and  respected  by  others.  This
struggle attempts to change our relationship to others, and to change the world, by challenging
their cisnormative attitudes.
For many trans women, particularly those early in some process of transition, simply being
themselves in the world is a struggle, in the sense of being a political act. To be seen, to assert one's
identity against a frequently hostile world,  requires in some way acting against,  resisting, and
challenging the ideologies which say that we cannot be like this. Though it is often a lonely process,
it is inevitably done against a background of continuing trans and feminist movement, a history of
political  struggle  which  has  set  the  ground  for  the  self-understanding  and,  to  some  degree,
material  conditions  that  make  transition  easier,  or  even  possible.  In  this  way,  even  with  a
distinctively political understanding of struggle, we can understand McKinnon's repeated claim
that transition “forces one... to struggle with the world in ways one hadn't before.”57
Similarly, to some extent a trans woman who encounters such things is “forced to struggle
against  implicit  bias,  stereotype  threat,  attributional  ambiguity,  [and]  harassment,”58 not  just
because  she  now experiences  these  things  –  many women through  history  have  encountered
sexism  without  struggling  against  it  in  quite  the  form  Hartsock  and  other  standpoint
epistemologists have discussed -  but because of the particular experience of witnessing a loss of
privileges and freedoms that she had previously enjoyed.59 To be sure, this struggle may not result
in the successful creation or adoption of a liberatory feminist standpoint; trans women are also
prone to internalised sexism and transmisogyny.60 Nonetheless, this helps explain the apparently
high proportion of trans women who identify as feminists, and why “transition is often (though
56 See Millbank (2012).
57 McKinnon (2015), p. 18, emphasis mine.
58 McKinnon (2015), p. 20, emphasis mine.
59 See McKinnon (2015), p. 20-21.
60 See Millbank (2011) on the complicated relationship trans women may have to street harassment.
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certainly not always) closely followed by some form of a 'feminist awakening.'”61
In  discussing  the  epistemic  ramifications  of  trans  awakening  and  gender  transition,
McKinnon has provided us with a great example of a transformative experience that can bring
about immense epistemic benefits, of use to moral theory. However, for the purposes of this thesis
there is something limiting about this example: if we are concerned with identifying what kinds of
experiences a moral philosopher might seek to go through in order to improve their ability to do
moral philosophy, gender transition is obviously not a great example. Those for whom transition is
a  viable  option  –  trans  women,  men,  and  non-binary  folks  who  have  not  yet  transitioned  –
certainly should consider it, though presumably not primarily for the reason of improving their
ability to do moral philosophy. But such a change is certainly not recommendable, and perhaps not
entirely coherent, for cis people. The more general prospect of seeking epistemic benefit through
changing one's social location also seems unlikely, for reasons McKinnon discusses with reference
to  John  Howard  Griffin's  book  Black  Like  Me,62 which  come  down  to  the  difficulty,  perhaps
impossibility, of entirely shifting social location in certain ways. So, we are left needing to identify
some kind of transformative experience which is potentially open to anyone, which can be sought
after and recommended as a general method, and which gives us epistemic benefits not unlike
those  a  trans  woman may gain  through trans  awakening.  I  will  now try  to  identify  such  an
experience through an exploration of the idea of feminist awakening.
FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERSONAL TRANSFORMATION
In her early exploration of the phenomenology of coming to feminist consciousness, Sandra Lee
Bartky wrote:
To be a feminist, one has first to become one.  For many feminists, this involves the experience
of a profound personal  transformation,  an experience which goes far  beyond the sphere of
human activity we regard ordinarily as “political.” This transforming experience, which cuts
across the ideological division within the women's movement, is complex and multifaceted. In
the  course  of  undergoing  the  transformation  to  which  I  refer,  the  feminist  changes  her
behaviour...  These  changes  in  behaviour  go  hand  in  hand  with  changes  in  consciousness:  to
become a feminist is to develop a radically altered consciousness of oneself, of others, and of
what, for lack of a better term, I shall call “social reality”63 
61 McKinnon (2015), p. 27.
62 McKinnon (2015), p. 22-25.
63 Bartky (1990), p. 11.
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Though Bartky wrote  this  in  the  early  70s,  in  the  early  days  of  the  second wave of  women's
movement,  this  phenomenon continues to manifest.  Though basic  conditions for  women have
improved in a number of ways, nonetheless coming to awareness of some of the deeper, more
pervasive and ideological feminist issues, such as rape culture, or the systematic devaluation of
women and whatever is classed as feminine, still often goes along with a significant transformative
experience much like the one described in Bartky's paper. Fischer has noted that such accounts
“are remarkably similar across the generations.”64 
In discussing this kind of change, I will tend to speak of a woman coming to feminism, as
this is the central, and most discussed case.65 However, the process of a man, or a person of any
other gender coming to be a feminist will probably share many similarities.66 Further, in discussing
this kind of transformation I do not mean to be presenting any kind of universal account, and the
discussions I draw upon here (and my own experiences) tend to relate to anglophone women,
mostly  white  women,  coming  to  feminist  consciousness  in  the  context  of  an  established  or
emerging  women's  movement.  Additionally,  though  my  discussion  focuses  on  feminist
consciousness, I do not mean to suggest that this is the only, or the most valuable form of political
consciousness, and much of what I say may relate to other forms of political consciousness, such as
that gained through anti-racist or anti-capitalist movements.
Becoming a feminist is not simply a matter of coming to know new things. It does not just
involve  coming  to  believe  something  like  a  set  of  feminist  propositions.  Rather,  “feminist
consciousness suddenly encompasses every aspect of one's life. Thus, one feels like one's very self
has been replaced by another self,  like a feminist self  has taken the seat  of  a prefeminist  self,
changing one's perception of everything formerly taken for granted as 'normal.'”67 Most obvious
here  is  the change in perception.  Someone's  becoming a feminist  will  involve her interpreting
things  differently;  perhaps  where  she  once  saw  a  casual  remark,  she  will  now  see  a  sexist
comment, perhaps where she once took a comment from a stranger in the street as complimentary
or  innocent,  she  will  now  understand  it  to  be  threatening  and  controlling.  Many  ordinary
interactions and cultural objects will come to seem particularly gendered. An early sociological
64 Fischer (2014) Gendered Readings of Change: A Feminist-Pragmatist Approach (Palgrave Macmillian: New York),
p. 122.
65 Some have even questioned whether a man can be a feminist, or whether they could only ever be an ally. I tend 
towards the more inclusive notion of "feminist" and will employ it in this thesis.
66 bell hooks often stresses the importance of feminist consciousness among men in hooks (2000), Feminism Is For 
Everybody (South End Press: Cambridge).
67 Fischer (2014), p. 123.
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study revealed that “Feminists are more likely to use a feminist vocabulary of motives, introduce
the general theme of sexism or specific feminist themes such as job discrimination...  Feminists
interject feminism into their interpretation of everyday life and perceive situations differently from
nonfeminists”.68 The moral dimension of this new way of seeing is obvious; as Minnie Bruce Pratt
described her own change of consciousness, “I became obsessed with justice”.69
Bartky wrote “Feminists are not more aware of different things than other people; they are
aware of the same things differently.”70 However this doesn't seem quite right. There will also be a
change in the kinds of things a feminist notices, in what is salient. Certainly the nonfeminist and
the feminist may both see the sexist billboard, and will both be effected by its sexism, though they
will interpret it differently. However, where the nonfeminist may ignore the billboard, think of it as
unremarkable, and be unable to recall it later in the day, the feminist may have her eye drawn to it,
be outraged by it, talk about it and keep it fresh in her mind. Further changes in what one is aware
of will come along with behavioural changes: a feminist may be motivated to attend a Reclaim The
Night march, where she becomes aware of the existence of police harassment against sex workers,
while the nonfeminist simply never hears of this. This may in turn lead the feminist to be more
aware of police presence on the streets in her daily life.
One of the deepest and most personally important changes that can come with feminist
consciousness is a change in attitudes and values. Central to being is a feminist is not just seeing
sexism, but also hating it. Feminists may come to dislike what they previously liked; as a simple
example, a friend of mine commented that since becoming aware of feminism, she could no longer
enjoy most stand-up comedy.71 Feminists may come to love what they have previously been unable
to; a small study of women coming to feminism in the 70s found “In the process of acquiring a new
image and identity, women establish friendships with each other. For some women, it is the first
time in their lives that they have had other women as friends.”72 As feminists struggle to resist
internalised  sexism which  casts  other  women in  patriarchal  terms,  or  as  rivals,  more  positive
attitudes can develop. The attitudes a feminist has towards herself may also improve, as “we are
68 Green (1979), "The Feminist Consciousness," The Sociological Quarterly 20:3, p. 359.
69 Pratt (1984), "Identity: Skin Blood Heart," in Yours in Struggle: Three Feminist Perspectives on Anti-Semitism and 
Racism, Bulkin, Pratt & Smith (Long Haul Press: New York).
70 Bartky (1990), p. 14.
71 Relatedly, see Sukan (2015), "How I became a feminist: My origin story and the importance of meltdowns," 
published at Medium.com, https://medium.com/@idilsukan/how-i-became-a-feminist-my-origin-story-and-my-
latest-public-meltdown-807cfa8acf71
72 Acker & Howard (1972), "Societal and Familial Supports in the Development of Feminists," Education Resources 
Information Center, ED 072-379, p. 20.
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no longer required to struggle against unreal enemies, to put others' interests ahead of our own, or
to hate ourselves.”73
Changes in the feminist's perception and attitudes go along with changes in behaviour,
some as minor as attending a protest or changing how she shops,  some as major as leaving a
marriage or setting up a women's shelter. “It was common for women in consciousness-raising
groups to share radical changes in members' lives, relationships, work, life goals, and sexuality.”74
In  particular,  there  is  a  “transformation  of  day-to-day  living  into  a  series  of  invitations  to
struggle”.75 These changes are oriented both towards personal  improvement – finding ways of
living  that  are  more  in  the  interest  of  ourselves  and  other  women  –  and  towards  political
improvement. The changes in behaviour feed into further epistemological changes, as the feminist
is  exposed  to  experiences,  testimony,  and  ways  of  life  that  she  would've  missed  if  she  had
continued as before.
Becoming a feminist also involves a change in relationships. Most obviously, the feminist
may gain new friendships or a greater closeness with those who share feminist concerns, and may
alienate or separate herself from those whose sexism is blatant or intransigent. More generally, the
nature of her relationships will change. She will attempt to remove herself from, or change the
structure of, relationships of domination and control – or, at least, non-consensual ones. She will
aim to create closer, more cooperative relationships with other women.
The process of coming to feminist consciousness is often described as sudden, happening
all at once, and triggered by a single identifiable event. It “is usually related in epiphanous terms,
as an "aha"-moment, a sudden, all consuming revelation."76 It is frequently characterised, like trans
emergence, as an 'awakening,' a dramatic shift to a new way of being, a move “from unconscious
to conscious.”77 The particular events usually credited for triggering a feminist awakening tend to
involve exposure to the feminist movement (particularly, in the 70s, through consciousness raising
groups,78 more recently through the internet and social media), an egregious experience of sexism,
or a related experience such as  coming out as  a lesbian or as  trans.  For example,  Lindy West
identifies a pivotal moment when she was presented with a simple definition of feminism by a
73 Bartky (1990), p. 21.
74 MacKinnon (1989), p. 91.
75 Bartky (1990), p. 20.
76 Fischer (2014), p. 122.
77 Fischer (2014), p. 123.
78 hooks noted that "Fundamentally, the consciousness-raising (CR) group was a site for conversion," hooks (2000), p.
8.
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university lecturer79.  bell hooks wrote "My own conversion to feminist thinking in my teenage
years was in direct response to my father's domination of everyone in our household."80 Cherríe
Moraga recalled “It wasn't until I acknowledged and confronted my own lesbianism in the flesh,
that my heartfelt identification with and empathy for my mother's oppression - due to being poor,
uneducated,  and Chicana — was realized. My lesbianism is the avenue through which I  have
learned the most about silence and oppression, and it continues to be a tactile reminder to me that
we are not free human beings.”81
However,  this  idea of  a  sudden transformation triggered by a particular  event  may be
significantly  more common among white,  middle-class  feminists,  as  suggested in a  discussion
between Barbara Smith and Beverly Smith, “Across the Kitchen Table.”82 Barbara Smith points out
a difference in politics between women “who come to a realization that oppression exists say at 22,
25, or even 18, versus Black women's and other women of color's perspective, which is that your
oppression is a lifelong thing.”83 Beverly Smith notes that white women seem to come to feminist
much  more  often  through  an  academic  or  intellectual  route,  rather  than  through  personal
experience, and adds “They still talk about when you have an experience that makes you realize
your  oppression  as  a  women,  makes  you realize  other  women's  oppression,  you know,  some
revealing incident in your life as a woman. That is a 'click.' Well I mean, I guess there are 'clicks'
among  racial  lines,  but  the  thing  is  they're  so  far  back  in  terms  of  class  that  they're  almost
imperceptible. It just feels to me like it's a different kind of thing.”84
The phenomenology of feminist consciousness is often characterised as difficult or painful,
but  tends  to  be  characterised  as  nonetheless  worthwhile.  Bartky  argues  in  some  depth  that
“feminist  consciousness,  in  large  measure,  is  an  anguished  consciousness”.85 Feminist  women
become  divided  by  the  contradictions  they  begin  to  see  in  society,  and  by  the  tensions  in
understanding themselves as simultaneously victims, resisters, and, sometimes, oppressors.86 They
may suffer confusion and guilt from an awareness of their own role in perpetuating oppression.87
79 West (2015), "Herland: the forgotten feminist classic about a civilisation without men," published in The Guardian, 
Monday 30th March 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/mar/30/herland-forgotten-feminist-
classic-about-civilisation-without-men 
80 hooks (2000), p. 100-101.
81 Moraga (1983), "La Güera", in This Bridge Called My Back, Moraga & Anzaldúa eds. (Kitchen Table: Women of 
Color Press: New York), p. 23.
82 Smith & Smith (1983), "Across the Kitchen Table: A Sister-to-Sister Dialogue," in Moraga & Anzaldúa (1983).
83 Smith & Smith (1983), p. 112.
84 Smith & Smith (1983), p. 112-113.
85 Bartky (1990), p. 14.
86 Bartky (1990), p. 16.
87 Bartky (1990), p. 16.
177
They are isolated and frustrated by the difficulty of communicating their anger and outrage to
others.88 They are rendered paranoid and hypervigilant from the knowledge that they “can be
attacked almost  anywhere,  at  any time,  by virtually  anyone.”89 They are  “often afflicted  with
category confusion, an inability to know how to classify things,”90 for example whether as sexist or
innocent,  accidental  or  malicious.  They also  suffer  an ethical  crisis,  being constantly  aware  of
potential harms and opportunities for struggle, facing self-doubt and shame when they inevitably
let some go.91 Feminists labour under a certain kind of epistemological difficulty; not so much a
difficulty in coming to know, but rather with living with what they know, making sense of an
obviously confusing and hostile  world,  and managing the  increasingly apparent  ignorance,  of
themselves and of others.
By contrast, pre-feminist consciousness may be, epistemologically, simpler and easier, albeit
flawed, and often materially more difficult; most injustices are hidden behind an epistemology of
ignorance, and those that we see are easily explained in terms of the dominant ideology, as natural
or desirable. Nonetheless, this pre-feminist consciousness carries an element of repression, of self-
stifling. As such, coming to feminist consciousness is experienced as desirable and liberatory: “We
are no longer required to struggle against unreal enemies, to put others' interests ahead of our
own, or to hate ourselves... No longer do we have to practice upon ourselves that mutilation of
intellect and personality required of individuals who, caught up in an irrational and destructive
system, are nevertheless not allowed to regard it as anything but sane, progressive, and normal.”92
Recently, Fischer has questioned what we can take from this phenomenology. Though she
grants that “coming to feminist consciousness is often experienced as a sudden epiphany,” 93 she
argues  that,  nonetheless,  “the  transforming  experience  of  coming  to  feminist  consciousness  is
protracted and extended.”94 Her reasons for this  are mostly based on the observation that  the
doubt and unease which manifest in feminist awakening may exist, below awareness, in a person
from a very  young age.  Her picture  of  coming to  feminist  consciousness  looks  like  this:  as  a
woman or girl lives in an oppressive system, she gains a sense that things do not fit right, a sense
of contradiction, and begin to incorporate doubt into her life. Often this doubt is self-directed; she
88 Bartky (1990), p. 17.
89 Bartky (1990), p. 17.
90 Bartky (1990), p. 18. See also McKinnon (2014).
91 Bartky (1990), p. 19-20.
92 Bartky (1990), p. 21. This would also, non-coincidentally, describe the phenomenology of trans awakening.
93 Fischer (2014), p. 136.
94 Fischer (2014), p. 138.
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recognises the lack of fit between herself and the patriarchal ideals of her society, but instead of
doubting society, instead she doubts herself, and this doubt manifests in behaviours such as eating
disorders. However, at some point her consciousness may begin to be raised, so she “comes to
realize what she should be doubting [and] directs  doubt towards  the causes of  her existential
contradictions”.95 As  MacKinnon puts  it,  consciousness  raising  “redefines  women's  feelings  of
discontent  as  indigenous  to  their  situation  rather  than  to  themselves  as  crazy,  maladjusted,
hormonally imbalanced, bitchy, or ungrateful.”96 Similarly, the Combahee River Collective noted
“Black  feminists  often  talk  about  their  feelings  of  craziness  before  becoming  concious  of  the
concepts of sexual politics, patriarchal rule, and most importantly, feminism – the political analysis
and practice that we women use to struggle against our oppression.”97
This change, coupled with feminist insights and entry into a feminist community which
helps her to acquire and develop new, anti-sexist habits, brings the feminist new knowledge and
certainty,  easing her  confusion and sense  of  doubt.  In  contrast  to  Bartky,  Fischer  characterises
feminist consciousness as a relatively peaceful and self-assured state, where we can be confident in
new-found certainties, and where doubts are firmly directed towards society rather than the self.
Though there is much of value in Fischer's account, we may still question some elements.
Regarding the  abruptness of  feminist  awakening,  it's  not  clear  how much hangs  on this.  It  is
certainly valuable to identify a history of doubt and questioning behind the eventual attainment of
feminist  consciousness;  no  one  would  deny  that  individual  feminists  may  have  a  history,  in
patriarchal society, which makes them particularly drawn to and receptive of feminist insights. As
Fischer agrees with Bartky that awakening may be triggered by particular discrete events, and that
at some point “feminist consciousness  suddenly encompasses every aspect of one's life,”98 it's not
clear  what  substantive  difference  there  would  be  in  characterising  feminist  awakening  as  a
protracted process,  or  rather identifying it  entirely with the particular  moment when we gain
feminist  insights,  and  begin  to  direct  doubt  towards  society.  Perhaps  one  advantage  is  that
understanding  coming  to  feminist  consciousness  as  a  protracted  process  would  discourage  a
particularly idealised view of the process, one where a single transformative event radically and
comprehensively transforms us into a person who has basically all the right beliefs, attitudes and
behaviours, or the personal resources to develop these – an idealisation we may read into Bartky's
95 Fischer (2014), p. 138.
96 MacKinnon (1989), p. 100.
97 Combahee River Collective (1983), “A Black Feminist Statement,” in Moraga & Anzaldúa (1983).
98 Fischer (2014), p. 123, emphasis mine.
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claim that “consciousness of victimization is immediate and revelatory; it allows us to discover
what social reality is really like.”99 However, we could reject this idealisation while still identifying
awakening as a sudden process, so long as we keep in mind that no one single event of personal
transformation  can  be  expected  to  do  all  the  epistemic  work  we  expect  of  transformative
experiences.
On the other hand, I think we should be very wary of Fischer's rejection of the idea that
feminist consciousness is an anguished consciousness. In emphasising the certainty that is to be
gained from feminist awareness, and downplaying the increased sense of doubt, confusion and
alienation,  we  risk  a  dangerous  complacency  and  self-assurance.  Bartky  explicitly  links  the
anguished and divided nature of feminist consciousness to racism, noting that those who fail to
develop such a divided consciousness “remain blind to the extent to which they themselves are
implicated in the victimization of others.”100 As I concluded in the previous chapter, we should be
very worried about any methodology that claims to  resolve our self-doubt, or bring us a kind of
comfortable epistemic mastery. The danger here is all too real. There are many forms of feminism,
and some seem to be oriented largely around attempting to promote the rights and welfare of some
women by trampling on those of other, less privileged women. 
For example, many white U.S. suffragettes explicitly employed racism to argue in favour of
votes  for  white  women,101 racism  was  rife  in  the  consciousness  raising  groups  and  feminist
seperatist movements of the 1970s, and persists particularly in the form of “Carceral Feminism,” a
mainstream  feminist  tendency which  seeks  to  deploy  the  fundamentally  racist  and classist  of
policing and incarceration in  order to  solve  feminist  problems.102 Similarly,  there  are  forms of
feminism which are deeply hostile to trans women, and (related) forms which attempt to eliminate
sex work through methods that have been proved to harm individual  women involved in sex
work.  Though there  is  a  lot  going on to  sustain these  forms of  feminism,  and their  existence
definitely cannot be reduced to the particular educational path of individual feminists, I would like
to suggest that these forms of feminism are marked by a lack of epistemic humility. Such feminists
believe that have found a solution to misogyny, without taking the further, less comfortable step
towards recognising their own possible involvement in racism, transphobia, and stigmatisation of
99 Bartky (1990), p. 16.
100 Bartky (1990), p. 16.
101 See Ortberg (2014), "Suffragettes Who Sucked: White Supremacy and Women's Rights," The Toast, April 21, 2014,
http://the-toast.net/2014/04/21/suffragettes-sucked-white-supremacy-womens-rights/
102 See Law (2014), "Against Carceral Feminism," Jacobin, October 17, 2014, 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/10/against-carceral-feminism/
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sex workers,  and recognising  their  own limitations  when it  comes to  understanding forms of
oppression that they privilege from, rather than suffer from.  
Both  these  points  are  well  illustrated  by  Minnie  Bruce  Pratt's  autobiographical  essay
“Identity: Skin Blood Heart.” Here, Pratt tells a story of her own political development from a
sheltered white girl growing up in a racist society, in the south of the United States, to a lesbian
feminist with increased consciousness of racial oppression and resistance. While her essay reveals
a lot about feminist consciousness, it is notably different to many other, less personal accounts of
becoming a feminist in that it avoids the universalisation these accounts often suffer from. Many of
the white feminist writers I  have mentioned present their account of feminist consciousness as
though it must apply to every woman who becomes a feminist, and, as I will discuss later, this
universality  has  been  rejected  by  some feminists  of  colour.  On  the  other  hand,  Pratt,  who  is
explicitly concerned with racism in the feminist movement, does not suggest that the process she
describes is how every feminist develops politically, but is rather just presenting her own story in
order to illuminate how one may become aware of sexist and racist oppression.
Another striking feature of Pratt's essay, in contrast to many other, narrower accounts of
coming  to  feminist  consciousness,  is  that  it  does  not  focus  on  a  single  transformative  event,
inflating the difference in consciousness before and after a single revelation. Rather, Pratt describes
a number of events through her life, each of which transformed her in quite dramatic, but limited
ways. She portrays herself not as one who has 'seen the light,' who is always in a position to easily
know anything, or to simply find out. Rather, she describes a lengthy, exhausting, and continuing
process of “moving from the experience of the 'unknowing majority' (as Maya Angelou has called
it) into consciousness.”103
The transformative experiences Pratt describes are spread across much of her life, and each
involves a dramatic change in attitudes, behaviour, beliefs and circumstances, consistent with how
feminist  awakening  is  often  characterised.  These  experiences  include  membership  in  a
consciousness raising group,104 leaving her hometown and “living in a place where I was conscious
of being afraid because I was a woman,”105 meeting a feminist who acknowledged and applauded
her,106 having her children taken from her by a judge's decision,107 and hearing of a local attack by
103 Pratt (1984), p. 29.
104 Pratt (1984), p. 42.
105 Pratt (1984), p. 39.
106 Pratt (1984), p. 41.
107 Pratt (1984), p. 43.
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the Ku Klux Klan on an anti-Klan demonstration.108 Each of these experiences contributed to a
growing awareness: leaving her hometown helped her “to understand that women are used as
sexual pets, or are violently abused, are considered sexual prey … at the mercy of another class,
men.”109 The Klan attack led her to realise how racism was so often exercised in her name, in the
name  of  protecting  white  women,  which  led  her  to  research  her  own  family's  role  in  white
supremacy.
Despite these many individual experiences, Pratt describes one perhaps central experience,
which culminated from or partially  caused many of  the  others.  To  answer how she began to
change, she writes “I began when I jumped from my edge and outside myself, into radical change,
for love – simply love – for myself  and for other women. I  acted on that love by becoming a
lesbian, falling in love with and becoming sexual with a particular woman; and this love led me
directly, but by a complicated way, to work against racism and anti-Semitism. … It was my joy at
loving another woman, the risks I took by doing so, the changes this brought me to, and the losses,
that broke through the bubble of skin and class privilege around me.”110 
In taking this particular experience, of coming out as a lesbian, to be pivotal, we gain a
sense of how powerful  and momentous a transformative experience may be,  but we need not
return  to  idealising  such  experiences.  Many  of  the  changes  and  revelations  Pratt  describes
occurred before she became a lesbian, and she is also explicit in describing events after this change
where she continued to act with ignorance, racism and anti-Semitism.111 Nonetheless, becoming a
lesbian was,  for  Pratt,  not  just  one  change among many others,  but  was  rather  pivotal  as  an
expression  of  the  love  for  and  identification  with  women  that  was  involved  in  her  progress
towards feminist consciousness, and as it directly led to further transformative experiences, due to
her permanent loss of the protective privileges of assumed heterosexuality, and her subsequent
involvement in the women's movement. 
This cascading effect should be expected of the kinds of transformative experiences I am
discussing, as the changes in behaviour and epistemology that they bring will tend to encourage
further novel  experiences.  This,  along with the tight connections between forms of  oppression
suggested by  intersectionality,  should  give  us  some reason to  pause  before  assuming  we  can
simply identify any particular experience as one of coming to feminist consciousness, rather  than
108 Pratt (1984), p. 51.
109 Pratt (1984), p. 39.
110 Pratt (1984), p. 36-37.
111 Pratt (1984), p. 47-50.
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any other, or broader, anti-oppressive consciousness. However it is also worth considering how
this cascading effect could be blocked; a significant element in Pratt's narrative is the immense loss
of privilege and protection that accompanied her coming out, and the devastating removal of her
children.  If  an individual  were  protected from such events  (perhaps by other privileges),  and
resisted any wider personal changes, then even a dramatic transformative experience may have a
more limited effect.
Relatedly,  Pratt's  narrative also highlights the difficulty involved in living with feminist
consciousness, as she metaphorically characterises the process of coming to feminist consciousness
as  'leaving home',  which involves losing comfort,  familiarity  and safety,  albeit  a  safety that  is
conditional on acquiescence with white supremacy and compulsory heterosexual. She explicitly
connects this difficulty to her increased consciousness, as a white woman, of racial oppression.
While  she felt  her  expanding consciousness  of  her  own oppression “as painful  but  ultimately
positive,” breaking through to an understanding of racial oppression was more difficult: "Because I
was implicated in the doing of some of these injustices, myself and my people, I felt in a struggle
with  myself,  against myself.  This  breaking  through  did  not  feel  like  liberation  but  like
destruction."112 She stresses that expanding political consciousness involves loss, because “the old
lies and ways of living - habitual, familiar, comfortable, fitting us like our skin - were ours.”113 Of
course, it also involves gains, as we “learn a way of looking at the world that is more accurate,
complex, multilayered, multidimensioned, more truthful,”114 and can develop a new sense of self-
respect.115
This characterisation of feminist consciousness as 'leaving home' is not uncommon; it also
appears  in  the  work  of  Teresa  de  Lauretis,  who  describes  feminist  consciousness  as  “a  dis-
placement  and a  self-displacement:  leaving  or  giving  up a  place  that  is  safe,  that  is  'home'  -
physically, emotionally, linguistically, epistemologically - for another place that is unknown and
risky, that is not only emotionally but conceptually other; a place of discourse from which speaking
and thinking are at best tentative, uncertain, unguaranteed. But the leaving is not a choice: one
could not live there in the first place.”116
On the other hand, again this experience seems particular to middle-class white feminists,
112 Pratt (1984), p. 53. Emphasis hers.
113 Pratt (1984), p. 56. Emphasis hers.
114 Pratt (1984), p. 33.
115 Pratt (1984), p. 60.
116 de Lauretis (1990), "Eccentric Subjects: Feminist Theory and Historical Consciousness," Feminist Studies 16:1 p. 
138.
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as Barbara Smith points out “The thing that's different about women's oppression is that you can
be white and middle class and female and live a so-called “nice” life up until a certain point, then
you begin to notice these 'clicks,' but I think the quality of life for the upper or middle class white
woman is so far ahead of the quality of life for the Black person, the Black child, the working class
child or the poor child.”117 The narratives presented by Pratt and de Lauretis involve leaving a safe,
pre-political home, a conditionally livable space.  However,  women of color who have suffered
from “constant  physical  and material  oppression,”118 lifelong and extreme,  may have  no  such
starting point, no physical and emotional space which is even conditionally tolerable. Still, this
need not mean that the kind of political consciousness attained by women of color will be less
difficult than that of white women, but rather that the process of coming to this consciousness will
often take place  earlier,  be  more  fluid,  and may be  experienced as  more obviously a  positive
change overall.
Again,  I  believe  we should  be  concerned about  any account  of  feminist  consciousness,
especially from relatively privileged white feminists, that does not include this element of anguish.
It is not so much that such account are wrong, that feminist consciousness cannot be experienced as
overwhelmingly positive and liberatory, but rather that something seems dangerously absent when
feminist consciousness is presented simply as a relief, as a confident freedom from self-doubt. Pratt
stresses the importance, for her consciousness of racism, of admitting that “there are things that I
do not know - an admission hard on my pride, and harder to do than it sounds”.119 I have already
discussed how something like the failure to make this difficult further step towards doubt may
lead to involvement in particular oppressive forms of feminism.
Another important element in Pratt's narrative is that, despite the importance of distinct
transformative experiences, these are not presented as simple,  complete solutions, even to limited
problems.  Rather,  these  transformations  are  accompanied  by,  and  actually  prompt,  other
epistemological methods, such as consciousness raising,120 political organisation,121 self scrutiny,122
and basic research; as when Pratt researches the history of Black resistance, and her own family's
involvement in slavery and oppression,123 as well  as the acts of resistance to racial  oppression
117 Smith & Smith (1979), p. 113.
118 Smith & Smith (1979), p. 113.
119 Pratt (1984), p. 59. Cf. Sholock (2012).
120 Pratt (1984), p. 42.
121 Pratt (1984), p. 47-51.
122 Pratt (1984), p. 52.
123 Pratt (1984), p. 51-52.
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carried out by Southern white women like herself.124 Of particular importance, Pratt advocates a
methodology of listening: “I have to struggle to remember that I don't rule the world with my
thoughts and actions like some judge in a tilt-back chair; and that by  listening to criticisms, not
talking back but listening, I may learn how I might have been acting or thinking like one of the old
powers-that-be.”125
Bartky characterises feminist consciousness as “revelatory; it allows us to discover what
social  reality  is  really  like.”  So long as  we are  wary  of  the  possible  idealisation around  this
statement – the claim is just that feminist consciousness allows discovery, not that it guarantees it -
there is an important point here: coming to feminist consciousness is not an epistemically neutral
change, the new awareness it brings is not just as good as any other kind of awareness, and the
knowledge it can lead to is deep and important. The reasons for this follow largely from what I
have discussed previously in this thesis, particularly in the previous chapter; given the way that
epistemologies  of  ignorance  so  deeply  structure  the  lives,  behaviours  and  motivations  of  the
privileged  -  and,  in  a  different  way,  the  oppressed –  we  could  not  expect  to  overcome  such
ignorance without undergoing quite deep personal change. Similarly, given the achieved nature of
a liberatory standpoint, we should not expect to heed the demands of standpoint epistemologies
by  simply  choosing  to  employ  or  identity  with  a  particular  standpoint;  rather,  taking  on  a
standpoint  in  a  way with  deeper,  reaching effects  on  our  lives,  a  genuine change in  political
consciousness, seems to be essential to the use of standpoint methodologies.
Harding  has  recently  addressed  this  point  directly,  by  asking  what  kind  of  “proper
scientific  self”  we  might  take  to  be  best  able  to  produce  knowledge.126 She  identifies  three
distinctive kinds of proper scientific selves in social justice research, one of which is the “multiple
and conflicted self.”127 This kind of self “must be conceptualized as a disunified, on-going, social
process, not as a coherent, static, completely internal entity.”128 She particularly identifies this kind
of self appearing Intersectional Black Feminist work, and, drawing on research by Lourdes Torres,
in autobiographical work by Latina feminists.
Torres notes that “men's [autobiographies] generally are presented as chronologically linear
wholes, while women's stories tend to consist of fragmented, disjunctive units.”129 In particular,
124 Pratt (1984), p. 61-64.
125 Pratt (1984), p. 60, emphasis hers. Recall my discussion of listening in the chapter 5.
126 Harding (2015).
127 Harding (2015), p. 8.
128 Harding (2015), p. 8.
129 Torres (1997), "The Construction of Self in U.S. Latina Autobiographies," in Women, Knowledge, and Reality: 
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Latina authors have attempted to claim “an identity they have been taught to despise. In order to
do this,  they must work through all  the cultural  and gender socialization and misinformation
which has left them in a maze of contradictions. This results in a fragmentation of identity, and the
inability  to  speak  from  a  unified,  noncontradictory  subject  position.  No  existing  discourse  is
satisfactory because each necessitates the repression of different aspects of the self."130 This work
leads to a “realization that a noncontradictory, unified self is impossible within the discourses they
traverse [which] opens up the possibility of radical change for these Latina writers,”131 as they
attempt “to integrate the various parts of their individual experiences and collective histories to
create a new self.”132 Ultimately “The authors embrace a shifting and multiple identity which is in a
state of perpetual transition.”133
Processes of personal transformation are essential to the multiple and conflicted selves that
Harding and Torres identity, as “they must learn how to transform such contradictory positions
into  sources  of  knowledge  and  power."134 I  believe  we  could  identify  the  kind  of  anguished
consciousness,  described  by  Bartky  and  Pratt,  as  a  multiple  and  conflicted  self,  which  has
attempted to create a new, feminist self out of a personal and collective history under patriarchy,
and finds itself in perpetual transition.
I'd like to end this exploration of feminist consciousness with a passage from Nellie Wong
to re-emphasise the liberatory potential of feminist awakening:
You believed once in your own passivity, your own powerlessness, your own spiritual malaise.
You are now awakening in the beginnings of a new birth. Not born again, but born for the first
time, triumphant and resolute, out of experience and struggle, out of a flowing, living memory,
out of consciousness and will,  facing, confronting, challenging head-on the contradictions of
your lives and the lives of people around you. You believe now in the necessity and beauty of
struggle: that feminism for you means working for the equality and humanity of women and
men, for children, for the love that is possible.135
FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
If we accept that feminist awakening, and other forms of political awakening, may be important
Explorations in Feminist Philosophy, Garry & Pearsall eds. (Routledge: London), p. 128.
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for  being  able  to  get  at  social  and moral  reality,  we  still  face  a  question  of  how this  can  be
incorporated into the methodology of  moral  philosophers.  Though this  kind of  transformative
experience looks more available, to a wider range of people, than trans awakening, there are still a
few difficulties in recommending that people aim to undergo such an experience.
Firstly,  there  is  a  danger  in  the  possibility  of  transformative  experiences  becoming
prescriptive, something we demand of theorists, especially if being a particular sort of person is
taken to be a prerequisite to contributing anything to feminist or moral philosophical discussion.
In  the  70s,  feminist  theorist  Jo  Freeman  identified  a  particular  practice  of  feminists  publicly
attacking other feminist women, a practice she referred to as “trashing,” which damaged lives,
suppressed  feminist  critique  and  action,  and  destroyed  solidarity.  Though  she  identified  this
practice as arising from internalised sexist gender roles, she also notes “It is much more prevalent
… among those who stress personal changes than among those who stress institutional ones”. 136
She wrote:
The  Movement's  emphasis  on “the  personal  is  political”  has  made it  easier  for  trashing to
flourish. We began by deriving some of our political ideas from our analysis of our personal
lives. This legitimated for many the idea that movement could tell us what kind of people we
ought to be, and by extension what kind of personalities we ought to have. As no boundaries
were drawn to define the limits of such demands, it was difficult to preclude abuses. Many
groups have sought to remold the lives and minds of their members, and some have trashed
those who resisted.137
In philosophy and in feminism, there is a risk in allowing the kind of person that we take another
to be to become a reason to dismiss them, and cut them out of our discussions; though openness
must  be  balanced  against  the  importance  of  not  allowing  racist,  ableist,  classist,  or  cissexist
comments and actions to go unchecked, and the value of creating some discursive environments
where certain basic assumptions and attitudes can be taken to be shared, rather than in contention.
Though I do not have much to say on this topic, it seems we can go some way towards reducing
the  risk  involved  in  including  transformative  experience  as  an  element  of  philosophical
methodology by emphasising that we should not except all change to look the same, should not
expect  all epistemically  valuable  personal  transformation  to  result  in  any  particular kind  of




individual. Even self-identification as a feminist should  not be expected among those who have
been through the change I called 'coming to feminist consciousness,' considering the very good
reasons to reject that term expressed by trans women who have suffered from feminist rejection
and  marginalisation,  and  by  women  of  colour  who  for  similar  reasons  have  identified  with
alternative anti-patriarchal movements, such as womanism. Similarly, some amount of epistemic
humility is called for: we should be careful of taking ourselves to have the authority to judge the
kinds of  attitudes,  relationships  and consciousness that  others  have;  though,  again,  not  to the
extent of ignoring oppressive statements and behaviours. 
A different methodological issue arises simply from the fact that feminist consciousness is
rarely something that is sought out. Perhaps once a person is convinced that they need it, they
already have it, or are on their way to developing it anyway. Consider the types of experience
usually credited as triggering feminist awakenings: egregious experiences of sexism will happen to
women anyway, they can and should hardly be sought out. Certainly some kind of appropriate
response to them, tending towards feminist understanding rather than patriarchal excuses,  can
and should be recommended, but it seems that heeding such a recommendation would rely on a
person's already having some exposure to and sympathy for feminist approaches. Coming out as a
lesbian has similar methodological restrictions as trans awakening; it is of limited availability, and
generally won't, and shouldn't, be sought for primarily epistemological reasons. Exposure to the
feminist movement - through articles, meetings, protests, online consciousness-raising, and the like
- is the most obvious path to recommend to philosophers, and fits nicely with the urgent need for
philosophers to diversify their research, curriculum, and teaching methods, but it is also in some
ways  the  weakest,  least  reliable  path.  Recently,  almost  everyone  is  exposed  to  some  feminist
thought, particularly the liberal feminism which increasingly appears in mainstream media and
culture,  and  many  even  agree  with  it,  without  any  transformative  effect.  We  could  advise
philosophers to engage with such work in a certain spirit of openness and receptivity, rather than
the argumentative resistance philosophers often bring to new texts, but again this recommendation
is unlikely to move someone not already convinced of the value of feminist consciousness.
At this point it is worth spelling out more carefully how I see the relationship between
personal  transformation,  moral  philosophy,  and political  change.  So far  in  this  chapter  I  have
argued that some kinds of deep personal transformation can be necessary for moral philosophers –
individuals practising moral  philosophy – to be able to achieve a less distorted view of moral
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reality. Along with this comes the suggestion that seeking out, being open to, or exposing oneself
to transformative experiences might be an essential part of moral philosophical methodology. I
don't mean to suggest that seeking such changes forms anything like the entirety, or even the core
of sound moral philosophical methodology. I except a lot of the more familiar activities, of theory
building, research and argument to remain intact, though modified by the kinds of positions I have
been discussing throughout this thesis, and by the different sensitivities that come from personal
transformation. Furthermore, I certainly would not want to suggest that personal transformation is
a central methodology for bringing about political change. I have only been discussing personal
transformation in the context of its relation to philosophical thinking, and ultimately I am modest,
even pessimistic about the role of philosophy in bringing about political change. Certainly, changes
in individuals' consciousness have been politically important - we have seen that in the rise of
feminist consciousness - and certainly widespread cultural changes are a necessary part of some
political  developments.  However,  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  directly  pursuing  individual
changes in consciousness is  a primary method for mass political change.  I  expand upon these
points in what follows.
Here we might ask whether we should really be interested in personal transformation in
the context of a methodological discussion. Within that narrow context, we could perhaps see the
relevance of feminist awakening in how it changes what we find salient – drawing our attention
towards  gender,  social  facts  and  ideology,  away  from  abstract,  supposedly  universalistic  and
apolitical categories – and how it  tends to promote certain analytic  tendencies,  such as  taking
oppression  and  non-ideal  theory  seriously,  being  suspicious  of  universalistic  first-personal
methods,  and general  epistemic  humility.  Then,  given some characterisation along these  lines,
could  we  not  just  directly  recommend  these  effects  as  a  philosophical  method,  rather  than
recommending, as DePaul does, some kind of openness to transformation? Similarly, could we not
just see personal transformation as a kind of methodological epiphenomena, something that will
happen to those who are on a particular philosophical path, a side-effect of a good methodology
rather than a viable methodology in itself? So, feminist awakening would be an interesting topic
for those concerned with personal identity,  feminist behaviour,  or social epistemology, without
being immediately relevant to those who ask what moral philosophers should be doing when they
do moral philosophy.
These points bring up three related questions, which I shall answer together. Firstly, given
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the importance of personal transformation to moral epistemology, what should this tell us about
the methodology of moral philosophy, if not that philosophers should explicitly aim to undergo
such transformation? Secondly, who is such personal transformation available to? Thirdly, who
should we, philosophers and feminists, take ourselves to be talking to when we are doing moral
philosophy? In order to address these questions, we need to talk about the relationship between
personal change and political change.
The kind of transformation I have discussed has an obvious political element.  We have
already started to see how becoming a feminist involves political change, as a feminist changes her
behaviours – perhaps engaging in protests, or political conversations with friends – and changes
her relationships. Hartsock stresses the way that feminist practice involves changing our social
relations,  and  how  doing  so  involves  a  political  change.138 She  argues  that  “A fundamental
redefinition of the self is an integral part of action for political change,”139 and that “since we do not
act  to  produce  and  reproduce  our  lives  in  a  vacuum,  changed  consciousness  and  changed
definitions of the self can only occur in conjunction with a restructuring of the social (both societal
and personal) relations in which each of us is involved.”140 
For Hartsock, this is quite a strong claim, that “To change oneself – if individuality is the
social relations we are involved in – is to change social institutions.”141 Though there is surely some
truth in this, it seems that some forms of personal change could involve such minor adjustments to
social reality as to not be worth mentioning. But there is a weaker point which is still important.
When we consider the changed social relations which feminist consciousness has, and continues to
lead  women  to,  relations  which  have  not  been  traditionally  supported  or  allowed  by
heteropatriarchy, we can see how larger scale social changes were necessary, or were fought for, as
part of what it took for women to become the people they saw a need to become. As women left
controlling or abusive marriages, changes in divorce laws were required. Changing relationship
structures have required changed institutions of marriage, adoption and childcare. The need for
academic  feminists  to  organise  and  work  together  led  to  campaigns  for  women's  studies
departments,  and  they  saw  the  “commitment  to  women's  studies  as  political  action.”142 The
creation of  rape  crisis  centres,  feminist  lobby groups,  women's  media  outlets,  women's  health
138 Hartsock (1979).
139 Hartsock (1979), p. 60.
140 Hartsock (1979), p. 61.
141 Hartsock (1979), p. 62.
142 hooks (2000), p. 9.
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centres and abortion clinics,  all  can be seen as political  change driven by the personal  change
which demanded it. More recently we have seen this with transfeminist movements, as continuing
activism by trans women, men, and non-binary folk, prompted by the changing understanding of
self that came with trans awakening, has led to gender recognition laws, improved medical access
and protocols,  changes in  the  mainstream media's  treatment of  gender,  establishment  of  trans
women's presses, and so forth.
Hartsock argues that feminism's “focus on everyday life and experience makes action an
necessity, not a moral choice or an option...  By appropriating our collective experience, we are
creating  people  who  recognize  that  we  cannot  be  ourselves in  a  society  based  on  hierarchy,
domination, and private property.”143 We acquire a consciousness which forces us, by our distress
and by a practical necessity, to revolt against the inhumanity we can now see. 144 It is plausible that
the kind of self transformation I have been interested in during this chapter makes political action
something  like  a  practical  necessity,  but  this  will  be  worryingly  idealised  unless  we  have  a
sufficiently  broad idea of  what constitutes  political  action.  Not  every feminist  will  stand on a
picket line,  organise boycotts, start a women's shelter,  or join a separatist commune. There are
differences in the kinds of action that various people are drawn to, have access to, have talent for,
are comfortable with, or see as worthwhile. But if we can see how political struggle is involved in,
if  nothing  else,  changing  our  relationships  with  others,  resisting  the  persistent  sexism  of  a
patriarchal  society,  engaging with  culture  and media  in  a  less  harmful  way,  and making our
changed selves coherent to others, then we can see how the transformation involved in processes
like coming to feminist consciousness necessarily involves not just political awareness, but also
political action.145
 From here we can see that political action is not entirely separable from good philosophical
methodology, that the image of a purely academic philosopher, who sees the moral truth but is not
driven to act in any particular way, is flawed. If to be, and to become the kind of person who can
see the moral landscape more clearly necessarily involves us in political action then to argue that
the proper methodology of the moral philosopher involves only the former, and not the latter,
seems pointless at best.146 I believe we should reject the idea that the job of the philosopher is
143 Hartsock (1979), p. 64, emphasis mine.
144 Paraphrasing a quote Hartsock takes from Marx, Selected Writings in Sociological and Social Philosophy, trans. T. 
B. Bottomore (McGraw-Hill: New York), p. 232.
145 Recall the discussion of struggle in moral epistemology in chapter 5, and earlier in this chapter.
146 Hartsock makes a much stronger point, that feminist theory is just the articulation of "what we know from our 
practical activity." Hartsock (1979), p. 65. I am tentatively inclined to agree.
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simply “to  theorize about ethics, not to live the moral life.”147 If someone seems to be completely
unchanged by their moral philosophical work, I think we could begin to question how successful a
philosopher they are.
Incidentally, this element of practical necessity also limits the need for epistemic humility in
a positive way. Faced with an insistence on more epistemic humility, and a directive to expose
themselves to more diverse, challenging views, an experienced feminist may object that they can
know that they clearly have nothing to gain from listening to male anti-abortionists or to Men's
Rights Activists.148 The practical necessity to revolt against inhumanity helps explain this; if we see
individuals arguing for, and agitating for the repeal of those gains which have helped make life
liveable – arguing for the repeal of anti-rape laws, banning of abortion, and defunding of women's
shelters – we do not need to seriously consider the merits of their arguments, or the perspective
from which they speak, to know that these positions are wrong and must be opposed. In a similar
way, lived experience from a marginalised social position can reveal that some argument is not
worth engaging with;  Rachel McKinnon has discussed “TERF propaganda,” a cluster of views
promoted by a  small  number  of  cissexist  feminists,  including the  view that  trans  women are
“predators, attempting to gain access to women-only spaces in order to harass or sexually assault
(cis) women.”149 She points out that there is no serious risk of a trans woman encountering this
view and coming to believe she is a predator; she simply knows from her own lived experience
that  this  is  not  true.150 This  provides  another  limit  on  epistemic  humility;  if  our  own  lived
experience directly contradicts some claim, there is no need to seriously engage with the claim
(except insofar as we are forced to resist it), as we know there is no real possibility of it being true.
This limit allows us to say that,  despite the need for epistemic humility,  there are some moral
beliefs which are, for some people, practically beyond questioning. It also opens up space to argue
that some moral beliefs  should be beyond questioning, as some philosophers have argued of the
belief that torture is wrong; though it is clear that, for the human population at large, this belief is
not in fact beyond questioning, as it is widely and fairly openly practised, particularly, in the case
of western governments, as part of incarceration and border control policies.
147 Schwitzgebel (2012). Schwitzgebel attributes this attitude to others, but adds that he agrees with the word, if not the
spirit, of the claim.
148 Thanks to my external examiner, Jenny Saul, for pushing me on this point.
149 McKinnon (forthcoming), "The Epistemology of Propaganda," forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, p. 6.
150 That said, some trans women might buy into TERF propaganda by setting up false dichotomies; a social position 
does not guarantee access to a standpoint.
192
The necessity of change for feminists means that personal change and political change are
entangled in both directions. It is not just that personal change causes political change, but also
that political change and political action enables personal change. This is true even in first coming
to feminist consciousness. Though something like feminist consciousness may be coherent without
a feminist movement,151 certainly the prevalence of feminist consciousness and the particular form
it takes is dependant on the existence of a political feminist movement. Fischer discusses the way
that feminist  community is  essential  for shaping the kind of  person a woman becomes as she
enters into feminist consciousness, particularly by shaping her new habits through processes of
approval and disapproval.152 More generally, we can see how political action creates the awareness,
visibility, theory, and social conditions that will lead individuals to feminism, and shape the kind
of people they become.
More  generally  still,  political  change  and  political  action  is  essential  for  creating  the
conditions whereby we, as philosophers and as people, can improve our moral knowledge. If it is
essential for moral  philosophy that philosophers become the kind of people who can discover
social reality, then it is also essential that the conditions are created to allow us to become such
people.  Furthermore,  achieving social  justice,  destroying oppressive institutions like patriarchy
and white supremacy,  is  entangled with challenging ideology,  tearing down epistemologies  of
ignorance,  and  correcting  hermeneutical  injustice;  this  is  political  work  that  has  significant
epistemic benefits for everyone, and that must be carried out if we are, collectively, to achieve less
distorted ways of understanding the social and moral world.
We  can  also  bring  this  idea  down  to  a  more  individual  level:  for  some  people,  some
individual philosophers, political action may be necessary before they are capable of seeing the
error in some of their moral beliefs. In discussing whether the feminist standpoint is available to all
people, Kukla and Ruetsche raise the possibility of a man for whom “it is second nature to dismiss
women's testimony as not reason-providing, at least when it comes to certain topics”.153 They argue
that  such  a  person would  be  irrational,  and  so  we  should  not  necessarily  expect  them to  be
educable, changeable, through rational methods. Rather, their “blind spots [may] need a kind of
151 Fischer briefly discusses how this may be possible in Fischer (2014), p. 133. See also Lerner (1993), The Creation 
of Feminist Consciousness: from the Middle Ages to Eighteen-Seventy, (Oxford University Press: Oxford).
152 Fischer (2014), p. 133.
153 Kukla & Ruetsche (2002), "Contingent Natures and Virtuous Knowers: Could Epistemology be 'Gendered'?" 
Candian Journal of Philosophy 32:3, p. 410-411. Emphasis theirs; they are using "second nature" in a technical 
sense.
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political correction.”154 In discussing this topic,  Haslanger notes “The suggestion is not that we
relinquish a commitment to non-violent and rational discourse, but it is to insist that there are
multiple ways to gain knowledge of social reality and the normative demands of justice, including
experience.” In particular, she has advocated a methodology of disrupting ideology through action
such as “queering our language, playing with meanings, monkey-wrenching or otherwise shifting
the material conditions that support our tutored dispositions.”155
My point here is to suggest that if we see philosophy as that collective epistemic enterprise
by which we, as philosophers and as people, aim to improve our philosophical knowledge, then
we should see political action as part of what it is to do philosophy, part of what it is to bring us
collectively to that improved knowledge, part of the methodology of philosophy. If some factors
that  distort  our  judgement  derive  from  living  in  a  world  permeated  by  injustices  such  as
systematic  gender  inequality,  racial  oppression  and  systems  of  heteronormativity  and
cisnormativity,  it  may  be  the  case  that  making collective  progress  in  moral  philosophy could
essentially  require  changing  the  external  world;  eliminating  these  sources  of  injustice  and
distortion,  perhaps over the course  of  generations.  Thus,  the  job of  philosophers (as  a  whole)
coming to have true  moral  beliefs  (in whatever sense)  may depend on political  action,  which
changes the world to be such that accurate moral judgement becomes, in the long run, possible.
This is similar to a much more modest claim: philosophers already understand some tasks
such as teaching, establishing conferences or philosophical events, and setting up philosophical
departments, as part of their job. These are tasks which are not directly about improving one's own
knowledge,  but  rather  about  establishing  the  conditions  for  the  continued  development  of
philosophy, on both a personal and collective level, and I believe we could see them as part of the
wider methodology of philosophy. Similarly then, if action that changes the world, that disrupts
ideology,  creates  progressive  social  movements,  and  challenges  oppressive  institutions,  is
necessary to bring the world to a state where its inhabitants, including the philosophers, are better
able to see social reality, then it seems plausible that this kind of action, too, should be considered
part of the methodology of philosophy. One might see this as such a radical a departure from the
ordinary idea of moral philosophy as to not really constitute philosophy any more. However, if we
see moral philosophy as just that activity which helps us, collectively as moral philosophers, come
154 Kukla & Ruetsche (2002), p. 411.
155 Haslanger (2015), "Ideology as Shared Belief and the Epistemology of Critique," presented at Analysing Social 
Wrongs, May 14th 2015, Vienna.
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to the correct moral attitudes, it is hard to see any principled reason for excluding this kind of
action  from its  purview.  And,  one  might  say,  if  it  is  excluded,  so  much the  worse  for  moral
philosophy.
From  here,  we  can  start  to  see  an  answer  to  the  question  of  who feminist,  and more
generally anti-oppressive, consciousness is available to. On the one hand, we can easily imagine
individuals such as the bigoted, misogynistic man, the right-wing CEO, the person in a kind of
epistemic  bubble,  with  no  internal  or  external  motivation  to  engage  with  disruptive  political
experiences. The kind of political consciousness and transformation I have discussed may simply
not be open to them, and I don't believe it is worth wasting time worrying too much about how
we could rationally convince such people. But on the other hand, there is a sense in which no one
is in principle prevented from attaining this kind of consciousness; it is available to everyone  so
long as the conditions change, through political action, such as to allow them access. That is, it
seems no one is excluded simply on the grounds that they are white,  male,  rich,  or otherwise
privileged, but only ever through the facts of a particular history, social position and personality, in
combination with the  operation of  oppressive  institutions,  such as  epistemologies  of  ignorance,
which limit their access to knowledge, and which have also shaped their history and personality. By
challenging these institutions, we may change and expand who has access to knowledge of social
and moral reality.
This finally brings us to the question of who we should take to be the audience for our
moral philosophical works. Philosophers rarely seem to think about who their audience is. They
often express the idea that their work is, in some sense, for everyone, on subjects that should be of
interest to everyone. Sometimes,  particularly with more technical work, they will  concede that
their work is really just addressed to those with the specific education to understand it, or those
already interested in some specific philosophical debate; rarely will they go on to think about how
even this will structure their audience along class, racial, and gender lines. Still, this limitation is
often taken to be somehow not significant; in principle, their work is addressed to everyone, it's
just that, given some fairly mundane and perhaps lamentable social realities, only a few people
will get it.
Rawls has claimed that “justification is addressed to others who disagree with us”. Even
this  looks  like  it  need  not  be  true.  Consider  a  gay  man,  seeking  to  articulate  to  himself  a
justification for coming out (distinct from a justification to his family for being gay). In such a case,
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his moral reasoning may be addressed to no one but himself, and need not even be coherent to
anyone else; and we have seen good reason to suspect that, at times, such a justification may not be
understandable to everyone, though it may become more widely accessible as political realities
change.  More  widely,  we  might  imagine  a  group  of  animal  rights  activists  discussing  the
justification of a planned disruptive action against a factory farm; they may have no interest in
justifying their actions to those outside the group, and we need not assume anyone inside the
group disagrees with the action. We might argue that such an attitude would be wrong – that such
actions would probably not bring about any long term change if they were simply baffling to the
public  -  but  it  does  not  look  as  though  their  attempted  justifications  must  be  incoherent  or
irrational simply because they do not extend beyond their own group. 
 O'Neill has specifically claimed that particularist conceptions of practical reasoning fail “in
their assumption that reasoning need be followable only by a restricted audience who already
share quite specific norms or practices, sensibilities or commitments.”156 She goes on to grant 
Although it is plausible enough that some stretches of practical reasoning have a restricted scope,
in  the sense  that  they can be  taken to be  followable  only by a restricted and homogenous
audience, so are 'insiders' reasoning, not all practical reasoning can have such restricted scope.
In the first place practical reasoning has to be followable not only by those directly addressed
on a given occasion, but by wider groups. In reasoning, in justifying what we do, in criticizing
what others do, we constantly appeal to a wider group, of whose boundaries we usually lack
any very definite conception. Secondly, we do not think that all those for whom thought or
action is to be cogent will be closely similar to one another.157
I  do  not  plan  to  address  here  the  possibility  or  desirability  of  unrestricted  practical
reasoning,  as I have already discussed this in chapter 4. What is significant here is that, although
O'Neill  grants  the  possibility  of  reasoning addressed to  a  restricted  audience,  she  makes  this
reasoning derivative of, or dependant on universal reasoning, followable by everyone, “in the first
place.”
O'Neill  frequently  emphasises  our  connection,  in  practical  reasoning  and  action,  with
others, while ignoring the philosophical work that goes on in making ourselves and our situation
intelligible to ourselves. This is a very political stand. Consider the claim “Those whose actions and
plans of action constantly assume the intelligent cooperation and interaction of many others, who
156 O'Neill (1996), p. 52.
157 O'Neill (1996), p. 53.
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differ in diverse ways, will also expect some at least of their reasoning to be followable by those
others.” For many marginalised groups, in the face of constant oppression, assuming 'intelligent
cooperation' from members of oppressive groups is simply implausible, and any such assumption
will be severely limited. O'Neill idealises away the political realities which make her insistence on
universal reasoning untenable.
As an example: it is common for trans people to find themselves dependent on various
cisgender  medical  practitioners.  Though  medical  practice  may  seem  a  likely  space  to  find
intelligent  cooperation,  it  is  widely  understood  among  trans  folk  that  such  practitioners,  or
'gatekeepers,'  are  often  obstructive,  uncaring,  more  concerned  to  uphold  cisnormativity  and
traditional gender roles than to offer urgent care, and utterly unable to comprehend trans people's
experiences or self-understandings.158 Thus trans people will often discuss among themselves how
to manipulate or circumvent these practitioners. These discussions, and many articulations of trans
folks' situation more generally, are not intended to be followed by gatekeepers who are seen as
fundamentally hostile.  This kind of non-cooperative situation will  be common for members of
marginalised  groups,  and  more  important  than  O'Neill  seems  to  allow.159 And  certainly,  this
situation is not ideal, but it is the political and moral reality in a world where material power and
hermeneutical resources are not distributed equally.
The  methodological  danger  here,  in  emphasising  universalist  reasoning  over  more
restricted  kinds,  is  of  allowing the  existence  of  philosophical  work  addressed  to  a  restricted
audience – such as feminist theory which assumes, in its audience, the belief that sexist oppression
exists – but treating such work as less philosophical, less important or less central to philosophical
practice,  further marginalising such philosophy,  and its  practitioners,  within the discipline.  By
emphasising the possibility of connection with all  others,  in our reasoning, while ignoring the
value of intra-group theorising, we would contribute to a philosophical climate where feminists
face the unjust “burden of having to translate their work,”160 a pressure to create connections and
to reach for universal reasoning, which is not be felt by those, with more mainstream areas of
study, whose work is simply assumed to be universal and legitimate.
158 The degree to which this is the case varies from place to place, and has also changed over time. For fairly frequent 
expressions of trans folks' frustration with medical professionals, particularly in the UK, it is worth browsing the 
#transdocfail feed on Twitter: https://twitter.com/search?q=%23transdocfail.
159 See Bailey (2007), "Strategic Ignorance," in Sullivan & Tuana (2007), which examines "the ways expressions of 
ignorance can be wielded strategically by groups living under oppression as a way of gaining information, 
sabotaging work, avoiding or delaying harm, and preserving a sense of self."
160 Meagher (2012), "Feminist Transformations," The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26:2, p. 205.
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Relatedly, O'Neill also writes “If some practical reasoning is to be inclusively followable by
all within a wide (but not precisely determined) scope, its authority may be used to assess that of
other stretches of practical reasoning that are intended to be followable only by those within some
more  restricted  portion  of  that  wider  domain,  and  to  connect  restricted  stretches  of  practical
reasoning  to  one  another.”161 And  even  more  explicitly,  “Universalist  practical  reasoning  can
sometimes  show why the claims of  some restricted reasoning should be  taken seriously,  even
endorsed  or  denounced,  beyond  its  immediate  and  appropriate  contexts.”162 Here,  O'Neill
apparently makes all reasoning addressed to a specific audience answerable to some more abstract,
universal reasoning, giving the more situated reasoning a philosophically subordinate status. In
this, O'Neill is clearly ignoring the possibility of intra-group reasoning which simply  cannot, or
cannot  right  now,  be  made  intelligible  to  all  audiences;  methodologically,  she  is  licensing
philosophers  to  say  of  reasoning that  they  cannot  follow “I  can show you why this  must  be
wrong.” Though her intention here is to reject relativism, we need not be relativists to deny that
some  universal  perspective  can  critique  all  situated  reasoning,  as  we  need  not  grant  that  all
situated perspectives and standpoints are epistemically on par.163
To illustrate,  consider  how trans people have sometimes employed particular stories  to
intelligibly justify their transition to others, such as the “trapped in the wrong body” narrative,
even if they would, in their private and intra-group reasoning, reject the essentialism that such a
story rests on.164 Here, though we have trans people deploying both universalistic and restricted
understandings,  they  take  the  restricted  understanding  to  be  superior,  and  the  universalistic
understanding as  flawed,  presented only due to the belief  that  trans experience is  simply not
universally intelligible  at the (political)  moment.  Then, as trans experiences become more widely
understood and respected, the “wrong body” narrative begins to die out, as it is seen to do more
harm than good.165 Of course, it is significant here that the universalistic reasoning is flawed, but
161 O'Neill (1996), p. 55.
162 O'Neill (1996), p. 55-6. Emphasis mine.
163 See Kukla & Ruetsche (2002)
164 See Bettcher (2014) "Trapped in the Wrong Theory: Rethinking Trans Oppression and Resistance," Signs 39:2, 
which discusses the "wrong body" narrative as a (problematic) form of resistance. Of course, some trans people do 
straightforwardly accept "wrong-body" narratives.
165 Hope (forthcoming) "Human Rights: Sometimes One Thought Too Many?" presents a similar story regarding 
justification and legitimation in Māori history, where modes of political argument understandable by European 
powers were sometimes strategically employed, "all the time holding that these modes did not adequately capture 
the nature of the injustice to be rectified" and while distinctively Māori modes of legitimation were simultaneously 
held, developed, and applied in other contexts. He writes "there is an increasingly audible sense among Māori that 
they should not have to do this, that the assertion of Māori special rights should be accepted as legitimate on its own
terms."
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my point is that O'Neill does not take seriously the possibility that, for some issues, there may
simply  be no relevant universally accessible reasoning, and that to insist upon or privilege such
reasoning can do damage to people's identities, self-understanding, and lives.
In rejecting the supremacy of philosophy that is intended to be intelligible to the widest
possible audience, I hope to make room for philosophy that is not written for, perhaps not even
congenial to,  the relatively privileged philosophers who continue to dominate the discipline.  I
mean  to  promote  the  viability  and  importance  of  philosophy  which  is  by  and  for  various
marginalised groups, philosophy that may even be characterised as talking and thinking among
ourselves/themselves;  not  necessarily  excluding  others,  but  making  no  effort  to  take  their
participation into account, or cater to their attitudes and assumptions.
Dotson  has  identified  this  goal  in  much  feminist  philosophy:  “[many  feminist
philosophers]  feel  a  sense  of  incongruence  with  professional  philosophy's  expectation  of  a
panoramic  view  and  the,  often  misunderstood,  particularity  attached  to  'minority'  social
identities.”166 MacKinnon has been particularly clear about this: “Feminism does not begin with the
premise that it is unpremised. It does not aspire to persuade an unpremised audience because
there is no such audience.”167 Dotson also identifies this attitude among many Black philosophers,
who have not accepted “the expectation that philosophical theorizing begins from the broadest
possible vantage point.”168 This attitude is essential to the culture of praxis that Dotson advocates
for philosophy, particularly in its “healthy appreciation for the differing issues that will emerge as
pertinent among different populations.”169
I  see  this  particular,  rather  than  universal,  philosophy,  as  essential  for  marginalised
philosophers seeking to rectify hermeneutical injustice, to create the concepts and theories they
need to understand their selves and their world. Such philosophy allows those with particular
standpoints, those who have undergone certain transformations or see the world in certain distinct
ways,  to  develop their  thoughts  and theories  together,  without  needing to  form the  kinds  of
connections O'Neill is interested in, and without needing to start with premises common to all
philosophers. It is not just that I think these requirements would be difficult to fulfil, or an unjust
burden, but rather that the kind of detailed theoretical and often personal work that this kind of
philosophy  involves  would  be  impossible  to  achieve  while  struggling  to  be  intelligible  to  an
166 Dotson (2012), p. 14.
167 MacKinnon (1983), p. 638.
168 Dotson (2012), p. 14.
169 Dotson (2012), p. 17.
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audience who cannot see such basic details as the existence and relevance of oppression. Even the
attempt, I believe, would hamper the effort. We would risk getting stuck on the attempt to justify
the positions we  need to start at, even when, with the world as it is right now, it would not be
possible to rationally get some supposedly universal audience to that position.170
Barbara Christian, a Black feminist working in literature, has written “what I write and
how I write is done in order to save my own life” and “My readings do presuppose a need, a
desire among folk who like me also want to save their own lives.”171 I believe we must make room
for such writing in philosophy, but by this I do not mean just that we should accept particular and
personal philosophy among, or as equal to, the universal philosophy that currently dominates. An
acceptance  of  particular  philosophy must  bring  into  question  the  universality  of  all  currently
practised philosophy. A cis man's feeling that he can get nothing from hearing about a theory of
transmisogyny may not be strongly different to my lack of interest in a technical solution to Parfit's
repugnant conclusion, or some novel articulation of possible world semantics. The idea that there
is some philosophy that is somehow intrinsically of interest to everyone is an illusion perpetuated
by the skewed demographics of the profession, and the particular processes by which students are
educated into philosophy's existing culture and norms.
That  said,  this  need  not  mean  that  philosophers  may  as  well  split  up,  stop  working
together, or form themselves into exclusive subgroups based on mutual interests and perspectives.
In practice, that situation would not look so different from the current marginalisation of feminist
and critical philosophy within the discipline, left out of courses and seminars just because no one
running them feels any particular interest in the topics. By making room for philosophy that is by
and for particular groups, I do not mean to suggest that other philosophers should simply ignore
their work. By creating philosophy that does not explicitly address itself to the privileged, that
does not seek to start from where they are, that does not foreground or cater to their way of seeing
things, and that challenges or even alienates them, we need not be creating philosophy which is
irrelevant to the privileged, or completely incomprehensible to them. Rather, it seems important that
philosophers – all philosophers – develop ways of listening to, and learning from diverse kinds of
philosophy without  taking  themselves  to  be  authoritatively  positioned to  pronounce  upon,  to
wholly understand and judge that philosophy.
Donna-Dale Marcano has asked of Black feminist philosophy “will it become a discourse in
170 See MacKinnon (1983), p. 638-9.
171 Christian (1987), "The Race for Theory," Cultural Critique 6, p. 61-2.
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which the experiences of black women are in the forefront but does so in such a way that it appeals
to  understanding  that  as  a  philosophy,  it  is  telling  us  something  about  the  world,  about
experiences,  about  philosophy,  for  black  women  but  also  for  philosophers  in  general.  This
universality is what it means to be an authoritative discourse, but it also requires that first the
philosophical  establishment  must  recognize  the  significance  of  such  a  subtopic  as  vital  to  its
understanding of itself.”172 It is important both that we challenge the universality of the familiar,
mainstream  philosophy,  and  that  we  make  clear  the  potential for  wider  relevance  in  what  is
currently marginalised work.
Some ways of making that potential clear should be obvious. In creating philosophy from
their  own experiences  and standpoints,  marginalised  folks  are  not  seeking  just  to  understand
themselves, but also to understand their world, the wider social reality. Engaging with the work of
people of colour seeking to reveal white supremacy will be invaluable for white people, such as
myself,  who  cannot  understand  ourselves  and  our  world  without  understanding  whiteness.
Engaging with feminist work will be essential for men to see and comprehend what it is to be a
man in this world. Similarly for the thought and philosophy of disabled folk, working class people,
queer  people,  trans  folk,  autistic  and  otherwise  neurodivergent  people,  and  so  forth;  and,  of
course, those at the intersections of such marginalised social positions. Though privileged people
are  not  often  encouraged  to  see  or  understand  their  own  privilege,  we  cannot  understand
ourselves without understanding how our privilege shapes us and our world, and we cannot do
that without listening, with humility, to the work of those who lack our privileges. Our work as
philosophers, particularly as moral philosophers, simply cannot be done without both making a
space for, and carefully engaging with the philosophy of oppressed people.
Ultimately, my goal in this chapter, and in this thesis as a whole, has been to challenge
methodologies and cultures of philosophy which do not make room for, or learn from, such non-
ideal philosophy, philosophy which deals non-abstractly with the issues and injustices that arise in
the lives of marginalised and oppressed people. I have also argued for a loose mixture of positive
and  negative  methodological  positions:  for  example,  I  have  argued  against  unconsidered
abstraction and idealisation, and for methodologies which explicitly socially situate the researcher
in relation to their topic. A number of recurring themes have appeared, such as the importance of
intellectual humility,  and of listening to others,  rather than assuming ourselves to be perfectly
172 Marcano (2010), "The Difference That Difference Makes: Black Feminism and Philosophy," in Convergences: 
Black Feminism and Continental Philosophy, Davidson, Gine & Marcano eds. (SUNY Press: Albany), p. 61-2. 
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placed  to  know  everything  philosophically  worth  knowing.  However,  no  single,  complete
methodology has emerged; as I suggested at the outset, this was not my goal. While I believe that
much moral philosophy practised today is deeply, methodologically flawed and limited, I do not
have a single vision for how philosophy must be done, and I see this thesis as more concerned with
expanding, rather than restricting, what we, in practice, count as good philosophy.
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